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OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY



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VOL. XXI

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No. 1

THEOLOGY OF SATISFACTION



IN both traditional and contemporary theology of sin and penance one of the most elusive ideas is that of satisfaction.¹ The term gives a juridical and anthropomorphic sound which easily arouses suspicion. Men today, and Catholics are no exception, do not rest content with words; they want to

¹ Cf. P. Galtier, S. J., "Satisfaction," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* 14, 1 (1939), 1129-1210. The satisfaction for sin can be understood in more than one way, as noted by Fr. Galtier (*art. cit.*, 1134). We may point especially to two meanings: reparation for sin in general as offense against God (in this sense it includes in a way all that is required of a repentant sinner to make good his sin, namely, the whole of his penance whether in or outside the sacrament), and the penitential works, whether sacramental or extra-sacramental, undertaken for already forgiven sins, in view, namely, of the remaining temporal punishments. In the course of this article we shall consider both of these meanings.

P. Galtier (*art. cit.*) traces the history of the doctrine and practice of satisfaction especially in connection with the sacrament of penance. He generally does not go beyond the traditional formulas and ideas of the rather juridical conception of sin and satisfaction.

get at reality. What does it mean to offer God satisfaction for sin? We are told and we believe that Christ worked our salvation by way of satisfaction: He satisfied for the sins of mankind.² To His satisfaction we must join ours; our penitential works of prayer, fasting, almsgiving, united to Christ's satisfaction, atone for our forgiven sins.³ Further, as for ourselves so also for other people are we invited to offer satisfaction; we are called to share and imitate in our own small way the vicarious satisfaction of the Redeemer. This idea of vicarious satisfaction underlies the Catholic doctrine and practice of indulgences. It is central in one essential aspect of the devotion to the Sacred Heart, that of reparation.⁴ And it has suscitated the practice of the heroic act of charity by which one foregoes all satisfactory value of one's good works (and indulgences offered for one after death) in favor of the souls in purgatory—a practice that meets with the approval of the Church.⁵

These few facts show if anything how basic the notion of satisfaction is in Catholic doctrine and practice. But that notion raises a number of difficulties. The very idea of offering God a compensation for sin is intriguing and seems to convey little meaning.⁶ God cannot be harmed by sin nor gain anything from the compensation we offer Him: what then does it mean to satisfy for the offense against God? And if after Trent we say that by our satisfaction, whether sacramental or extra-sacramental, we pay off the debt of temporal punishment that may remain for forgiven sins,⁷ then the question arises what this "*reatus poenae temporalis*," divested of its juridical and anthropomorphic connotations of paying a debt (to whom?),

² *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 3; Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, 799.

³ Cf. Council of Trent, Denzinger, 904-6, 923-25.

⁴ Pius XI, encycl. *Miserentissimus* of May 8, 1928; AAS 20 (1928), 165-78.

⁵ Cf. A. Bride, "Acte héroïque de charité," *Catholicisme* 1 (1948), 85 f.; *Enchiridion indulgentiarum. Preces et Pia Opera*, ed. 2 (Rome, 1952), n. 593.

⁶ Satisfaction means compensating for sin by doing or undergoing something painful which reestablishes the order upset by sin, offering God the equivalent of or something better than what sin "withdrew" from Him, namely, His honor and service; cf. *Summa Theol.*, *Suppl.*, q. 12, a. 3.

⁷ Cf. Denzinger, 902-6, 823.

actually means. Even when both these ideas of satisfaction can be made acceptable, there still remains the question of the mutual connection between making good the offense against God, and paying off the debt of temporal punishment.

Other difficulties arise from the notion of vicarious satisfaction. This supposes that the satisfactory value of our good works can be dissociated from their meritorious value, the latter being personal and not transferable.⁸ And what does the intention of satisfying for the sins of other people effect in them? Can we offer satisfaction for their offense against God if they themselves do not care, as is supposed in the reparation of the Sacred Heart devotion?⁹ Is it possible to renounce all the satisfactory value of one's good works and while increasing in charity and merit accumulate, as it were, an indefinite amount of unpaid temporal punishment?¹⁰ Should not growth in grace of itself decrease one's debt of temporal punishment? What exactly is meant by this debt to be paid here or hereafter?

⁸ According to common theological teaching, we cannot merit for other people *de condigno*, but only *de congruo*, and to the extent that our meritorious works are first of all a condign merit for ourselves and in the second place at the same time a merit of congruity in favor of others. Our condign merit is strictly personal—only Christ, Head of the Mystical Body, could merit *de condigno* for us. In contrast to this, satisfaction does not seem to be personal but rather transferable. In what sense can we satisfy for the sins of others: compensating for their offenses against God, or paying off their debt of temporal punishments? When we do so, is that satisfaction (after the manner of merit) first of all a personal satisfaction *de condigno* for ourselves and secondarily a satisfaction *de congruo* for others? Or is the case of satisfaction different from that of merit, and why?

⁹ Cf. Pius XI, encycl. *Miserentissimus*, AAS 20 (1928), 169-73; cf. K. Rahner, "Einige Thesen zur Theologie der Herz-Jesu-verehrung," in J. Stierli, *Cor Salvatoris. Wege zur Herz-Jesu-Verehrung* (Freiburg, 1954), 166-99; especially 188-91.

¹⁰ There is a difficulty in conceiving this supposed discrepancy between growth in grace and charity essential to merit, and permanence (or even increase?) of the debt of temporal punishment. It would seem that it is not possible to grow in the love of God without *ipso facto* lessening one's debt of punishment. This would involve that satisfaction is not less personal than merit. A concrete case of this difficulty is given in the state of souls in purgatory: does the perfection of their charity for God measure their sufferings (intensity and duration), or is there no direct proportion between the two, in such manner that souls with a more perfect charity can have a greater purgatory than others with a lesser love of God? The latter alternative would follow on the supposed dissociation between merit and satisfaction.

These and more similar questions point to the complexity of the problem. Basic to both satisfaction in general and to vicarious satisfaction is the theology of sin itself. Two notions especially are to be considered here, that of sin as offense against God, and that of the liability to temporal punishment for forgiven sins.¹¹ If we can say what objective reality these express, then we should be able to detect their mutual connection and to say what satisfaction does to them. This should also give one element for the solution of the question of vicarious satisfaction, the two other elements being the relation of satisfaction to merit, and the social aspect or transferability of satisfaction.

Sin as Offense Against God

It is traditional Catholic doctrine, recalled recently by Pius XII in *Humani generis*, that sin is a real offense against God.¹² It is not merely a moral disorder against reason or nature; it of necessity involves a theological dimension. One cannot knowingly and wilfully transgress God's commandment without at the same time, independently of one's explicit intention, offending against God.¹³ Yet, no less plain is it from the teaching of the faith on God's transcendence and immutability, that sin cannot touch nor harm Him. Nor can He be offended after the manner of men whose goodwill changes to displeasure and anger against the offender and who break off good relations with him till he apologizes and repairs his fault. God's anger and displeasure, mentioned in Holy Scripture and Tradition, do not evidently designate any psychological change in Him; they only express the objective change in the sinners who no longer receive the gifts of God's love which they refused by sinning.¹⁴ But then, if the whole objective harm done by sin is in the

¹¹ Both of these notions are on the face of them rather anthropomorphic. In what sense can God be offended? What is the meaning of a paying a debt for forgiven sins?

¹² AAS 42 (1950), 570; cf. Denzinger 3018.

¹³ Cf. Pius XII, allocution to Lenten preachers, February 22, 1944, AAS 36 (1944), 73.

¹⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 2; *De Verit.*, q. 28, a. 2.

sinner only and sin actually is "*malum hominis*," what do we mean by saying that this very loss of grace is first of all an offense against God and sin is in the first place "*malum Dei*?"¹⁵

It would not seem enough to say that God is offended according to a right moral estimate, or that the very refusal of His gifts is an offense against the Giver. This explanation, apparently, does not go beyond an anthropomorphic way of conceiving the offense against God. What *reality* does the phrase express?¹⁶ The answer seems to lie in the relative essence of grace (and basically of our creaturehood; but we need not here enter into this consideration). A constant tradition in Catholic teaching and theology has it that sanctifying grace, besides and, in a way, before being a "quality" in the just souls, unites God's adopted sons to their Father and entails or presupposes the inhabitation of the Holy Trinity. In other words, the gifts of created grace are inseparable from the uncreated Grace or from union with God. Grace, therefore, as Fr. Mersch put it, is of its nature an "entity of union," a link with God. Or, for those who can see their way to accept the formula of Fr. de la Taille, grace is a created actuation produced in the just souls in their very union with the uncreated Act.¹⁷ Accordingly, it is impossible to reject grace by sinning without breaking off this relation of union with God. This relation, evidently, is unilateral and not mutual (as is every relation between creatures and God); it is a real relation of the soul to God, and only a relation of reason from God to the soul. And that is why the breaking off of this relation by sin does not effect God in Himself (His transcendence is fully safeguarded). But

¹⁵ Cf. our article, "Offence against God," *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, 1957. We summarize here the substance of the solution given there.

¹⁶ Cf. Journet, "Sin as Fault and as Offence," *Conflict and Light* (London, 1952), 8. An offense among men does real harm to the offended one, even when it does not result in physical loss for him, by the injury of a moral good which is the honor and esteem due to him. But to transpose these moral considerations in God is little less than anthropomorphism. Offense of God must be expressed in some ontological reality, as the basis and reason of our speaking of offense against God.

¹⁷ For detail references, cf. art. in *Ir. Eccl. Rec.*, 1957.

because that relation is real in us and sin breaks off our relation with God, God is really offended by sin. The phrase "offense against God" expresses therefore the objective reality of the sinner who through his own fault is no longer really united with God as he was before losing grace. It expresses the essentially theological character of sin, or the necessary respect to God involved in sin, based on the essential relative character of grace as a link with God.¹⁸

This explanation, it would seem, shows in what the objective reality of the offense against God consists. God is really offended by sin because our real union with Him through grace is broken off; yet He remains untouched in Himself because His relation to us is only of reason. To speak of offense against God is therefore no mere anthropomorphism; it is a necessary manner of expressing the reality of sin.

Satisfaction for the Offense against God

If the above explanation is acceptable, then it is also necessary to speak of the satisfaction to be made for the offense against God. Satisfaction, St. Thomas says, regards sin as offense against God.¹⁹ It is a "*recompensatio offensae*," a making up for the offense; it consists in giving the offended person something he loves as much or more than he hates the offense.²⁰ What does this mean in the case of an offense against God? Since this offense consists in man's breaking off his real relation to God, compensating for it will demand the restoration of this relation. What can and must a sinner do for that purpose?

God alone can effectively restore the union of man with

¹⁸ Accordingly, the offense is *real*, or there is an ontological reality expressed by the phrase 'offense against God,' without involving a real harm to God Himself (this is evidently impossible). This paradoxical character of the offense against God rests in the inevitable unilateral character of all our relations to Him.

¹⁹ *IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2 ad 1: "satisfactio non respondet peccato nisi secundum quod est offensa Dei."

²⁰ *Ibid.*, sol. 1; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 2; "ille proprie satisfacit pro offensa qui exhibet offenso id quod aequè vel magis diligit quam oderit offensam."

Him through grace. He is the sole author of grace. But He cannot do so, while respecting man's freedom—and grace does perfect nature after the manner of nature—without the sinner's free co-operation.²¹ There is in fact in the sinner an obstacle to the infusion of grace, namely, his evil will or guilt and what this entails for his whole being. A sinner therefore must remove this obstacle as far as in him lies. He can do so with the help of grace. This is his satisfaction for his offense against God and it implies a twofold element: the breaking of his sinful will, in contrition and all that this entails: sorrow and destestation of sin with a purpose of amendment and readiness to do penance or to take up the penitential works demanded to undo the disorder of sin—all this is the penal or painful aspect of satisfaction;²² its second element is love of God or desire to return to Him, which is the very soul of contrition.²³ The two together, made possible and actual by grace, constitute the unescapable disposition for a sinner to return to the state of grace: they are the satisfaction he must offer to God for his offense against Him, the condition on which God forgives the offense, that is, restores His grace to the repentant sinner.

This satisfaction, it should be noted, is adequate or condign in a certain sense only. Strictly speaking, Christ alone, the Word Incarnate, could and did offer God a condign satisfaction for sin, the infiniteness of sin as offense against the Infinite demanding an infinite satisfaction which only an infinite Person could give.²⁴ From the point of view of the restoration of grace, this means that only Christ could effectively repair fallen man.²⁵ A sinner's satisfaction, when supernaturalized by grace, shares

²¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 3; Trent, Denzinger, 799: "per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum."

²² *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 90, a. 2; Trent, Denzinger, 894, 896, 914, 922 sq.

²³ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 4; Trent, Denzinger, 798 sq., 898. According to St. Thomas, in every justification, whether sacramental or extra-sacramental, the last disposition for the infusion of sanctifying grace is contrition perfected by charity. Cf. our article "Two Concepts of Contrition and Attrition," *Theological Studies* 11 (1950), 17 f.

²⁴ *III Sent.*, d. 20, a. 3; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 1, a. 2 c and ad 2.

²⁵ Cf. *Comp. theol.*, c. 200.

in the infiniteness of Christ's satisfaction or in its efficacy in view of restoring grace.²⁶ This means that it is from grace as a union with Christ that his loving repentance draws its sufficiency as a disposition—necessary and necessitating—for the re-infusion of sanctifying grace. To that extent and in that sense only it is a condign satisfaction, its condignity being Christ's gratuitous gift.

The sorrow and pain involved in repentance and penance are an intrinsic compensation for the offense, an immanent reparation of the disorder of sin.²⁷ When this disorder of sin is seen and acknowledged as such, it naturally reveals itself as pain, and this is a beginning of the restoration of the order. In the present sacramental economy, penance cannot be effective in Christians for the compensation and remission of the offense against God unless it be sacramentalized, either in fact or at least in desire, by its submission to and formation by the power of the keys.²⁸ God now grants His pardon through the Church, continuing Christ's action in the ministry of the priest. The penitent's co-operation with the priest constitutes the sacrament, Christ's instrument in re-infusing grace.²⁹ And so the sinner's satisfaction for the offense against God now includes submission to the Church as part of the compensation for the disorder of sin. The Church in Christ's name demands or imposes a penance; its actual fulfilment, however, is not required as satisfaction for the offense as such which is forgiven before; only the readiness to fulfil it is necessary.³⁰ The proper effect of its fulfilment regards the liability to a temporal punishment which may remain after the reparation and remission of the offense.

²⁶ *IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 2 ad 1; a. 3, sol. 2.

²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, a. 4 sol. 1.

²⁸ Cf. Trent, Denzinger 895, 898, 916.

²⁹ The sacraments produce their effect both by virtue of the form and of the matter; and the acts of the penitent are the matter of the sacrament. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 84, a. 2; compare Trent, Denzinger, 896.

³⁰ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 90, a. 2 ad 2: "satisfactio confert gratiam prout est in proposito. . . ."

Debt of Temporal Punishment

We have it from the definition of the Council of Trent that in the case of justification through the sacrament of penance, the debt of temporal punishment, "*reatus poenae temporalis*," is not always remitted together with the guilt of sin and the debt of the eternal punishment.³¹ The Council also hints that generally, "*plerumque*," such a debt remains,³² the case of an intense repentance remitting every debt of punishment, as proposed and explained by St. Thomas,³³ being more or less exceptional. It also defined that the sacramental and extra-sacramental penances done after the forgiveness of one's sins go to pay off that debt.³⁴ And St. Thomas had given the theology of this payment.³⁵

But we may well ask: What is this debt of temporal punishment? And how is it "paid" or "remitted," these being the two ways traditionally given of doing away with it?

If mortal sin is a voluntary turning away from God and a turning to a creature as to one's end—a move which normally is not only an act of the free will but involves in a way the whole man, soul and body—³⁶ then the cessation of the state of sin demands the voluntary re-turn to God and the voluntary turning away from the creature. The return to God in repentant love entails the remission of sin as offense against God or as guilt and of the debt of the eternal punishment (this cannot be "paid off," it can cease only by forgiveness). The two, "*reatus culpae*" and "*reatus poenae aeternae*," go together as two aspects of one reality, the voluntary loss of sanctifying grace; they are also forgiven at one. Their remission is accomplished in God's pardon or in the re-infusion of sanctifying grace.³⁷

³¹ Denzinger, 840, 922.

³² *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 158.

³³ Denzinger, 925.

³⁴ Denzinger, 923.

³⁵ *IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1 and 2.

³⁶ Cf. v. g., St. Thomas' teaching on the potencies that can be the seat of sin, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 74.

³⁷ Cf. Denzinger, 807, 840.

The turning away from the creature is a more complex reality. Disorderly and sinful attachment to a creature is not only the fact of the free will, it also involves the will as nature and the whole composite being of the sinner with its sensitive appetite and its sort of inertia that goes together with but does not fully obey the free will. When the attachment of the free will ceases, in consequence of the free act of repentance, the "agglutination" ³⁸ of the will as nature and of the sensitive appetitive powers may still persist. Perhaps it generally does. This attachment, due to the resistance nature opposes to the free acts of the person, is no longer wilful and guilty, but it is a disorder that must be set right, by a move more passive than active (since our free resolve is not sufficient to make it), as it were, in the opposite direction. This move will have the character of a punishment or of a pain following on moral evil. Accordingly, the disorderly (though unwilful) attachment to the creatures, persisting after the forgiveness of the sin, is the objective reality of the "*reatus poenae temporalis*." ³⁹ It is the reason of the necessity of a temporal punishment. There is in the forgiven sinner an ontological necessity of a painful return to the right order which is the metaphysical expression of the debt of temporal punishment.

This debt, it is said, can neither be paid off nor remitted. It is not difficult to see what paying off here means. It consists in wilfully undergoing the painful process or move contrary to the disorderly attachment to the creature which must result in the freedom of the re-established order. Not so easy is it to see what remission of the debt means and how this also results in a like return to orderly freedom.

³⁸ The term is suggested by St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 86, a. 1 ad 2: "amor rei amatae animam conglutinat."

³⁹ This disorderly attachment is in a way itself a beginning of punishment when it is realized as a disorder, a realization which is painful and is the first step towards its removal. But it is the removal of it, the loosening of the adhesion as it were, which is the painful process of the punishment. It is imperative to distinguish between the objective foundation of the necessity of a punishment or of the "*reatus poenae*," namely, the disorderly attachment, and the punishment itself or the removal of the attachment, the "*poena*."

Satisfaction for Temporal Punishment

Satisfaction for temporal punishment for sin aims at suppressing the necessity of the painful return to the right order in one's attitude towards the creatures by establishing the penitent in a state of detachment. In this state no temporal punishment is due any longer. This is done, Trent says, by the penitential works which are either imposed in the sacrament of penance or freely taken up by the penitent, and by the voluntary acceptance of the God-sent trials of life.⁴⁰ When none of these have been done during one's lifetime, then the temporal punishment remains to be paid off in purgatory,⁴¹ whose offerings cleanse the souls (or detach them) by way of satisfassion.

In both the works of penance and the sufferings of purgatory satisfaction or compensation for the temporal punishment is actually made: the penitents and the souls in purgatory actually go through the process of detachment and when this is done are freed from the necessity of undergoing further temporal punishment. Both of them pay off their debt. There is, however, an important difference between the two ways of "detaching." Penitential works satisfying for the temporal punishments due for forgiven sins are good works done in the state of grace and so are meritorious or bring with them a growth in grace and charity. Inversely all meritorious works also involve a satisfactory value.⁴² But in the satisfassion of purgatory there is no such increase in grace; the satisfactory value of these sufferings stands in isolation from merit. The only effect of their satisfassion consists in paying off the debt of the temporal punishments due, that is, in detaching the souls from all inordinate creaturely affection.⁴³

⁴⁰ Denzinger, 906, 923; 807, 840.

⁴¹ Denzinger, 840.

⁴² Cf. Denzinger, 842. We need not enter here into the question about the fervor required, according to Thomistic teaching, for the actual acquisition of an increase in grace.

⁴³ The holy souls are no longer "*viatores*," since the pilgrimage ends with death; yet they are not in the possession of the End—a rather paradoxical state.

We may well inquire after the relation between the meritorious and the satisfactory value of penitential works or of good works in general. Their meritorious value, as common Catholic teaching has it, springs from the charity that "forms" or commands them; their satisfactory value from the painful element they generally involve.⁴⁴ This already suggests that there need not be a strict proportion between the two; the degree of merit does not by itself determine the measure of satisfaction. Does this possible discrepancy hint at another difference between merit and satisfaction, the first being strictly personal and the other transferable? The point will be examined presently.

What we must ask now is whether there is another way of being freed from the necessity of temporal punishment than by actually undergoing it, that is, than by offering satisfaction for it. The traditional teaching about "remission" of the debt of temporal punishment seems to suggest this; the phrase seems to say that the debt can be scrapped without having been paid.⁴⁵ This is said to happen in the case of indulgences,⁴⁶ or even when we receive absolution (this always remits part, at least, of the debt of temporal punishment).⁴⁷

It should be noted that the final outcome of this remission must be the same as that of the satisfaction made for a debt of temporal punishment, namely, the state of detachment and freedom. The difference between the two processes, on the face of them, is that the way of satisfaction is a painful one and that of remission does not involve this painful aspect—at any rate it does not do so "*formaliter*"; perhaps it may be said to do so "*aequivalenter*" or even "*eminenter*," that is, by another and higher process of detaching which leads to the same result without the painful character of the other. An example of such

⁴⁴ Charity is the root of all merit, cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 4; satisfaction supposes a penal element, cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1.

⁴⁵ This is suggested by Trent, Denzinger, 840 and 922; and cf. v.g., P. Galtier, *De Paenitentia*, ed. 3, n. 550: "non semper tota poena temporalis remittitur."

⁴⁶ *CIC*, can. 911: "remissio coram Deo poenae temporalis."

⁴⁷ As insinuated in Trent, Denzinger, 904, 922, and before in 807; cf. Galtier, *op. cit.*, 550.

remission is the case of the baptism of adults: if these are well disposed and do not keep any wilful and (venially) guilty attachment, they do obtain, as said by Trent,⁴⁸ and held in common Catholic teaching,⁴⁹ the remission of all debt of temporal punishment. How this must be explained will be examined later.

A case of such painless detaching, or of equivalent and not formal satisfaction for temporal punishment, is that of the penitent whose contrition is so intense and the love which inspires his contrition so ardent that the "attachment" to God, involved in the repentant return to Him, inevitably goes together with detachment from the creature. St. Thomas says that or every remission of guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment remains; all of it is remitted together with the guilt and the debt of eternal punishment.⁵⁰ Such remission clearly is a case of eminent rather than "formal" satisfaction. The case, however, Trent says, is not the normal happening.⁵¹ But even apart from such fervor of contrition, every conversion to God or every remission of guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment entails a partial remission of temporal punishment:⁵² attachment to God normally detaches from creatures, at any rate from inordinate affection and in some measure; though the free act of the will adhering to God does not fully command nature and the senses, yet, a free resolve does have its echo in nature.

The remission of temporal punishment through indulgences

⁴⁸ Denzinger, 807: "ut in baptismo fit," and cf. 904.

⁴⁹ Cf. v. g., Diekamp-Hoffman, *Theologiae Dogmaticae Manuale*, IV, p. 95; who notes that this complete remission of temporal punishments supposes the proper disposition: "Post baptismum igitur etiam poenae temporales propter imperfectam dispositionem suscipientis remanere possunt."

⁵⁰ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 158.

⁵¹ Denzinger, 925.

⁵² Cf. above n. 47; and *IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3: "quanto maior est contritio, tanto magis diminuit poenam." The same idea is implicit in St. Thomas' teaching that a greater charity makes for a greater satisfaction, cf. *ibid.*, d. 20, a. 2, sol. 3: "poena habet vim satisfaciendi, maxime ratione caritatis qua homo eam sustinet."

or in baptism or because of the satisfaction other people offer for one is different. This is less a remission than, so to speak, a paying off by proxy. It raises the question of vicarious satisfaction.

Vicarious Satisfaction

The idea of vicarious satisfaction is commonly accepted in Catholic theology and spirituality. As already hinted, it is basic in a number of current practices of Catholic life.⁵³ Its general meaning looks simple enough, however mysterious may be the reality it expresses. We speak of vicarious satisfaction when one person in a state of grace offers the satisfactory value of his penitential or other good works in reparation and compensation for the sins of others. This is done, for example, in the heroic act of charity in favor of the holy souls or in the reparation practices of the devotion to the Sacred Heart in favor of living sinners. It supposes that the satisfactory value of these good works can be dissociated from their (condign) merit, since the latter is personal and cannot be transferred to another.⁵⁴ This very transferableness of satisfaction is the foundation of indulgences which apply the satisfactions of Christ and of the saints from the treasury of the Church,⁵⁵ and of the remission of temporal punishments in baptism where the satisfactions of Christ free the baptized sinner (if well disposed) from all such debt. In these cases two distinct manners of vicarious satisfaction can be noticed, in keeping with what was said above about satisfaction in general: one person can make satisfaction for another's offenses against God—so in the first place did Christ our Lord on behalf of all sinful mankind,⁵⁶ so do the devotees of the Sacred Heart and in particular the

⁵³ Cf. above p. 1 f.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 6. For others we can merit only by a merit of congruity; cf. our article "Merit and Prayer in the Life of Grace," *The Thomist*, XIX (1956), 446-80, esp. 478.

⁵⁵ Cf. *CIC*, can. 911. On the spiritual treasury of the Church, cf. v. g., Galtier, *op. cit.*, 590 sqq; on indulgences, *ibid.*, 598.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 2.

so-called victim souls.⁵⁷ Or the satisfactions of one person can be applied in "payment" of the debt of temporal punishment owing by other people—this is the case in indulgences,⁵⁸ or in the heroic act, or also in penitential works offered for forgiven sinners.

However certain and accepted the idea of vicarious satisfaction may be, it is nonetheless very mysterious. It is not easy to see or to say what objective reality the phrase expresses freed from all undue anthropomorphism. We may make allowance for an inevitable and necessary "personalistic" connotation which springs from the very fact that religion is a personal relation between God and men. The question is this: what happens objectively in a sinner or in a forgiven sinner when another person in a state of grace "satisfies" for him or when the satisfactions of others are applied to him? And more especially, since the outcome of it apparently should be that a sinner be forgiven his offenses against God or remitted his debt of temporal punishment, how can the ontological change supposed in the forgiveness of the offense or the cessation of the debt of punishment happen in a sinner not through an act of penance of his own but through that of another person?

Christ's Satisfaction for Mankind

A unique case of vicarious satisfaction is that of Christ satisfying for the sins of mankind. It is unique to the extent of not being properly "vicarious," in the sense that Christ did not do for us something which we ourselves could have done; no, He did on our behalf what no mere man could have done.⁵⁹ He "repaired" our fallen nature and effected an ontological change in our nature, opening it again to the inflow of grace.⁶⁰ He alone, because He was a divine Person, could have this

⁵⁷ Cf. on this point K. Rahner, *op. cit.*, 188-91.

⁵⁸ The spiritual treasury of the Church, according to common teaching, proposed v. g., by P. Galtier, *op. cit.*, th. 49, is "constans ex satisfactionibus Christi et sanctorum." But it is not easy to see what this means ontologically. Cf. below, n. 104.

⁵⁹ Cf. above, n. 24, and *De Verit.*, q. 29, a. 7.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Comp. theol.*, cc. 200 and 239.

universal effect on the whole race. In terms of satisfaction this meant that He offered God a condign and superabundant compensation for men's sins.⁶¹ His passion and death were of infinite satisfactory value, being those of a divine Person. Christ's satisfaction is unique also because it is a sort of general or universal cause in the order of satisfaction, being the basis of every other satisfaction, as St. Thomas taught and Trent after him.⁶² It is in virtue of Christ's satisfaction that ours can be acceptable to God and share in its infiniteness and condignity, that is, be effective for the forgiveness of our offenses against God or the paying off of our debt of punishment.⁶³ It is unique, finally, because it is and could not but be purely altruistic, since Christ Himself was the sinless One, in need of no satisfaction whatever. His satisfaction of its very essence was meant for His members, to restore their union with God by grace and to do so fully, freeing them from all disorderly attachment to creatures. The objective reality of Christ's satisfaction, therefore, was our redemption "*in actu primo*," as the common phrase goes, namely, the establishment within our human race of the open source of grace. Christ *by right* re-connected our link with God in grace.⁶⁴

It is important to note that the result of Christ's satisfaction was not our redemption "*in actu secundo*," namely, that we were again *in fact* united with God in grace. As common Catholic teaching says, the objective redemption "*in actu primo*" has still to be applied to each individual person who is to be a member of Christ.⁶⁵ An ontological contact with Christ must be established for the inflow of grace to happen, and this supposes on the part of men a voluntary move, either of their personal free wills in the case of adult sinners,⁶⁶ or of the Church acting through her ministers in the case of the

⁶¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 2.

⁶² Cf. *ibid.*, q. 86, a. 6 ad 3; cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 3; Denzinger, 904, 923 sq.

⁶³ Cf. above, n. 26.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 49, a. 1 ad 3, ad 4, ad 5; a. 3 ad 1.

⁶⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, *loc. cit.* and q. 62, a. 5.

⁶⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 3 and a. 4.

baptism of infants (the case of infants, however, does not fall within our present purpose, since there can be no question on their part of personal offense against God or of debt of temporal punishment which also supposes personal sin). Accordingly, the satisfaction of Christ on behalf of sinful mankind, for all its being infinite and superabundant, does not actually have its objective effect on His individual sinful members without their co-operation. He did not satisfy for their sins so as to dispense with their own satisfactions.⁶⁷ If such is the case of Christ's vicarious satisfaction, much more will it be so for the satisfaction His members may offer on behalf of their brethren.

Our Satisfaction in Favor of Others

Catholic doctrine has it that the just are able to offer to God satisfaction for sin in favor of other people. The reason for this possibility lies, according to St. Thomas, in the bond of charity that exists between the members of Christ's Mystical Body.⁶⁸ Because they are one by an objective link, namely, the link of grace or of sharing in the same grace of Christ, they can profit each other spiritually, both in the order of merit or of growth in grace⁶⁹ and in that of satisfaction or of reparation for sin. The objective link of charity exists either mutually between those in a state of grace, or unilaterally from the just to the sinners.

Does this mean that the just can satisfy for the sins of others in a condign manner just as they can do so in their own favor for their own sins (of course, this condignity being relative, and due only to grace)? If so, then there would be a contrast between merit and satisfaction. Merit can be condign solely in favor of the person who merits; in favor of others the just can merit only in a congruous manner.⁷⁰ With regard to satis-

⁶⁷ Cf. Trent, Denzinger, 904.

⁶⁸ *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 2, sol. 3; *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 158; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 2 ad 1.

⁶⁹ On meriting for others, cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 6; and our article cited above, n. 54, esp. 478 f.

⁷⁰ *Art. cit.*; also "Merit of Congruity," *Bijdragen*, 1957.

faction, traditional teaching may seem to suggest, for rarely perhaps the question is asked in so many words, that vicarious satisfaction works its effect in some sort of condign manner. At any rate, it seems to be more or less taken for granted that such satisfaction is not merely a fittingness of remission of the offense or punishment but really effects what it is meant to.

Whatever may be the terms in use, from the very example of Christ's satisfaction in our behalf⁷¹ we should say that our satisfaction in favor of others does not have its effect on them without their co-operation. They cannot be freed from sin, whether as offense or as debt of punishment, unless they wish to be and, with the help of grace, dispose themselves to this liberation. Accordingly, satisfaction in favor of others does not work its effect in them automatically or infallibly but only conditionally and dependently on their co-operation.⁷² We shall have to examine what this co-operation must be, according to different cases of vicarious satisfaction. But whether we call this satisfaction condign or congruous, is little more than a question of words. If we compare it with merit, since merit in favor of others is only of congruity, one reason for saying so being that it cannot be effective in them without their co-operation, it would seem to be more consistent, if we wish to use this terminology for satisfaction, to say that vicarious satisfaction is of congruity, rather than of condignity.

But then we must ask the question: Is the case of satisfaction similar to that of merit also in this respect that, just as one does not merit for other people in a congruous manner except dependently on condign merit in one's own favor,⁷³ so also one would not satisfy for others except dependently on satisfaction in one's own favor? This raises the question of the transferableness of satisfaction. If one can offer satisfaction in

⁷¹ Cf. above, nn. 65 f.

⁷² The analogy with our merit in favor of others could help to illustrate the point; cf. *art. cit.*, *The Thomist*, p. 479.

⁷³ Cf. *art. cit.*, 478; v. g., *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 2, sol. 3 ad 3: "ille qui ex caritate pro alio meretur saltem merito congrui, etiam sibi magis meretur."

favor of other people without at the same time and in the first place satisfying for oneself, then we may say that the satisfaction of our good works is transferable.⁷⁴ But if satisfaction for others is so to say only an extension of satisfaction for one's own sins in the sense that it exists only in dependence on satisfaction for oneself, then one cannot speak of transferableness of satisfaction.

Transferable and Not-Transferable Satisfaction

The case is conceivable, and we may say that it is no doubt actual in saints and saintly persons, in which people who perform penitential or other good works are not in need of satisfaction for their own sins, the temporal punishments for eventual forgiven sins having been paid or remitted completely. In that case, the satisfactory value of their works would be all to the profit of others in whom it could and would have an objective effect (conditioned, however, by their cooperation). This satisfaction then would be transferable. For those, however, who are in need of satisfaction for their own sins, it would seem that of its nature the satisfactory value of their good works will first profit them, and others only in the second place according to a manner of congruity arising from the link of charity which unites them to the performers of satisfactory works.⁷⁵

It is about the second category of people that the question arises: Does the intention of freely renouncing the satisfactory value of their good works in favor of others alter the situation? It does.⁷⁶ Both the practice of Catholic life mentioned above and the very nature of things point to that. Victim souls or

⁷⁴ We should not conceive this transferableness in too physical a way, as though "something" passed over from the just who offer vicarious satisfaction to the sinners for whom they offer. It actually says only that the satisfactory causality of our good works attains the sinners objectively and produces some effect in them.

⁷⁵ Cf., however, what St. Thomas says, *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 2, sol. 3 ad 3: "non autem qui pro alio satisfacit, pro se satisfacit: quia illa quantitas poenae non sufficit ad utrumque." The answer will be given presently.

⁷⁶ Cf. St. Thomas, *ibid.*, a. 2, sol. 3.

those who live by the heroic act believe they do in fact cede their satisfactions to other people. And we can see how and to what extent it is actually possible to do so.

Good works done in a state of grace are both meritorious and satisfactory. They increase our love for and attachment to God and they detach us from creatures. Their meritorious value is measured by the charity that inspires them, their satisfactory efficacy by their penal or painful side.⁷⁷ The growth in attachment to God involves a degree of detachment from creatures and this is inseparable from merit.⁷⁸ If we call this detachment satisfaction, and there is no reason not to do so, then this measure of satisfaction is inseparable from the merit of the good actions. It is personal and not transferable. The intention of the doer does not alter this nature of the things. But the satisfaction which goes beyond this degree and has its effect from the painful element involved in the good works does not have this necessary connection with their merit and with the growth in charity they produce. A high degree of charity can go together with a greater measure of liability to temporal punishments owing for un sinful attachment than a lower degree of charity in one who sinned less but also loved and merited less.⁷⁹ To the extent, therefore, that satisfaction is not necessarily connected with merit it can be renounced. For a condition of its effectiveness is the desire to profit by it. Though the disorderly attachment which the satisfaction is meant to undo is not properly voluntary and sinful, and is not taken away except by passive purification, yet one cannot get detached against one's own will,⁸⁰ as appears, for example, in trials,

⁷⁷ Cf. above, n. 44.

⁷⁸ Forgiveness of the guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment regularly entail some remission of temporal punishment, cf. above, nn. 47 and 52.

⁷⁹ Cf. St. Thomas, *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 2, sol. 3 ad 1: "quandoque ille qui est melior, habet maioris poenae reatum."

⁸⁰ The reason for saying so is the following: an involuntary attachment often remains after the forgiveness of sin because the free will, retracting the guilt, has no full command over nature and its powers; these do not fully obey the will, and so remain inordinately attached. But the desire of undoing this attachment

exterior or interior, which one does not accept but rather revolts against. These do not detach one; they rather increase the attachment. Similarly, when one, for a very different reason, renounces the satisfactory value of his good works, he does not desire to be freed from the sinful attachment that constitutes the liability to temporal punishment; he out of charity for the neighbor transfers to them his satisfactions and keeps his own debts⁸¹ (not fully, however, since part of them is equivalently paid by his growth in charity). This analysis thus shows both the possibility and the measure of the transferableness of satisfaction.

Effects of Vicarious Satisfaction

If then the just are able to offer satisfaction for other people, what is required on the part of these to make vicarious satisfaction effective, and what exactly does it effect in them? That it does require some co-operation from them and cannot profit them if they refuse to be profited, should be clear from the above.⁸² Just as no one is justified against his will, so no one can be freed from the consequences of sin if he does not want to be. But the sinner's cooperation and the effect in him of vicarious satisfaction is different in the case of satisfaction for the offenses against God and that of satisfaction for the debt of temporal punishment. In the above discussion of transferable satisfaction it was in the first place, if not exclusively, the satisfaction for temporal punishment that was considered.

Little remains to be added to what was said about the disposition or cooperation required on the part of these for whom

or better of having it undone (by some other causality than that of the will) is included in the disposition that made the forgiveness of sin possible. This implies the will to profit by satisfaction, which is a sufficient condition for its effectiveness. But as will be said in the text, one can suspend this desire, out of charity for another, and then satisfaction does no longer operate its effect in him who satisfies. This is, as it were, a refusal to accept wherewith to pay one's debt; cf. St. Thomas, *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 3, sol. 1 ad 1, on indulgences: "datur ei unde debitum solvat."

⁸¹ Cf. St. Thomas, text quoted above, n. 75.

⁸² Cf. n. 80.

vicarious satisfaction is offered in view of their being freed from the liability of temporal punishments. These requirements may be summed up in two conditions. First, that they be in a state of grace.⁸³ The debt of temporal punishment is a remainder of forgiven sins; as long as the guilt of sin has not been repented and remitted, whether of mortal or of venial sin, the debt of punishment cannot be paid. Satisfaction, to be profitable, supposes the state of grace.⁸⁴ From this angle, vicarious satisfaction offered for souls in purgatory can help them, but offered for sinners it remains ineffective. The second condition for the effectiveness of vicarious satisfaction is the readiness and desire of profiting by the satisfaction,⁸⁵ readiness and desire that need not be explicated in words but may remain implicit in the general disposition or resolve to make use of the means for spiritual profit God may provide. This desire is real in the holy souls; or in the just who earnestly fulfil the conditions laid down to gain an indulgence—these profit by the vicarious satisfaction which is applied in the indulgences;⁸⁶ or in adults who receive baptism well-disposed—they are freed from all liability of temporal punishments through the application of Christ's satisfaction.

More intriguing perhaps is the actual reality of the effect of vicarious satisfaction and the way in which it is obtained. This effect must be, as of every satisfaction for a debt of temporal punishment, to detach one from disorderly affection for creatures.⁸⁷ In satisfaction for oneself this detaching is the immanent result of one's going through the painful process of being purified. In vicarious satisfaction, those who are purified

⁸³ Cf. for satisfaction in general, *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 158: "dummodo uterque in caritate fuerit"; for indulgences, *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 5, sol. 1: "indulgentiae non valent existentibus in mortali," cf. Galtier, *op. cit.*, 620.

⁸⁴ *IV Sent.*, d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2, "sine caritate opera facta non sunt satisfactoria."

⁸⁵ Cf. above, n. 80.

⁸⁶ The intention to gain the indulgence, contained at least in the careful fulfillment of the conditions, is such a desire.

⁸⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 87, a. 5.

by it do not pass through this painful process but profit by the suffering of others with whom they are linked by charity as members of one Body. By virtue of this bond they are being detached by an equivalent process being included in the charity of others who wish and do them this spiritual favor.⁸⁸ All that they themselves do is to accept or not to refuse this fraternal help. Accordingly, in an analogous way to that by which fervent love of God includes a degree of satisfaction for one's personal debt of temporal punishment, or detaches one in some degree (or even, in exceptional cases of fervent contrition, fully and with complete remission of all temporal punishments), does the love of the neighbor by which one person wishes another freedom from these punishments and offers satisfaction for them, one member offering and paying for another, operate in him by way of vicarious satisfaction, included in and offered because of that love, his detachment from the inordinate affection which is the basis of his liability to temporal punishment. It operates this effect not "*formaliter*" but "*eminenter*." We should only note that this reasoning shows indeed the possibility and reality of this effect of vicarious satisfaction but leaves us in the dark about the measure in which this effect is obtained. That this is rightly so may be derived from what the Church and Catholic theology hold about our ignorance concerning the actual effect of indulgences. Of this particular case of vicarious satisfaction it is generally agreed that we do not know the measure of its actual effect.⁸⁹

One may ask: does this detaching and freeing from inordinate attachment show itself in a man's psychology? Not necessarily. Psychological habits rarely change suddenly, and the work of grace or of supernature respects the laws and ways of nature. An adult, for example, who receives baptism, for all his being

⁸⁸ This seems to be the natural explanation of St. Thomas' saying that one can pay a debt through one's friends, *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 2 ad 1; or about "compassion" with one's friend, *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 158.

⁸⁹ Cf. v.g., Galtier, *op. cit.*, n. 617 (for indulgences applied "*per modum suffragii*"); for other indulgences, see *Clergy Monthly* 18 (1954), 262.

freed from all debt of temporal punishment, is not as by magic freed from sinful habits he may have contracted. Yet, there is an objective or ontological change in him which, if he co-operates with the grace he is certain to be offered, will slowly have an effect in his psychology. The change is this: the debt of temporal punishment being remitted by virtue of Christ's satisfactions and so the inordinate attachment having been remedied ontologically, in such a way that it is no longer there as a basis for a necessity of punishment, what remains in his psychology by way of unhealthy disposition is there only as a defect—not as a “*poena*” but only as a “*poenalitas*”—which will be an occasion for struggle and victory but not a liability to punishment.⁹⁰ Much as, according to the Council of Trent and to Catholic theological tradition, after baptism concupiscence remains,⁹¹ and with it all the “*poenalitates*” or con-natural defects of our nature; but these are no longer sin or punishment of sin⁹² (the proof being that, if a baptized infant comes to die, he goes straight to heaven, concupiscence being no liability to the purification of purgatory), but only, as Trent says, an occasion for struggle and merit.⁹³ In the psychology, therefore, of those who have been freed from a debt of temporal punishment or “detached” from inordinate affection by vicarious satisfaction, there may be no apparent immediate change, yet an ontological change there is, and unless undone by subsequent sin or infidelity, this will gradually show also its psychological effects.

Vicarious Satisfaction for Offenses against God

What does vicarious satisfaction for the offenses against God effect in the sinners for whom it is offered? It should have some

⁹⁰ This is not a mere play of words. The moral connotation involved in the idea and reality of punishment is absent from what is only a defect, a “*poenalitas*,” and this makes a difference, even in the painful aspect of the two realities, which perhaps are materially the same.

⁹¹ Denzinger, 792.

⁹² Cf. Diekamp-Hoffman, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 95.

⁹³ Denzinger, 792.

objective effect in them, else apparently it would hardly have any meaning beyond a verbal offering and the spiritual fruit it may have in those who offer it. For it does not make any real reparation to God unless it somehow helps to re-establish the relation of men to God which was broken off by sin. As explained already, the reparation of the offense against God does not demand or aim at anything else but to bring about the reinfusion of sanctifying grace in the sinners—this reinfusion repairs the offense and restores God's honor and glory.⁹⁴ Satisfaction achieves that aim by arousing in them the disposition of repentance and all that it entails, which is necessary for, and with the help of grace, necessitating the reinfusion of grace. That is the way in which it makes good for the offense.

The question is then: Does the satisfaction which the just offer for the sinner's offenses against God—as they do, for instance, in the reparation practices of the Sacred Heart devotion—help to bring about in the sinners the repentance necessary for their return to God's grace, and if so, to what extent and in what manner? It does, and it is not impossible to show how it does. From the very practice of reparation favored and fostered by the Church we must conclude that this vicarious satisfaction has its proper effect, else those acts of reparation and more still the penitential works offered in reparation for the sins of the world would be meaningless.⁹⁵ Those practices mean to make reparation for the offenses against God and they cannot actually do so except by contributing somehow to the conversion of the sinners, not only by "compensating" for the sins of other people by a greater fervor.⁹⁶ This increase of fervor and grace is no doubt a normal result of the practice of reparation,⁹⁷ but it would seem an all too human way of calculating

⁹⁴ Cf. above, nn. 21-23.

⁹⁵ Cf. K. Rahner, *op. cit.*, 188-91.

⁹⁶ Perhaps this is said in some acts of reparation. But with K. Rahner (*loc. cit.*) we should note that verbal acts of reparation are only one way, and a secondary one at that, of vicarious satisfaction, the more important one being our sharing in the passion of Christ by penance and suffering.

⁹⁷ According to St. Thomas this seems to be the case for every vicarious satis-

and computing were one to consider this compensation as making up for the sins of other people—by this increased fervor those sins would not be undone in any way. We must also say that the penance of the just does not directly effect or bring about the sinners' reconversion to God in repentant love.⁹⁸ This is all too evident. Not even Christ's satisfaction for the sins of mankind did so. The just cannot properly speaking repent for the sinners, repentance being a personal act for personal sins. They can feel sorry for them and for their sins and have a sincere wish, by way of velleity, that these sins should be undone, but they cannot resolve in their place not to commit these sins any more nor produce in them this sorrow and resolve. And it is only a personal repentance of their own that can dispose sinners for the reinfusion of grace. If the satisfaction offered by the just for sinners can be effective in some way to bring about their repentance, then it does in fact signify an objective reality and help to restore God's glory by their reconversion to Him. It actually does so in a manner analogous to that of Christ's own satisfaction for the sins of mankind. This can be shown in the following manner.

Vicarious satisfaction offered for sinners, to be effective, supposes in those who offer it the state of grace or actual union with Christ from whom all grace derives. This grace, a sharing in Christ's grace, is the root of its effectiveness, just as our merit also is rooted in grace. Accordingly, just as our merit is based on the merit of Christ and derives from Him its condignity, being a participation in the condign merit of Christ, so also our satisfaction (whether for ourselves or for others) is based on the satisfaction of Christ and derives from it its condignity and effectiveness.⁹⁹ When that satisfaction is offered for other sin-

faction; cf. *IV Sent.*, d. 20, a. 2, sol. 3 ad 3: "sibi meretur maius quid quam sit remissio poenae, scil. vitam aeternam."

⁹⁸ Compare St. Thomas, *ibid.*, ad 2: "per contritionem unius alius a culpa non liberatur," and "non potest unus pro alio sacramentum accipere"; or *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 2 ad 1, denying the parity between contrition and confession on the one hand, and satisfaction on the other.

⁹⁹ Cf. Trent, Denzinger, 904: our satisfaction is "*per Christum*," "*in Christo*"; cf. 923; and St. Thomas, above, n. 63.

ners, it contributes to the proper effect of satisfaction which is the repentant and loving return to God, in this case of those other sinners, after the manner of Christ's own satisfaction. Christ's satisfaction repaired the sins of mankind by making available to all the open source of graces necessary for their return to God.¹⁰⁰ Our sharing in His vicarious satisfaction will imitate this opening of the sources of graces to sinners.¹⁰¹ And this means mainly two things. First, that our vicarious satisfaction for them is a prayer for efficacious graces of conversion in their favor. Their conversion is not possible without these graces; and the only manner in which we can do anything to secure efficacious graces (whether for ourselves or for others) is by way of impetration.¹⁰² Being a prayer in favor of other people, it may happen that it be not heard, because of their indisposition or failure to respond to the invitation of grace.¹⁰³ Secondly, this satisfaction, to the extent that it is transferable, goes to enrich the treasury of the Church, is kept in readiness, as it were, to help those who are willing to draw from it.¹⁰⁴ It will go to help towards the "remission" of the debts of temporal punishment which forgiven sinners owe to God because

¹⁰⁰ Cf. above, nn. 60 f.

¹⁰¹ Christ's satisfaction is the exemplar of ours, cf. *III Sent.*, d. 20, a. 3.

¹⁰² Cf. *art. cit.*, *The Thomist* (1956), esp. p. 473 f.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 479.

¹⁰⁴ As hinted above, n. 58, it is not easy to see how to conceive the ontological reality of this treasury of the Church. We give here an attempt for what it is worth. The union of the faithful who gain indulgences with Christ and the saints through charity (for they must be in a state of grace to gain them) is the basis for their sharing in the satisfactions of the Head and the glorious and saintly members of the Mystical Body. How this charity of Christ and the saints effects the communion in satisfaction, we tried to explain above, pp. 22-23. The apparent difficulty arising from the time factor—these satisfactions are of the past—should not prevent one from seeing that their being outside time, or rather in a manner of duration that is coextensive to our time, makes them our contemporaries in a real, however mysterious, manner. As to the Church's power of disposing of this treasury, we may note besides the more traditional explanation by way of jurisdiction (cf. Galtier, *op. cit.*, 611), the more recent one proposed by B. Poschmann, according to which indulgences of their nature work "*ex opere orantis Ecclesiae*," by way of impetration, not by way of jurisdiction (cf. also *Clergy Monthly*, 1954, 262 f.).

of their remaining inordinate attachments. This twofold fruit of vicarious satisfaction should suffice to show that it has indeed an objective meaning and actually effects something to satisfy for other people's offenses against God.

Conclusion

The above reflections on the theology of satisfaction will have shown, we hope, that the traditional Catholic teaching and practice of personal and vicarious satisfaction for sins, for all its being expressed in what looks like a juridical vocabulary, is based on the objective reality of the invisible world of grace. A juridical terminology is legitimate to the extent that a personalistic expression of our relations to a personal God is necessary and inevitable. These relations are based on the realities of grace and of sin and the remnants of sin; these are ways of being that can be expressed in ontological concepts. The transposition of the juridical concepts into objective or ontological ones, as essayed in this study, is the factual legitimation of their use. It is only the aspect of these juridical terms to which no proper objective reality corresponds any longer that must be said to be anthropomorphic, that is, a human way of expressing a reality that is partly incorrect. But it is enough to be aware of this to an extent inevitable human and imperfect way of our theology to make this anthropomorphism innocuous. We hope this study on satisfaction may contribute to arouse this awareness and thus to show the true meaning of our Catholic doctrine and practice.

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ARISTOTLE'S NOTION OF BEING



IT is today a commonplace that Aristotle's *Metaphysics* suffers from a defect that is fundamental and thus pervasive. The defect in his doctrine, which he termed the science of Being *qua* Being, is located in his very grasp of Being. As a philosopher, it is claimed, Aristotle viewed Being in a wholly non-existential manner. In the chosen language, the Stagirite was an *essentialist* pure and simple. For, it is said, not as possessed of existence but solely with respect to the act of essence was the real perceived and characterized by Aristotle; the existence of things was either not attained or not felt worthy of mention. And thus was determined at its very roots the Aristotelian science of Being *qua* Being. For, having abandoned natural, and perforce lacking biblical, illumination upon the character of Being, his ordered speculations on reality took their departure from and were limited to the quidditative and its derivatives.

In the forefront of those who so interpret Aristotle's thought are M. Etienne Gilson and Fr. Joseph Owens, C.S.S.R. M. Gilson's principal efforts here are to be found in his *Being And Some Philosophers*;¹ those of Fr. Owens, in his work *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics*.² Many of the arguments developed by these thinkers merit careful study. Among them are Fr. Owens' discussion of the *Posterior Analytics* II, 1-10, where Aristotle distinguishes between *whether* a thing is and *what* it is; his discourse on the non-existential nature of the Aristotelian principle of contradiction, and M. Gilson's interpretation of *Gamma* 2, in which Aristotle considers the transcendentals, *ens*, *unum* and *res*. However, a fair beginning will be made if the present discussion is limited to their

¹ Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1949.

² Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1951.

commentaries on one key text, Chapter 1 of Book *Zeta*. It is a decisive text for the question in hand, because in it Aristotle treats, briefly but penetratingly, of substantial and accidental Being. Of the two, M. Gilson offers the more lengthy commentary; in fact, Fr. Owens' views on the passage will have to be filled out by referring back to his interpretation of a related passage in *Gamma* 2. However, in both cases the intent of the author is clear. The argument of each turns upon the meaning, as employed by Aristotle, of "is," "to be" and "Being." The thesis maintained is that these words mean something altogether different from their ordinary English equivalents—"exists," "to exist" and "that which exists." Rather, it is held, these words signify or are taken from the act of essence.

* * *

Among all such introductory passages, *Zeta* 1 contains Aristotle's most probing analysis of Being. Its goal is to establish the primacy of substance as Being, and, along with that, the entirely relative status as Beings of the other categories. The primary Being is spoken of as both a "this" and the "what-is."³ This fact makes for a certain confusion, since it is not evident whether "what-is" signifies the individual substance or its essence. The solution to this problem is not pertinent to our inquiry. However, it does, quite mistakenly, take on importance for M. Gilson.

The first argument showing the primacy of Entity rests on the fact that when we express *what* a thing is, we speak in terms of substance or essence.

While Being is expressed in so many ways, it is obvious that of these primary Being is the *what-is*, which signifies the Entity. For when we say of what *quality* a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say *what* it is, we do not say "white" or "hot" or "three cubits long," but a "man" or a "god."

Substance, then, is the fundamental and the principal reality,

³ Z 1, 1028a11-12.

that which primarily *is*. The remaining categories, on the other hand, are Beings only insofar as they inhere in substance.

And all other things are called Beings because they are, some of them, quantities of Being in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it.

The reference to Entity as the subject of the attributes reveals that by "Being in this primary sense" Aristotle now means the individual substance. And the dependence of these other Beings upon substance is central to the second argument establishing its primacy.

And so one might be in aporia about (Oxford—"might even raise the question") whether "to walk," "to be healthy," "to sit" imply that each of these is Being, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent (*kath'auto pephukos*) or capable of being separated from Entity, but rather, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is a Being. Now these are rather seen to be Being because there is something definite which underlies them (i. e., the Entity or the singular) which is seen in such a predicate; for we never use "good" or "sitting" without implying this.

This argument is perhaps the more decisive of the two. For it derives from what Aristotle sees as the determining characteristic of the primary Being precisely as a Being—its subsistence. Lacking this, it is only as inhering in substance that the accidents *are*; and cognizance of them as Beings involves referring them to their subject.

Aristotle then draws the evident conclusion with respect to the primacy of substance.

Clearly then through it each of the others also is. Therefore that which is Being primarily—i. e., not in a qualified sense but without qualification—must be Entity.

* * *

It is upon the above text that M. Gilson would base an argument purporting to demonstrate that, for Aristotle, Being is taken from essence rather than from existence; or, as he would also express it, that "to be" and "is" signify not existence

but essence. More precisely, his position is based upon one sentence in the first argument on the primacy of Entity and upon a statement by Aristotle that Entity is the primary subject of *Metaphysics*. But while the selection from *Z 1* is brief, the introduction to it is not. It begins with this statement of the problem: "to find out what there is, in any concretely existing thing, which makes it to be an *ousia*, a reality."⁵ He first considers the categories other than substance, but affirms: "Clearly enough, accidents are not the *ousia* we are looking for since their definition does not fulfill the requirements of what truly is."⁶ He then approaches the selections from *Z 1*, and the solution to the problem that they are said to offer, in the form of a question:

We must now proceed in our inquiry and ask Aristotle one more question which, I am afraid, will prove a puzzling one. This very being which reality is inasmuch as it is act, what sort of being is it? In other words, what do we mean exactly by saying of a being in act, that it *is*? The first answer which occurs to the mind is that, in this case at least, to be means to exist, and this, probably, was what it meant to Aristotle himself when, in everyday life, he forgot to philosophize. Nothing is more widespread among men than the certitude of the all-importance of existence: as the saying goes, a living dog is better than a dead king. But we also know that, what they know as men, philosophers are liable to forget as philosophers, and our problem is here to know if, when Aristotle speaks of actual being, what he has in mind is existence or something else.⁷

M. Gilson continues:

To this question, we are fortunate in having Aristotle's own answer, and nothing in it authorizes us to think that actual existence was included in what he called being. Of course, to him, as to us, real things were actually existing things. Aristotle has never stopped to consider existence in itself and then deliberately proceeded to exclude it from being. There is no text in which Aristotle says that actual being is not such in virtue of its own "to be," but we have plenty of texts in which he tells us that to be is something else. In fact, everything goes as if, when he speaks of being, he

⁵ *Z 1*, 1028a13-13, Fr. Owens' trans.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

never thought of existence. He does not reject it, he completely overlooks it. We should therefore look elsewhere for what he considers as actual reality.⁸

In part, the above formulates the problem with precision. Thus the question is: by "to be" does Aristotle mean to exist or does he intend to signify an act of a different order, that of essence? And: is "actual being" such in virtue of its own "to be," where this means existence, or solely in virtue of its form? However, certain of the formulations lack the requisite clarity. For example, we are told that we must look elsewhere than to existence for what Aristotle "considers as actual reality." This might be—and actually is—true, but its relevance to the question under discussion must be denied. For, in its customary usage, "actual reality" does not signify existence but, rather, that which exists. And so, Aristotle could well identify actual reality, or Being, with essence or substance without implying that either is taken as a substitute for existence, and without implying that *to be* is other than to exist.

The same crucial ambiguity appears when M. Gilson states that the problem is to know if, when Aristotle "speaks of actual being, what he has in mind is existence or something else." This suggests that the author equates *actual being* and *existence*—even though in the paragraph immediately following he opposed them as subject and act, showing thereby that *actual being* is seen as the equivalent of *that which is*. What is more important, it suggests that if Aristotle does not equate actual being and existence—or if he states that actual being is essence or substance—M. Gilson will hold as demonstrated that by "to be" Aristotle means something other than to exist. Of course, no such conclusion would follow, and it is only by a gross confusion that his reasoning would take this line. Regrettably, he does in fact fall victim to his own ambiguity. This is revealed in the actual argument offered in proof of Aristotle's *essentialist* understanding of "to be." Quoting from Aristotle's first argument in Z 1, he writes:

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-6.

"Among the many meanings of being," Aristotle says, "the first is the one where it means *that which is* and where it signifies the substance." In other words, the *is* of the thing is the *what* of the thing, not the fact that it exists, but that which the thing is and which makes it to be a substance.⁹

M. Gilson has here shown that by "primary Being" (*proton on*) Aristotle means essence or substance. He has not shown, though the structure of his argument demanded that he should, that by "to be" (*einai*) Aristotle means the act of essence. His statement that "the *is* of the thing is the *what* of the thing" can only be put down to the verbal confusion that he has himself engendered. Actual being for Aristotle most assuredly is essence or substance. But unless we are gratuitously to equate that which is and its *to be*, this fact permits only a repetition of Aristotle's words: Being in the primary sense is Entity.

This truth in no way deters M. Gilson. Convinced that he has proved his case, he appends a statement the significance of which possibly escapes him.

This by no means signifies that Aristotle is not interested in the existence or non-existence of what he is talking about. On the contrary, everybody knows that, in his philosophy, the first question to be asked about any possible subject of investigation is, does it exist? But the answer is a short and final one. Once evidenced by sense or concluded by rational argumentation, existence is tacitly dismissed. For, indeed, if the thing does not exist, there is nothing more to say; if, on the contrary, it exists, we should say something about it, but solely about that which it is, not about its existence, which can now be taken for granted.

That is why existence, a mere prerequisite to being, plays no part in its structure. The true Aristotelian name for being is substance, which is identical with what a being is.¹⁰

Like the preceding passage, these words are offered in support of the contention that, in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, "to be" signifies essence. And as before, the argument hinges on the different meanings of the word "being." It is thus worthless. But there is much more to the above than this.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

We are told that Aristotle is not without interest in the existence of things; that, indeed, the existence of the subject of any science must first be ascertained. Unaccountably, however, once the actuality of the subject is established, its *to be*, or existence, is converted into its essence. For this we have M. Gilson's own words: "the *is* of the thing is the *what* of the thing."

But we are also told that "existence, a mere prerequisite to being (i. e., *essence*), plays no part in its structure." Far from being identical with essence, then, existence does not even enter into the notion of *what* a thing is. In other words, there is for Aristotle a sharp distinction between essence and existence. This, none will question, is a startling affirmation for a person of M. Gilson's convictions.

Also important is the other side of the statement that existence is a prerequisite to being—i. e., essence. This means, if it means anything at all, that existence is required in order that essence be real. This, too, is an unexpected admission for one who would see Aristotle as an essentialist. For, in the name of the Stagirite, it accords to existence an absolute priority in the order of actuality.

Another unwonted criticism of Aristotle is that, once the existence of the subject is determined, he proceeds to study not this existence but the subject itself, its nature and, of course, its causes; that is to say, he seeks to know what and why Beings are. This comes to no more than the assertion that for Aristotle existence is not the subject of *Metaphysics*—an indisputable truth, but a failing only to M. Gilson and his followers.

In the mind of the author, indeed, it may be Aristotle's principal failing. For, apparently convinced that Aristotle's position here conclusively proves him to be an essentialist, he turns to the very end of *Z* 1, where substance is presented as the primary subject of *Metaphysics*.

We are not here reconstructing the doctrine of Aristotle nor deducing from his principles implications of which he was not aware. His own words are perfectly clear: "And indeed the question which was raised of old, and is raised now and always, and is always the

subject of doubt, namely what being is, is just the question: what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense."¹¹

By implication, M. Gilson would have had Aristotle say that the question for the philosopher, whether asked of old or not, is: what is existence? Since he asked instead what substance is, we are presumably to infer that he has substituted essence for existence with respect to Being. At any rate, the author uses the above, along with a more subtle variation on the word "being," to establish once more the non-existential character of Aristotelian Being. He writes:

All we have now to do is to equate these terms: what primarily *is*, the *substance* of that which is, *what* the thing is. In short, the "whatness" of a thing is its very being.¹²

The statement that its essence is the "very being" of a thing is doubtless viewed by the author as added proof that the *is* of a thing is its essence. But again, the actual conclusion falls far short of that required by his argument. It essence is indeed the very being of a thing, for it is *what* the thing is. However, this is to say nothing concerning the thing's *to be*. And so, the author's basic position remains unsubstantiated. He has established only that essence is in truth essence and that existence is not the subject of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. In a curious lapse, he has volunteered the judgment that for Aristotle existence is other than, though presupposed to, essence. These are the results of his commentary on Z 1. Putting the most favorable possible interpretation upon them, we must hold that they are irrelevant to the question he has himself posed: what does Aristotle mean by "to be?"

For the answer to this, we have only to turn again to his second argument on the primacy of substance in the order of Being. Opposing accidental to substantial Being, Aristotle stated:

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Z 1, 1028b2-8, in *Selections*, ed. by Ross, n. 26, p. 64.

¹² *Ibid.*

And so one might be in *aporia* about whether "to walk," "to be healthy," "to sit" imply that each of these things is Being, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from Entity, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is a Being.

The implication is clear: substance is a Being because it, unlike the accidents, subsists. And once this fact is adverted to, little more need be said. For subsistence is a mode, the primary mode, of existence; however one might twist or turn, this is undeniable. It is also undeniable that Aristotle calls substance a Being with respect to the existence to which it is ordered by its nature. Being, then, is taken from existence, and for Aristotle "to be" means to exist.

In view of the clarity of Aristotle's words, we can only wonder at M. Gilson's failure to quote from them. Fr. Owens is guilty of a somewhat similar oversight. Although the theme of his work is the doctrine of Being in Aristotle, and although he carefully notes the Greek equivalent of "self-subsistent," he passes over this characteristic of substance in relative silence. It is simply listed among other characteristics, and there is no mention of the decisive role that it plays with regard to whether or not a thing is a Being in the primary sense.¹³

Nor is Aristotle's equally existential discourse on accidental Being accorded the careful analysis it merits. Both M. Gilson and Fr. Owens do offer interpretations of Aristotle's teaching on this question, but in neither case is the exposition explicitly based on the relevant section of *Z* 1. M. Gilson speaks at some length, and with discernment, on the subject in the introduction to his commentary on *Z* 1; here, his neglect of the text may be overlooked. However, in an evident attempt to bring this particular question into line with his general position, he also has a few words to say on it after his identification of its essence with the *is* of a thing. At this point, his neglect of the text is inexcusable. Fr. Owens, on the other hand, apparently questions the special relevance of *Z* 1, and so refers the reader to his

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

commentary on a related but less determinate passage in *Gamma* 2. But whatever the reasons of either, Z 1 is clear in its import. After noting that accidents neither subsist nor are able to be separated from substance, Aristotle added:

Now these are rather seen to be Being because there is something definite which underlies them (i. e., the Entity or the singular) which is seen in such a predicate; for we never use "good" or "sitting" without implying this.

Though they do not subsist and lack the capability of being apart from substance, accidents are Beings in a certain manner. They are not seen as such, however, if they be considered in abstraction from their subject; they are therefore not Beings owing to their quidditative actuality alone. They *are*, rather, only as inhering in substance. And here, precisely, we encounter the existence proportionate to their nature—the distinctive *in esse* with which all Aristotelians are familiar. Accordingly, as in the case of its primary instance, substance, Being is again taken from existence.

In yet another of his laudable lapses, M. Gilson would concede this analysis of accidental Being, as to both its truth and its origin in Aristotle. In his introductory comments to Z 1, he called attention to

a first class of characteristics which, although we find them present in a given thing, do not deserve the title of reality. It comprises whatever always belongs to something, without itself being some thing. Aristotle describes such characteristics as "always being given in a subject," which means that they always "belong to" some real being, but never themselves become "a being."

Needless to say, the class in question is that of accidental Being. The author continues:

Such are, for instance, the sensible qualities. A color always belongs to a colored thing, whence there follows this important metaphysical consequence, that such characteristics have no being of their own. What they have of being is the being of the subject to which they belong; their being is its being or, in other words, the only way for them to be is "to belong" and, as Aristotle says, "to be in." That is why such characteristics are fittingly called "accidents," because

they themselves are not beings, but merely happen "to be in" some real beings.¹⁴

These words of M. Gilson are not altogether clear. It is not certain, on the one hand, whether he simply denies reality to the accident or whether he denies only that it is a *hoc aliquid*, and, on the other, whether he simply equates it with substantial Being or whether its Being is called that of substance in the sense that it is the *accidental* Being of substance. However, the *existential* tenor of his words is unmistakable. The only way, we are told, for accidents to be is "to belong" and "to be in." Surely the author would acknowledge that by "to be in" he signifies the kind of existence possessed by accidents. This is, after all, the actual condition of reality. And by his own admission, he is but paraphrasing the doctrine of Aristotle.

Now, although the above contained much that is unquestionably true, M. Gilson takes a different approach to the question following the assertion that for Aristotle the essence of a thing is its *to be*. The reason for this is evident. Since accidents *are* by virtue of their relation to substance, and since the only act he would grant to Aristotelian Being is the quidditative, he must account for accidents as Beings solely in terms of quiddity—immediately that of the accident itself, ultimately that of the substance. The thing's essence cannot, of course, be accepted as the cause of the accidents' *existence*; it would be anomalous were accidents alone to possess the actuality of existence. It must therefore be viewed as the cause of them as Beings in causing their form. The argument to this effect is quite brief. Noting that materially an animal is constituted of the inorganic, he states:

It is nevertheless an animal, and therefore a substance, because it has an inner principle which accounts for its organic character, *all its accidents*, and all the operations it performs. Such is the form.¹⁵

We must acknowledge that M. Gilson's position derives,

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47. Our emphasis.

though mistakenly, from an important truth. Accidents do indeed, in one way or another, depend upon form or essence. In immediate fashion, the causality of the form is certain in the case of proper accidents. Less directly, it will account for the possession by substance of whatever attribute. It is not just anything that can, for example, sit, walk or be healthy. But the question must arise: is it simply by virtue of their quidditative actuality that, in the mind of Aristotle, accidents are Beings? Had he consulted the relevant section of *Z 1, M*. Gilson would have seen that such is not the case. "To sit," "to walk" and "to be healthy" most surely signify certain quiddities, though of a lower order, and Aristotle does not question this fact. But he does question whether, thus signified, these things are *Beings*. And he does not solve the problem by referring to their quidditative dependence upon form, but by noting their inherence in substance. They are Beings not because they are determinations, but because they are determinations of *substance*; that is, they are Beings owing to the mode of existence proper to their nature.

We can readily appreciate the dilemma faced by M. Gilson. If he is to be faithful both to Aristotle and to reality, the inherence of accidents in substance must be acknowledged as that whereby they are Beings. If he is to be faithful to his own *a priori* theory of Aristotelian Being, the problem must be solved on the basis of essential act alone. But at this point, another critical problem appears. How is one to effect a reconciliation of these disparate interpretations of accidental Being?

The task is assumed by Fr. Owens. The context is *Gamma 2*, where Aristotle presents his first *ex professo* division of Being. His analysis here is limited to the statement that Being is said primarily of substance and of other things by reference to substance.¹⁶ Fr. Owens' purpose is to determine, utilizing this

¹⁶ "'Being' is expressed in many ways, but *pros en*, that is, in reference to one definite nature. . . . For some things are called 'Being' because they are Entities, others because they are affections of Entity, others because they are a way towards Entity or corruptions or privations or qualities or productive or generative principles of Entity or of the things expressed by reference to Entity, or the negations of any

one text, the precise way in which Being is predicated of its secondary instances, the accidents. He writes:

Accidents will not possess the nature of Being *in themselves*. The nature according to which they are Being will not be their own natures. It will be the Entity of which they are the affections. This should mean that when we say "The man is pale," the man alone really *is*. It is he who *is*—pale. The paleness itself, considered just in its own nature apart from the Entity of which it is an affection, could not be said to be. If we say, with any meaning, "paleness is," we are really saying "The man *is*—pale." The Being as such is that of the man. But "paleness" is by its very nature an affection of man; and so it *is*, but only through and in the Being of the man. The nature of the man alone *is* in itself. When "paleness" is said to be, the nature of the man—the Entity—is denoted by the verb.¹⁷

Here we have the historical development of M. Gilson's position. Its fundamental assertions are: "'paleness' . . . *is*, but only through and in the Being of man" and "the nature of the man alone *is* in itself." These appear to be no more than reformulations of M. Gilson's first exposition on accidental Being and thus of the doctrine presented in Z 1. However, the meaning they have for Fr. Owens is radically different from that of Aristotle. The first indication of this is found in the statement that, in the case of "paleness," "the Being as such is that of the man." The ambiguity here—that of which M. Gilson was

one of these or of Entity itself; for which reason we say that even not-Being is not-Being." (*Gamma 2*, 1003a33-b10, Fr. Owens' trans.) Aristotle's purpose here is to bring all Beings within the scope of the science of Being *qua* Being, while at the same time preserving the unity of the science. This is done by noting that though "Being" has many different significations, each instance involves a reference to the primary instance, substance. However, he does not, as he does in Z 1, render explicit the precise way in which the accidents are Beings. In view of this, it is strange that Fr. Owens should base his analysis of accidental Being upon *Gamma 2* rather than upon Z 1. Actually, his commentary is a mixture of Z 1, where the reality of accidental Being is clearly stated, and of his own theory of *pros en* equivocal predication, according to which the common word, though by definition having *many different meanings*, is restricted in its signification to the primary instance—"The nature or form designated by the word is found in the first instance *alone*." *Op. cit.*, p. 152.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

also guilty—is patent. Does the author mean that “paleness” is the *accidental* Being of man—an evident truth—or that it is simply one with the substantial Being of man? We are told that this Being is indeed one with substance: “When ‘paleness’ is said to *be*, the nature of the man—the Entity—is denoted by the verb.” Here, in addition, the nature of man—i. e., his essence—rather than the composite is presented as the primary Being. Thus it is the essence which is said to be denoted by the *to be* predicated of “paleness.” This is the ultimate refinement of M. Gilson’s teaching. For not only is substantial essence that alone whereby an accident has its *to be*, it is also the very *to be* of an accident—and, it goes without saying, of the substance as well. The process is complete. Not a trace of the existential remains in Aristotle’s account of Being. For this, we must look to Revelation and, beyond that, to its thirteenth century exegete.

But let us give pause. Fr. Owens’ interpretation rests upon two wholly illicit arguments. The first is the more evident, and was noted above. From the fact that an accident is a Being of substance, he inferred that the two were in an unqualified sense identical. The consequences of this are unseemly. Put abstractly, we have a situation in which that which exists in and through something is actually one with that in which it inheres. Concretely, we have not only “The man *is*—pale,” but this as well: “The paleness *is*—man”; and, if you wish, “The man *is*—paleness.”¹⁸

The second argument involved equating the composite substance with its essence. This was brought about through the mediation of the word “Entity.” At one time, it was taken to

¹⁸ The author might dispute this interpretation of his words, and claim that his true intent is to withdraw Being from accident and to locate it in what alone truly *is*—Entity. The difficulty here is that Being is actually predicated of accident, and in the most emphatic terms: “But ‘paleness’ is by its very nature an affection of man; and so it is. . . .” The addition, “but only through and in the Being of the man,” does not wholly mitigate this fact. A definite reality is thereby designated. This is most evident in the other way of expressing accidental Being: “The man *is*—pale.” There can be no doubt that the truth of this judgment depends upon the reality of “paleness.” Did it not exist, the man would not *be*—pale.

signify the composite; at another time, the essence. Confusing the two is understandable. It is also valuable, because only thus can the *is* predicated of the accident be taken to signify the essence. For the argument identifying accidental Being with substance drew upon the truth that, in some sense, the accident is actually a Being of substance. But the argument demanded that it also be seen as a Being of essence. Hence the substitution of "the nature of man" for "man" in the author's concluding judgment. Apparently we are to believe that the essence of man, rather than the composite, is the subject of paleness, health and goodness; that, in other words, the essence of man *is*—pale, healthy and morally good.

Two basic truths, though ambiguously expressed and then discarded by him, remain in Fr. Owens' commentary: "'paleness' . . . *is*, but only through and in the Being of the man" and "the nature of the man alone *is* in itself." If we emend the second to read "By his nature, man alone *is* in himself," and interpret both in the only intelligible manner possible, we attain the actual intent of Aristotle. For here we have the *in esse* and the *esse secundum se* of accidental and substantial Being. And here, precisely, are the notions of Being which Aristotle chose to clarify when, with Book *Zeta*, he entered properly into the science of Being *qua* Being.

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KANT AND AQUINAS: ETHICAL THEORY



WORKS purporting to report carefully and fairly the content of the ethical teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas often display serious deficiencies: want of precision in the grasp of meanings, want of correctness in the interpretation of statements, want of wit in the tracing of arguments, and want of comprehension and sympathy in the judgment of the system. These deficiencies astonish the careful student of St. Thomas and disturb those who have found his teaching helpful in the pursuit of the special end of practical knowledge. But the students of other attempts in this field and the disciples of other men working in this field have equally often had just cause for astonishment and dismay.

Too often the interests of polemic have been given a higher place than the interests of reason in finding truth and rectifying action. The careful examination of issues is often unimpressive. The methodical working out of positions is often unexciting. The impartial weighing of evidence is often inconclusive. Yet lazy devices of logic and commonplaces of dialectic and rhetoric, even when joined with stylistic brilliance and poetic luxuriance, are not suitable replacements for them.

To what must we look for the answering of philosophic questions and the resolution of dialectical oppositions? If we can be satisfied with a philosophic structure based on arbitrary inclination or pre-existing contingent interest, then we may look to lazy devices of logic, commonplaces of dialectic and rhetoric, stylistic brilliance and poetic luxuriance. But if our philosophic structure is to be based on the rational but objective necessity of the thing itself, then we must examine issues carefully, work out the positions ploddingly and weigh the evidence impartially.

On this basis we can see the reason for the use of historical analysis in the field of philosophy. It is true that we can learn

from our predecessors in what they have said well and benefit from their guidance where they proceeded rightly. We can also learn from them in what they spoke badly and benefit from them by learning not to follow their erring path, for in them we can see the end to which their path will lead. But these values can be gained only by assuming the point of view of a neutral observer whose judgment waits on the evidence, and these values will certainly be lost if we immediately assume the attitude of a party to the dispute to be judged. Comparison of the results of philosophic work must therefore be done in as impartial a manner as evidence ought to be weighed in a court of law. Neither the conditions of the inquiry nor the predispositions of the judge should determine right independently of the prior determination by the evidence presented.

Our work in this article is limited in scope. We wish to examine the issues between the ethical theories of Kant and Aquinas and to work out their positions. But the work is limited by the shortness of this article and by the limitation of our own investigation. We offer here a group of notes suggestive of a study to be made rather than the finished work itself.

I

There have been three perennial philosophic reductions. One of them reduces the problem of the organization of action and inclination according to what ought to be, and the problem of the organization of operations and materials according to what is to be through them, to the unique problem of the organization of facts according to formal relationships. A second perennial philosophic reduction reduces the enterprise of ordering materials through systematic procedures to predetermined results, and the enterprise of ordering investigation according to clues found in the thing itself to unexpected discoveries, to the unique enterprise of ordering actions and men to the relief of tensions endlessly created by endless attempts to relieve tensions. A third perennial philosophic reduction reduces the

elaboration of scientific structure out of data collected, and the elaboration of human life in society out of human capacity and human need to the unique elaboration of the real from the self. If we want labels we might call these three reductions the Positivist, the Pragmatist and the Romanticist, respectively. But the labels so used would not quite mean the same as they have meant in any of their many historic applications. In any case and whatever we call them, the three reductions have been with us always and no doubt will continue to be with us for a long time. For they represent three basic ways in which man can over-simplify the complexity which his thought requires but with which it can never be content.

Briefly, however, the perennial reductions have been interrupted from time to time, by occasional theories maintaining the theoretic, the practical and the productive as distinct radically and irreducible, on the basis that although the three areas may include one another reciprocally still there remains an opposition of relationships between them. Such theories allow distinct knowledges of what ought to be done and what is to be produced as well as of what is. They allow distinct practices of producing and investigating as well as of what needs doing. And they allow distinct elaborations of knowledge and of society as well as of the reality potentially present in human power.

Kant is perfectly clear about the distinction of knowledge into theoretic and practical, although his position in respect to technical knowledge is considerably more subtle. However, it is only the former distinction which need concern us in this article. He says, for example:

But when we consider these actions (human acts) in their relation to reason—I do not mean speculative reason, by which we endeavor *to explain* their coming into being, but reason insofar as it is itself the cause *producing* them—if, that is to say, we compare them with [the standards of] reason in its *practical* bearing, we find a rule and order altogether different from the order of nature.¹

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 1950), p. 474. Cited as: "Pure" The words in square brackets appear marked in the same way in Smith. The words in parentheses we added.

Strictly, the distinction is of reason in its practical as compared with its speculative employment, rather than of knowledge into theoretic and practical. For

... practical reason is concerned with objects not in order to know them but with its own capacity to make them real (according to knowledge of them), i. e., it has to do with a will which is a causality so far as reason contains its determining ground.²

In other words, the word "knowledge" is reserved for knowledge most strictly so-called, theoretic knowledge. Thus it is that Kant can say on the one hand: "*Knowledge*, which as such is speculative, . . ." ³ has a certain character, but then on the other hand:

But if we regard also the content of the knowledge which we can have of and through a pure practical reason, as the Analytic presents this content, there is to be found, besides a remarkable analogy between it and the content of the theoretical knowledge, no less remarkable differences.⁴

There is no contradiction in this, that is, there is no gap in the system showing in this merely verbal opposition. But we must understand Kant in and through his own technical language, keeping in mind at the same time the fluidity which he allowed himself even in his most technical uses of language, or we will find in him nothing but a fabric of obvious contradictions. We might say the same of almost any philosopher.

The distinction which Kant so carefully draws between the theoretic and the practical employments of reason is most basic in his ethical theory. At the very beginning of the *Critique of Practical Reason* he lays it down again, no doubt supposing for its justification the argument of the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

The theoretical use of reason is concerned with objects of the merely cognitive faculty. . . . It is quite different with the practical use of

² *Critique of Practical Reason*, in *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings*, tr. and ed. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, c. 1949), p. 195. Cited as: "Practical."

³ *Pure*, p. 427.

⁴ *Practical*, p. 197.

reason. In the latter, reason deals with the grounds determining the will. . . .⁵

Thus the beginning of the introduction of Kant's second *Critique*.

Kant generally says that truth consists in a conformity of knowledge with its object.⁶ But in a few passages, he seems willing to broaden this manner of speaking somewhat as reason is considered as functioning in different offices. When reason is used in a hypothetical way, for example, in order to give the greatest possible system to the knowledge of the understanding, it is this systematic unity itself which is the criterion of the truth of the rules which reason lays down.⁷ Reason, then, as giving rules, has a different criterion of truth from that which it has as simply knowing theoretically.

Following Kant's example in this matter, it is interesting to ask ourselves what the truth of the practical employment of reason would be. I do not know that Kant has anywhere taken up this problem in exactly these terms. However, in discussion of the distinction of the problems of the first and the second *Critiques*, he says:

There are, therefore, two very different problems. The first is: How can pure reason know objects a priori? The second is: How can pure reason be a directly determining ground of the will . . . ?⁸

The word "therefore" at the beginning of this passage relates to the paragraph immediately preceding, in which he has distinguished the laws of a system to which the will is subject from the laws of a system subject to the will; in the one the object causes a concept which determines the will, while in the other the will causes the object.⁹ In elucidating the second of the two problems which he has distinguished, he says:

It requires no explanation of how objects of the faculty of desire are possible, for that, as a task of the theoretic knowledge of nature,

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁶ *Pure*, pp. 97, 220, 532.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

⁸ *Practical*, p. 155.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 154-155.

is left to the critique of speculative reason. It asks only how reason can determine the maxim of the will. . . .¹⁰

From this it would seem that there is justification for supposing that Kant might well have given a definition of practical truth somewhat like the following: It is a conformity of the maxim of the will with reason. He notes the difference in the relation of determination and the realization of object which would lead to such a definition, and probably the only reason why he did not give such a definition explicitly is hesitation at transferring the notion of truth out of the speculative order, a hesitation which we noted above in respect to the notion of knowledge but which in that case, perhaps on the basis of common usage, he overcame. At any rate, the notion of a practical truth, although not in his verbal usage, is of first importance in Kant, and we might even say that the entire task of the *Critique of Practical Reason* is to explicate and justify this notion.

Having now noted Kant's distinction of the theoretic and the practical and constructed a plausible meaning, for him, of practical truth, we may make some brief comments concerning a few other leading ideas in the Kantian ethical theory.

First, there is a point at the beginning of the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*. As an opening to the first section of that work, Kant considers a list of things which, taken in relation to moral personality, might be considered as good. He shows that none of them is good in an unqualified sense, but, as his famous sentence goes: "Nothing in the world, indeed nothing even beyond the world, can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a *good will*."¹¹

Second, there is a point concerning happiness in the section on principles in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. "To be happy," Kant says, "is necessarily the desire of every rational

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹¹ *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 55, in the Beek volume. Cited as: "Foundations."

but finite being, and thus it is an unavoidable determinant of its faculty of desire." But he goes on to explain this desire as necessary by man's lack of self-sufficiency and, in accord with the definition of happiness as the gratification of all desires, he rejects it as a principle for the determination of the will, saying:

... it determines nothing specific concerning what is to be done in a given practical problem, but in a practical problem this is what is alone important, for without some specific determination the problem cannot be solved.¹²

We have here, then, a necessary object of desire which is not a moral determinant.

Third, Kant recognizes a double sense of "freedom." In all of his works in the field of practical philosophy, Kant continually makes use of a fundamental concept of freedom, the positive content of which is made known to us through the moral law, and which is the basis of that law *in esse*.¹³ In this sense, freedom is autonomy, self-determination in action. To the merely negative conception of freedom which can be thought theoretically, is added in the practical order a positive content, not only thought of as possible but known as actual for practice, that of a reason by the law of which the will is determined directly.¹⁴ But there is a second sense of "freedom," that of free choice. In the *Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant distinguishes between rational and elective will, that is, will and choice.¹⁵ Rational will cannot properly be called "free" or "not-free," it is not directed to actions but to the law; it is, in fact, practical reason itself. Elective will, on the other hand, is free in man. This is a freedom of indetermination with respect to opposites, but it is not to be defined by the

¹² *Practical*, p. 136.

¹³ *Ibid.*, *passim*, e. g., p. 119.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 158.

¹⁵ *Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, tr. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 5th ed. (London, N. Y., and Bombay: Longmans Green, 1898), p. 268. Cited as: "Metaphysics."

possibility of choice with or against the law, although there are plentiful examples of such indifference in experience.¹⁶

St. Thomas is quite clear about the distinction of knowledge into the theoretic, the practical and the productive, but the question of the place of logic in his system is somewhat more subtle. However, it is only with the distinction of the theoretic and the practical that we are concerned here. St. Thomas says, for example:

Now speculative and practical reason differ in this that speculative reason is merely apprehensive of things, while practical reason is not only apprehensive, but also causative.¹⁷

It may be noticed that this distinction is formally of reason into its theoretic and practical employments. But St. Thomas does make a corresponding distinction of knowledge, both in its broader sense and in its narrower sense of science, into speculative and practical.¹⁸

It is interesting to notice that there is a much narrower sense in which "science" is sometimes employed by Aquinas. In this narrower sense, it might be said that science as such is speculative, for it is distinguished against prudence with the comment: ". . . the subject of science, which is the right order of things which can be speculated about, is the speculative intellect. . . ." ¹⁹

Perhaps the most interesting text from St. Thomas on the distinction of the theoretic and the practical is that found in the introduction to the commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*:

Now order is compared to reason in four ways. For there is a certain order which reason does not make but only considers, for example, the order of things in nature. There is another order which reason makes in its own act, that is, when it orders concepts to each other and signs of concepts, for they are significant vocalizations.

¹⁶ *Metaphysics*, p. 282.

¹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 83, a. 2.

¹⁸ For the distinction of *cognitio* see: *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 8, a. 8, ad 3; I, q. 14, a. 16; for the distinction of *scientia* see: I, q. 14, a. 1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 56, a. 3.

Now third, there is an order which reason by its consideration makes in the acts of the will. And fourth, there is an order which reason makes in exterior things of which it is itself the cause, for example, in a ship or a house. . . . Now the order of voluntary actions pertains to moral philosophy. . . . So, therefore, moral philosophy, with which we are presently concerned, has as its property to consider human operations according as they are ordered to each other and to the end.²⁰

The chief point of this passage is that ethics has a proper order, an order which can be distinguished in terms of a unique relation of reason to its object, an order in which reason is determinative of acts of the will. This distinction must be of fundamental importance to the study of ethics in Aquinas' mind, for he inserts this passage as an introduction to his comment on Aristotle's *Ethics*, although Aristotle himself does not have an explicit consideration of such a distinction at the outset of his ethical inquiry.

"Truth," according to St. Thomas, is used primarily and most properly to signify the adequation of the intellect to its object. As such it is in the intellect, strictly speaking, although we can speak of "true things" inasmuch as they are compared to an intellect on which they are dependent.²¹ But there is another meaning of "truth" which is of considerable import for our purposes. In the *Summa Theologiae*, in showing that prudence is a virtue necessary to man, he answers an objection to the effect that prudence cannot be a virtue of the intellect:

. . . truth is ascribed to the practical intellect in a different way than it is to the speculative intellect, as is said in the sixth book of the *Ethics*. For truth is ascribed to the speculative intellect through its conformity to its object. . . . But truth is ascribed to the practical intellect through its conformity to right appetite. And this conformity has no place with respect to necessary things, such as do not come to be by human will, but only in contingent things which can be brought to be by us, which are either things which can be done within or things which can be made without.²²

²⁰ *I Ethic.*, lect. 1.

²¹ *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1; q. 1, a. 2.

²² *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad 3. Cf. *VI Ethic.*, lect. 2.

The speculative intellect has as its function to know, and so its truth is in conformity to the thing known. But the practical intellect has as its function to direct or to rule, and so its truth is in conformity with the principle according to which it rules, namely, right appetite.

Having now noted St. Thomas' distinction of the theoretic and the practical and his notion of practical truth, we may make a few brief comments concerning some other important matters in ethical theory.

First:

... whatever has a will is called good inasmuch as it has a good will, since through will we use everything in us. So we do not call the man good who has a good mind, but who has a good will.²³

Even the intellect itself can be called good only insofar as it is subject to a will which adheres to God.²⁴

Second, happiness is a universally necessary object of will and yet it is not sufficient to determine choice in particular:

... happiness can be considered in two ways. In one way, according to its common notion. And in this way it is necessary that every man will happiness. For the common notion of happiness is "perfect good," as has been said. But since good is the object of the will, perfect good of anyone is what totally satisfies his will. And so to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that the will be satisfied. Everyone wills this. In another way, we can speak of happiness according to the specific notion as to that in which it consists. In this way not all know happiness, since they do not know that to which the common notion of happiness applies. And consequently, as to this, not all will it.²⁵

Happiness, then, is a necessary object of will in its general notion, but through this necessity it cannot be a sufficient determining ground of will, for there can be ignorance of the relation of this to the particular.

Third, there is a double sense of "freedom" used by St.

²³ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 3.

²⁴ *De Verit.*, q. 14, a. 3, ad 8.

²⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 5, a. 8.

Thomas. There is one sense in which it is said, for example, that "... the contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of soul . . ." ²⁶; or when true liberty and false liberty are distinguished as liberty from sin and liberty from justice.²⁷ In this sense, liberty is a kind of self-mastery or self-directedness independent of both extrinsic conditions and one's own inclinations or dispositions. But there is a second sense of "freedom," freedom of choice. In this sense, liberty is divided in a three-fold division, as it relates the indeterminacy of the will to its object, to its own act and to the order to the end. In this sense, it should be noted, "... to will evil is neither liberty or part of liberty, although it is a certain sign of liberty." ²⁸

II

Up to this point our study has been, no doubt, quite unrealistic. It begins to seem as though Kant and St. Thomas can be drawn close together, although it is perfectly clear to any beginning student of their texts that their doctrines are irreconcilably opposed.

What very well might be said of our study to this point is that it has been a kind of systematic misinterpretation of both philosophers. A certain appearance of community in doctrine has been attained, it might be thought, where there is not any real unity underlying that appearance; texts have been considered out of the context in which they normally would gain determination in meaning.

Let us, therefore, begin again, considering rather more the broader bases of ethical principles together with the arguments leading to them, than such particular points as we have so far considered in isolation from their appropriate arguments.

Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* is divided into two parts: the doctrine of elements of pure practical reason and the doc-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 182, a. 1, ad. 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 183, a. 4. Cf. *de Verit.*, q. 24, a. 10, ad 7.

²⁸ *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 7. Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 82, a. 2.

trine of method of pure practical reason.²⁹ In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant makes use of an analogy to architecture to explain the distinction of these two parts as they appear in that work. He says that considering the whole of all theoretic knowledge as a building which we are to construct according to an idea which we have in ourselves, the doctrine of elements gives an estimate of the materials and shows the kind and size of the building which can be made with them. The doctrine of method, on the other hand, is concerned to give the plan of the building which can be constructed with such material.³⁰ But the *Critique of Practical Reason* is not concerned with the construction of an edifice of knowledge, but rather with the determination of will through reason. "Its task is merely to show that there is a pure practical reason, and, in order to do this, it critically examines reason's entire practical faculty."³¹ The doctrine of elements in the *Critique of Practical Reason* is concerned to show that practical reason, that is, reason as it determines action, can be pure, that is, free from influence in its determination from anything received by experience, and the suppositions and implications of this.³² And the doctrine of method in the *Critique of Practical Reason* is concerned with the way

. . . in which we can secure to the laws of pure practical reason access to the human mind and an influence on its maxims. That is to say, it is the way we can make the objectively practical reason also subjectively practical.³³

The doctrine of elements has two books, the first is the analytic of pure practical reason and the second is the dialectic of pure practical reason. The former is required as the rule of truth, in the practical sense, while the latter is required to display and resolve the illusion which may occur in the judg-

²⁹ *Practical*, p. 129.

³⁰ *Pure*, p. 573.

³¹ *Practical*, p. 118.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 118-119.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

ments of practical reason.³⁴ In other words, the book of analytic shows the conditions of the proper employment of practical reason according to which it is pure, while the book of dialectic shows the false problem which arises from an improper employment of practical reason and the way in which this problem can be resolved.

The analytic, with which we shall be exclusively concerned in the remainder of this part of our study, contains three chapters. The first deals with the principles, the second with the concepts and the third with the motives of practical reason. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the order was the reverse of this.

. . . the reason for this lies in the fact that here we have to deal with a will and to consider reason not in relation to objects but in relation to this will and its causality. The principles of the unconditioned causality must come first, and afterward the attempt can be made to establish our concepts on the ground of determination of such a will, their application to objects, and finally their application to the subject and its sensuous faculty. The law of causality from freedom, i. e., any pure practical principle, is the unavoidable beginning and determines the objects to which it alone can be applied.³⁵

The argument of the analytic of principles, reduced to its basis in outline form, is quite simple and direct. If desire for an object determines a practical rule to be an operating principle, the principle cannot be pure but must be only empirical. For in this case what determines choice is a conception of an object and its relation to the subject, by which the faculty of desire is determined to seek the realization of the object. Such a relation is called pleasure in the object, and so if desire for an object is to determine the operating principle, this relation of pleasure must be a condition of the determination of choice. Since pleasure or displeasure attached to an object can be known only by experience, such a principle would be merely

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

empirical and not pure. Since it depends on the susceptibility of the subject, it cannot be a necessary principle and so it can furnish no law. Since it is only determinative to the extent that we choose what we expect to make us happy, that is, what we expect to give an agreeable feeling as an accompaniment to life, it is based on the general principle of one's own happiness or self-love.³⁶

Now if there are any practical laws, that is, practical principles which are universal and necessary as determining grounds of action, they can be considered on two sides. On one hand, they contain reference to the object whose realization is determined through will. Now we have seen that practical laws cannot be determined by the relation of the object of the will to it. Therefore, they must determine this relation, and so it is not by their material aspect that they get the form and the force of law. The other aspect is that of their constitution as universal laws, i. e., their form considered in abstraction from the matter to which they refer. Since to be practical laws they must determine the will, and since they cannot do this by their matter, they must do it by their form alone.³⁷

Of what sort would a will be which could be determined not by any material condition but by the pure form of law? Such a will would be wholly independent of the natural law of appearances, the physical law of nature. For the determining ground of any actualization in nature must be found in sensible appearance. Independence of this natural law is freedom. Therefore, such a will would be free. Again, of what sort would a law be which could serve as the determining ground of a free will? It clearly must be a law which determines by its mere form, for if it were by any reference to the object which it has that it determined, there would be a causality exercised by the empirical conditions and such a causality is always necessary. "Thus freedom and unconditioned practical law reciprocally imply each other."³⁸

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-138.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-132, 138-139.

Which of these two, the moral law or freedom, first presents itself to us? Not freedom, since our concept of that is only negative at first and it cannot be deduced from any possible experience, since in nature all that we can find is determination through causes. Rather, it is the moral law of which we are first aware, and we become conscious of it as soon as we begin to construct maxims for the will.

But how is the consciousness of that moral law possible? We can come to know pure practical laws in the same way we know pure theoretic principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the elimination from them of all empirical conditions, which reason directs. The concept of the pure will arises from the former, as the consciousness of the pure understanding from the latter.³⁹

We are directly aware that we are obligated. This is not a feeling, nor is it theoretic knowledge, nor is it reducible to either of these. It is simply practical awareness. We know immediately in setting up practical rules for ourselves that we must not make ourselves an exceptional case; we ought to do just what anyone else in our place should have had to do. Our susceptibility to inclinations of feeling and our delight in having our own way cannot obliterate the obligation which we find ourselves under always to act in such a way that the rule according to which we are acting could hold just as well as an absolutely universal rule for anyone who acts according to reason: "So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as the principle of a universal legislation."⁴⁰

From this it follows that pure reason, just of itself, is practical, that is, it determines the will apart from any condition. It gives a universal law which we call the "moral law." On the other hand, freedom of the will is the condition of this moral law, a condition we know through the moral law of which we are immediately aware. The will, therefore, is autonomous, and dependence on something extrinsic to itself as

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-144.

a ground of determination does not obligate it and, in fact, is directly opposed to duty and morality. An obligating principle, a true law in the practical order, contains a reference to an object, most certainly, and it is through the law that this material is put into relation to the will. But it is not the material which determines the relation but the form of universality which determines the matter to be so related.⁴¹

The doctrine of the second chapter of the analytic in the *Critique of Practical Reason* follows directly from that of the analytic of principles. Kant understands by the concept of an object of pure practical reason the idea of an object as an effect possible through freedom. To be an object of practical knowledge signifies merely the relation of the will to the action by which the object would be realized. Insofar as the object is an object of pure practical reason, not of an empirically conditioned practical judgment, the question of its physical or empirical possibility is quite irrelevant, the only important question is whether we should will an action directed to the existence of that object. If an object is necessary in relation to a will determined solely through pure reason, it is a good; if it is a necessary object of the aversion of such a will, it is an evil. The concept of good, therefore, is not a derivative of anything other than the practical law. Otherwise, it means not the morally good, but that which is conditional with respect to mere well-being which is determined empirically and which by this very fact can be no ground of morality. It is not the case that

... the concept of the good as an object of the moral law determines the latter and makes it possible, but rather the reverse, i. e., that the moral law is that which first defines the concept of the good—so far as it absolutely deserves this name—and makes it possible.⁴²

The concepts of good and evil refer to the intention of the will. They suppose an object as given and determine the intention immediately with respect to that object. The categories of

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 144-165.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 166-172.

pure practical reason, that is, the predicamental relations of the practical characterization of an object by the concepts of good and evil, are rules of a sort. But they do not give us the slightest theoretic knowledge of objects, that is, they do not bring any unity to the multiplicity of experience, as science does; rather they contribute to the "a priori subjection of the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral law, i. e., of a pure will."⁴³

But the notion of these concepts as determinative and at the same time as determined which we have been sketching out, brings up a serious problem. That is the problem of how we decide whether an action possible for us in the sensible world is or is not a case falling under the rule. To make a decision of this sort requires practical judgment, but how is it possible? In the first place, the question does not concern the problem of the determination of the practicability of an action, that is, whether it can be carried out in the sensible world. Practical judgment is concerned only to apply the rule. The solution to the question, then, consists in the possibility of using natural law, whose relation to the sensuous can be determinate a priori, as a type according to which the practical judgment is to be made. If the agent were a member of the natural order, and if the proposed application were to be a case in that order falling under a universal natural law, would it be possible to will the case or not? Using this principle, two opposite errors are well avoided. First, this is not to call on empirical consequences to determine the will, so the empiricism of practical reason is avoided. Second, this principle avoids the mysticism of practical reason, according to which an attempt is made to discover a non-empirical type such as the kingdom of God, a thing which could not solve the problem because it is quite irrelevant to the empirical. Natural law serves, as it were, as a bridge, for it has in common with moral law the form of universal legislation, but it also has the required relevance to the sensuous.⁴⁴

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 176-179.

The third chapter of the analytic again is a direct consequence of the previous two. Incentive which finds its basis in inclination is not moral; the only true moral incentive is the law itself. This law, on the other hand, inasmuch as it determines the intention of the will with regard to all objects of inclination merely by itself and, to be exact, by its form, has an effect in inclination, curbing it and thus causing the moral feeling of respect. This feeling is not moral through leading to action in accord with the law, since action merely in accord with the law which is not done for the right motive as well, that is, action not done for the sake of the law, is not morally good. Rather, respect for the law is a moral feeling because it is determined by the law.

Since the law itself must be the incentive in a morally good will, the moral interest must be a pure nonsensuous interest of the practical reason alone. Now on the concept of an interest rests that of a maxim. The latter is thus morally genuine only when it rests on the mere interest that one takes in obedience to the law.⁴⁵

But the moral law is not our very nature. It commands because there is that in us which is not of itself in accord with the moral determination. We are not, in other words, pure independent rational beings. A pure will which could only act morally would not receive moral law as a command but would be itself identical with the law.

The moral law is, in fact, for the will of any perfect being a law of holiness. For the will of any finite rational being, however, it is a law of duty, of moral constraint, and of determination of his actions through respect for the law and reverence for its duty. . . . We are indeed members of a legislative realm which is possible through freedom and which is presented to us as an object of respect by practical reason; yet we are at the same time subjects to it, not sovereigns, and to mistake our inferior position as creatures and to deny, from self-conceit, respect to the holy law is, in spirit, a defection from it even if its letter be fulfilled.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 180-187.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 187-189.

As a corollary to this explanation of moral incentives we may reflect on the command to love God above all things and neighbor as self. This is not a command given to inclination, for inclination cannot be elicited on order. Rather, it is a purely practical love which is commanded, that we should like to do the commandments of God and like to perform all of our duties to our neighbor. As this is a disposition, the command is not absolute but means to strive toward this condition; in other words, we should make constant efforts to attain a perfect moral disposition through acting always for the sake of the law and thus continuously curbing inclination. Perfect fulfillment of a precept of this sort is impossible for a finite will, for every finite will must always be under the constraint of the law; it is impossible that man rise to so high a point that he become identified with the law, so that he would act morally not by constraint but by his own inclination. Kant cautions that this reflection is not introduced so much to give clarity to the evangelical command by exact conceptions so as to avoid religious fanaticism in respect to the love of God, as it is to avoid a narrow moral fanaticism, the idea of acting for the worthiness of it rather than out of duty to do so. Such a motive is reducible to self-love. And the principle of self-love would just reverse the evangelical command, so that the first precept would be to love oneself above all for one's own sake and God and one's neighbor for the love of self.⁴⁷

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Turning now to the works of St. Thomas Aquinas, we shall first examine the initial chapters of the third book of his *Summa contra Gentiles*, for in this place he establishes certain principles which are of the greatest significance for understanding his ethical theory. In the first book of this work St. Thomas considered the perfection of divine nature, in the second book the perfection of divine power according to which God is the author and lord of all things, and in the third book

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-192.

he considers the perfection of divine authority and dignity according to which God is the director and end of all. The first three chapters are concerned with questions of finality and governance in general, its universality with respect to all agents and its universality with respect to its termination in good.⁴⁸

There is one first of all beings, possessing the full perfection of all to-be, whom we call God. We have already shown this. From the abundance of His perfection He bestows to-be on all which are, so He proves to be not only first among beings but also the principle of all to-be. Now, not by necessity of His nature does He lend to-be to others, but according to a choice of His will. The result is that of the things He has made He is lord, as we have the dominion over things subject to our wills. But He has perfect dominion over the things produced by Him in that for their production He is in need neither of the support of some other agent nor the basis of matter, for He is the universal effector of all to-be.

Every voluntary agent acts for an end, ordering the things that are produced through his will to their goal. The thing reaches that goal by its own actuality, which must therefore be given direction by the originator of the principle according to which it has actuality. Thus, because God is the author of all, He rules all as well. Considering, however, the results of this regulation of all things by God, we see that the result differs according to differences in the natures of the things. Some creatures are like an arrow shot at a target. They reach the goal wholly through the direction of their author, just as the arrow reaches the mark wholly by the archer's direction. But there are others which have reason, and these reach their right end not only as directed by another but also as self-directing. By their own actions they lead themselves to their goal. If they follow the divine direction in their self-direction, then they reach their goal; they do not reach their goal if they ignore the divine regulation and go off in another direction of their own choice.⁴⁹

Every agent acts for an end, for every agent acts in a definite way when it does act, while if there were no end all ways of

⁴⁸ *III Cont. Gent.*, cc. 1-3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 1.

acting, as well as not acting at all, would be quite indifferent. And every agent acts for an ultimate end, an end which is not itself for an end. Otherwise there would be an infinite regress, and this is clearly impossible for each thing is dependent on the next for direction. And this applies both for intelligent agents and other things as well, the latter act for their end just by their own built-in structure, while the former act by a cognitive pre-conception of their goal.⁵⁰

Moreover, every agent acts for a good. For in acting for an end it acts for something determinate. This determinate object must be proportionate to it. And what is proportionate to the agent is good. So every agent acts for a good. The order of concepts which develops is: action, end, appetite, good. Good is the object of appetite, appetite is intrinsic tendency to end, end is the goal of action. The will is rational appetite.⁵¹

We turn now to an examination of some of the articles of question twenty-two in the *De Veritate*. This question is concerned with appetite for good and specifically with will.

Similar to the question we have just considered is that of the first article: Do all things have an appetite for the good? Yes. Every agent acts for an end. Things are ordered and directed to an end in two ways, by themselves and by another. Things knowing the end can be directed to it by themselves, but things which do not know the end can be directed to it only by some other. The latter occurs in two ways. Either they are inclined to that end by some intrinsic principle given to them by that other or they are merely moved to that end by that extrinsic principle. In the former way all natural things tend to their proper end, but in the latter way things which are moved violently move to the end. The latter would include all works of art and the violent in general, and the end here would not be the good of the thing moved but rather that of the mover. Now since all nature is directed by God to its end by its own inclination, it is necessary that that to which everything

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 2.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, c. 3.

is inclined is what is willed by God. Since God has no further end of His willing than Himself, and since He is goodness itself, it follows that all things are inclined by nature to good. So all things have an appetite for the good, for to have an appetite is nothing else than to seek to tend to something as ordered to it.

Therefore, since all are ordered and directed to good by God, and in such a way that there is in each thing a principle through which it tends to the good, as if seeking its own good, it needs be said that all things naturally have an appetite for the good.

For if things were directed to a good without having in themselves a natural principle of inclination, they could be said to have direction to the good but not to have an appetite for it, but by reason of their natural inclination all are said to have an appetite for the good, as if tending to it spontaneously. On account of this it is said in the book of Wisdom 8: 1, that divine wisdom disposes all things sweetly, since everything by its own motion tends to that to which it is divinely ordered.⁵²

Do all things have an appetite for God Himself? All things do have an appetite for God Himself in an implicit way; not all have an appetite for Him in an explicit way. Nothing draws appetite except by being an end, and just as the action of God is in every action, so the divine goodness is in every appetible, since it alone is the ultimate appetible. But this is only an implicit appetite for God. A rational creature, however, can reduce the secondary ends to the first, just as he can reduce conclusions to principles. Such a reduction of all appetibles to God is to have an explicit appetite for God.

And just as in demonstration one has not rightly grasped the conclusion until he has reduced it to first principles, so also the appetite of a rational creature is not rectified except through an actual or habitual explicit appetite for God.⁵³

In reply to the objection that no one desires what he flees but that some hate God inasmuch as they flee Him, St. Thomas explains that God can be looked at in two ways, in Himself

⁵² *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 1.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

and in His effects. In Himself He cannot but be loved since He is goodness itself. So those who see His essence, that is, the blessed in heaven, love Him as much as they know Him. In His effects, on the other hand, He can be hated, for those effects may seem contrary to the will. For example, punishment and hard precepts may be contrary to the good intended by a particular will. But even so, God is still loved implicitly in some other of His effects, for everything has an appetite for its own to-be and this also is an effect of God.⁵⁴

It might seem that God cannot be loved in Himself as an ultimate good, since one loves all things as proportionate to oneself, as good for the one loving. Now, it is true that everything mainly wills the good which is most suitable to it, and this is its good. When the good of the thing loved, however, is or is thought to be greater than the one loving, then the lover wills that good to be rather in the thing loved. For the good of the lover himself is found rather where it is more perfectly realized. The good of a part is found more in the good of the whole than in the part itself, and so every partial good tends more to complete good than it does to itself. Since our good is perfect in God, therefore even by nature it is more loved in Him than in us.⁵⁵

But can God be loved above all things with an eye to a reward? We can consider the act of love in two ways, in itself and in respect to its object. In respect to its object, it is clear that an act of love of God above all things with an eye to a reward or anything ulterior is impossible. On the other hand, goodness accrues to man as a result of his love of God, and this goodness can be said to be a reward. From the point of view of the act of love, which can itself be loved since it is a good in that by it we are inclined to God, something can be loved beyond that act as a reward of it. But if the right order is to be preserved, this reward must not be made the ultimate object of our love. Considered as a lovable object, our love

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, ad 3.

⁵⁵ *III Sent.*, d. 29, a. 3.

itself may be loved because it is good for us. But again, considered as a lovable object, our proper good must not be loved more than God.⁵⁶

There are different sorts of appetite. Everything has an inclination to the good by its very structure itself and this is called "natural appetite." But some things are capable of having not only their own structure but the structure of others as well, and this without conflict, since they have the structure of the other as of the other, they do not assume it as their own. This is knowledge. Where there is knowledge, there must be appetite leading to the perfection of the knower not only as he is naturally structured in himself but as he is a knower as well. Such appetite is of various kinds depending on the various kinds of knowledge which it follows. Human will is appetite consequent on intellectual knowledge, and so it is called "rational appetite." Man also has a sensitive appetite, which he shares with other animals, for everything that senses has this sort of inclination. And, of course, man also has natural appetite in common with all things in nature. Indeed, sense and will can themselves be considered as having natural appetite, inasmuch as by their structure they are inclined to the good.⁵⁷

Does the will then will something of necessity? The question as it is stated is ambiguous: Does the will will something by being forced, and again, does the will will something through its natural inclination? The first is clearly impossible. But in the second sense it is true that the will does will something of necessity. We have just seen that the will, too, is a certain nature. As such, by its natural inclination it is inclined to its due end. On the other hand, considered just as will it has appetite for something according to its own determination, not inasmuch as it is naturally inclined.⁵⁸

But natural inclination does not necessitate the will in all of its acts, because precisely as will, the will is indeterminate with

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, a. 4.

⁵⁷ *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 3; q. 22, a. 4.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 5.

respect to many. For the will does not follow perception immediately by natural inclination, as sense appetites do in brutes, but follows a judgment of reason. The freedom of the will is rooted in the indeterminacy of this judgment with respect to particular goods.⁵⁹

There is indetermination of the will with respect to its object, that is, with respect to what is willed. For while it tends to its ultimate end of necessity, still there is variety in what is to the end. There is also indetermination of the will with respect to its act, for its act is in its own power, so that given any particular good as a possible object it can act or not act. For it naturally wills the good, but it is not determined by its nature to will this or that good. There is also an indetermination of the will with respect to the order to the end. This indetermination can arise either from the indetermination with respect to the object in the case of those things which are to the end, or also from some failure in the apprehending of the end and the means.⁶⁰

In a sense the will is able to move itself. For from its determinate motion to the end, it is able to move itself with respect to those things which are to the end, just as by its own power the intellect can reason from given principles to conclusions.⁶¹ Furthermore, God moves the will as an efficient cause just as He moves every natural thing. For He causes the will and its natural inclination and He moves it into the act in which it moves itself, that is to say, here as in everything God causes all actuality including the actuality of the free act of a free will.⁶² But what of the indetermination of the will as to this or that object? Granted that the will moves itself to act or not to act and moves all the other powers of the soul in this fashion, it must be said that so far as the specification of the will is concerned, it is the intellect which moves it, for it is

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 24, a. 1; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 83, a. 1; I-II, q. 13, a. 6.

⁶⁰ *De Verit.*, q. 22, a. 6.

⁶¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 3.

⁶² *Ibid.*, a. 6.

the will's nature to be intellectual appetite, and thus it is the intellect which presents the will with its proper object.⁶³

Considering human acts, that is, acts which man freely performs, it is seen that it is the object which gives them their character, just as it is the structure of a natural thing which gives that thing its character. So the first goodness of a human act depends upon that act having a proportionate object. Sometimes this object is the natural effect of the action, and then the proportion of action to effect is the basis of its goodness. But although an action is called good from this, that it can induce a good effect, still the goodness of what is effected does not cause the goodness of the action.⁶⁴

But what is this suitability of the object which is at the basis of the goodness of the act? It is a suitability of the object to man, a suitability which man measures by reason. The norm or rule of morality, therefore, is reason. If we will what is good, our willing is good; if we will what is reasonable, what we will is good.⁶⁵

But this reasonableness is not itself an unmeasured measure. For it is itself measured by the eternal law which is the divine reason or plan. Our light of reason shows us the good and leads us to it only insofar as it is a reflection of the divine wisdom.⁶⁶

There seems to be a difficulty, however. In the first part we showed that, according to St. Thomas, truth of the practical intellect is in the accordance of judgment with right appetite. Now, however, we have said that reason is a moral standard, and so it would appear that right appetite is right insofar as it is in accord with reason. Which of these is true? St. Thomas, in commenting on Aristotle's *Ethics*, raises this question and replies to it as follows:

Now there seems to be a certain question here. For if truth of the practical intellect is determined in comparison to right appetite,

⁶³ *Ibid.*, a. 63.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 18, a. 2; q. 19, a. 2.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, q. 18, a. 5; q. 19, a. 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 19, a. 4.

and rectitude of appetite is determined through the fact that it is concordant with true reason, it follows that there is a kind of circularity in the stated determinations. Therefore, it ought to be made clear that appetite is of the end and of those things which are to the end, and the end is determined for man by nature, as has been explained in the third book. Those things which are to the end are not determined for us by nature but by the investigation of reason. Therefore, it is obvious that rectitude of appetite with respect to the end is the measure of truth in practical reason. And as to this, the truth of reason is determined by its consonance to right appetite. But the truth of practical reason itself is the rule of the rectitude of appetite as to those things which are to the end. And so as to this, appetite is said to be right as it follows out what true reason judges.⁶⁷

We can begin at this point to discern the order of determination: divine reason, nature, appetite for the end, human reason, object, appetite of things to the end.

There is one more problem which we may consider briefly, namely, the judgment in which the object is presented to the will. We must first distinguish between the judgment of conscience, that is, the particular judgment of goodness or evil, and the judgment of choice, that is, the particular judgment of what is to be done. The judgment of choice may be contrary to the judgment of conscience; one may judge to do that which he knows with the same particularity he ought not to do. In this respect, the judgment of conscience may be said to be pure cognition, not in the sense that it is theoretic rather than practical knowledge, but rather in the sense that it is pure practical knowledge rather than an application of such knowledge in the actual determination of appetite.⁶⁸

Conscience binds men, not by forcing choice, which would remove freedom, but in a conditional way through knowledge. What is the condition? Very simply, it is that if a certain good is to be sought or a certain evil is to be avoided, then it is required to choose in this fashion. The condition, in other words, is the good, and in the last analysis the condition is the

⁶⁷ *VI Ethic.*, lect. 2.

⁶⁸ *De Verit.*, q. 17, a. 1. Notice the replies, especially ad 4.

ultimate good, not, of course, in general but in particular determination.⁶⁹ And it cannot be thought that conscience does not bind as a law inasmuch as it is man's own act. For it certainly is true that man does not make a law for himself, but through an act of his knowledge, by which a law made by another comes to be known to him, he is bound to the fulfillment of the law.⁷⁰

The judgment of conscience is not self-evidently true but is the term of a reasoning process. Reason is concerned primarily with the universal; the judgment of conscience is always particular. There is a special sort of practical syllogism by which the required illation is accomplished and which St. Thomas has discussed and analyzed in considerable detail.⁷¹ We cannot consider that entire analysis here, significant as it is, but some remarks about the first principles of that reasoning process are in order.

Just as in the theoretic order there must be certain first principles which are self-evident or immediate, so also in the practical order. These first practical principles constitute what St. Thomas calls "natural law." The habit of these first principles is innate just as is the habit of first principles in the speculative sphere. But again, just as in the case of the first theoretic principles, the actual knowledge of these principles depends upon experience and intuition, the act of intellect abstracting from the particularity of experience.⁷²

The habit of first practical principles is called "synderesis." Yet we must know that the practical syllogism is not a syllogism in all the strictness of the scientific syllogism. St. Thomas calls the practical syllogism a "quasi-syllogism." The practical conclusion could not wholly be resolved to the first principles of the natural law, since synderesis supplies only what corresponds to the major premise of a scientific syllogism. One cannot proceed from the universal first principles of right, that is,

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 4, ad 1.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, qq. 15-17; *II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79.

⁷² *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 12; *II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

from the natural law, to the judgment of conscience without the introduction of other premises which are not contained in the natural law.⁷³

In respect to this natural law, the following points should be noticed. Like all law, it is an ordering by reason, since it is a kind of measure and ordination of what is to be done and this is an act of reason rather than of will.⁷⁴ Again, like all law, it is an ordination to the common good, since its force is reduced to the ultimate end and this is the common good.⁷⁵ Now we can speak of the eternal law, and this is nothing but the plan of governance of things in God as in the chief of the whole universe.⁷⁶ We may, on the other hand, speak of natural law. All things have a share in eternal law inasmuch as they are under rule by it. But different things share in the eternal law in different ways. Some are ruled by the eternal law without sharing in it in such a way that they can rule themselves by it; others, of course, rational creatures, are ruled by it by having a principle derived from it by which they rule themselves.⁷⁷ Such a principle is the natural law.

Natural law, then, is a body of first practical principles. It is not made by reason but discovered by it. It is formed by the mind by the mind's having a natural habit which is brought to act through abstraction from experience. This experience includes not only things that are, but also the natural inclinations of man. Not inclinations in the sense of sensual appetites, but in the sense of the general orientation to good and to particular goods which is structured into man. There are several principles of this law, the first of which is based on the most general inclination to good: "Good ought to be done, evil ought to be avoided." The consequent principles are based on this and on certain more specific inclinations to particular goods, as to self-conservation, generation and education of children,

⁷³ *II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 4.

⁷⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 1.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 91, a. 1.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, a. 2.

the use of intelligence and social life.⁷⁸ Moreover, as we noted above, it is of the greatest importance to notice that the judgment of conscience cannot be simply deduced from these principles.

III

We have attempted to give a summary account of a few of the leading principles of ethical theory in Kant and Aquinas. And we have made an effort to do equal justice to both. In neither of the theories is our account a summary of the complete ethics nor even of the principles of ethics. A good deal more could be said in both cases to supply the ultimate bases for the conclusions and to explain the doctrines of virtue, the determination of principles to particular cases, and even the points with which we have been especially concerned. These two ethical theories certainly could not be judged rightly either absolutely or even in comparison to one another merely on the basis of this summary.

But our purpose in this article is not judgment but examination and comparison. We have made an examination, limited, to be sure. But our examination should be sufficient for a similarly limited comparison. We proceed, then, with our limits in mind.

Let us first point out some of the oppositions which can be seen from our exposition.

For Kant, reason is a moral standard of itself alone, and it can be a moral standard only inasmuch as it is a standard of itself alone. Freedom, in the sense of autonomy, is first absolutely in the order of moral determination. For Aquinas, on the other hand, reason is a moral standard but not of itself alone; it can be a moral standard only inasmuch as it is consonant with the prior moral standard of right appetite, and in the final analysis with the final moral standard of the eternal law. There is no such thing as freedom in the sense of autonomy and freedom of choice is precisely what is in need of moral

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 94, a. 2.

determination. True liberty, that is, liberty from sin in which self-mastery consists, is not a peculiar moral principle; it is rather the attainment of a certain degree of moral perfection.

For Kant, inclination furnishes maxims which must be considered merely by reason according to its own principle, that is, merely as to whether they can have the force of universal law, and law has its character as law merely from its form. For Aquinas, reason cannot form law merely from itself. Inclination of nature, inclination in a very different sense from that which Kant had in mind, is a supposition of the law. What is even more basic, in Kant law derives its force from itself and not from any order or necessity besides itself; in Aquinas law derives its force from the end and from necessity of order to the end. In Kant the law is not discovered elsewhere than in reason; it is a fact of reason; in Aquinas law is found by our reason in nature. Kant explains the law by autonomy and that is an ultimate inexplicable principle; Aquinas explains the law by nature and ultimately by the divine nature.

For Kant, the will is the only absolute good because it is the ultimate source of goodness; for Aquinas, man is good fully by his will alone but this is because it is by the order of the will that all other human powers are moved to their ends and by it that man is moved ultimately to his ultimate end.

For Kant, the goodness of the object and of the end is a derived good, it depends on the will. For Aquinas, the goodness of the will in any particular act depends directly on the object and ultimately on the last end. For Kant, the law itself is the unique moral motive; for Aquinas, natural law and ultimate end are sharply distinct. For Kant, if our analysis is correct, it is possible that there is a practical truth but it is wholly dependent on reason as a law-giving faculty; for Aquinas, practical truth is reduced to a higher norm in the orientation of the will with respect to the ultimate end.

For Kant, the precept to love God above all things is to be reduced to the moral law; for Aquinas, the precept of love is at

the very foundation of the law, since it regards the relation of appetite to ultimate end and the law depends on this.

Superficial similarities do not stand up against such stark systematic oppositions. Nor are these mere superficial differences. Our first examination brought out some apparent resemblances but we have seen them dissolve before an examination of arguments. These differences are real and they are differences of the greatest importance. For they are no mere theoretic differences. Aquinas: until appetite is reduced to explicit intention of the ultimate end there is no moral goodness. Kant: if the will does not rest in the law, if it intends any end other than as a consequent of the law, then there is no moral goodness. Human goodness is at stake here; following one theory one would fail as a man if the other is correct. This point, we think, cannot be urged too strongly.

On the other hand, taking into account this opposition, the undeniable differences of the two ethical theories, one can see ways in which there is a similarity in the function of certain principles within one theory to the function of certain radically different principles within the other.

In Kant there are primary moral principles, the moral law is not manufactured by imagination or fixed on by feeling or taste but it is a fact of reason. Similarly in Aquinas there are certain fundamental moral principles which reason must see, principles which need no demonstration, principles which are objective and necessary. Just as we find first practical principles in Kant in the same way as we do first theoretic principles, by attending to the necessity with which reason prescribes them and clearing them of all empirical accretions; so we find first practical principles in Aquinas in the same way as we do first theoretic principles, by an intellectual intuition having a basis in a natural habit of the intellect and in common experience.

In Kant there is a requirement that moral interest be first in obedience to the law itself, other interests are moral only insofar as they are subordinated to duty. Similarly in Aquinas, there is a requirement that moral interest be first in the ulti-

mate good itself as it is in itself. Just as we are morally good in Kant by a subordination of every subjective interest to the universal moral law, so we are morally good in Aquinas by a subordination of every proper good to the common good. "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice and all the rest shall be added to you," can have a proportionately similar sense in both theories; to place the reward above the law in the one case, and above the ultimate common good in itself in the other, is a complete perversion of moral rectitude. Universality of legal form is to Kantian ethics what the common good is to the Thomist ethics.

In Kant there is a necessity of reason being practical of itself alone if it is to be truly practical at all. Similarly in Aquinas there is a necessity of appetite being for a good if there is to be any appetite at all. Just as we do not truly act practically in Kant except through the domination of reason over all else, so we cannot have any action in Aquinas except through the ultimate end: as Kant began with a problem of how reason can be practical, so Aquinas might have begun with a problem of how action as human is possible at all.

Such comparison of two radically different theories by a consideration of similarities between what is intrinsic to each as it is found related within it could be carried on indefinitely. Nor is it determinate in the sense that one comparison excludes another: Kant's law is like Aquinas' end and also like *synderesis*.

Returning now to the point from which we began, the distinction between theoretic and practical is both greater and less in Kant than it is in Aquinas. If we may use terms not precisely adapted to either of our philosophers, hoping that a careful examination of the discussion which follows will assist in the clarification of our meaning, we might say that Kant puts a unity between the two as to form and ultimate principle, a unity which is quite alien to the philosophy of Aquinas; but Aquinas, on the other hand, claims a unity or continuity with respect to object or matter, a unity again altogether alien to the system of Kant.

Kant, in the introduction to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, explains that the organization of the first *Critique* and that of the second must conform in general outline "... because it is still pure reason, the knowledge of which here underlies its practical use."⁷⁹ He explains this statement further in a section on the critical examination of the analytic at the end of that book.

Whoever has been able to convince himself of the truth of the propositions in the Analytic will get a certain enjoyment out of such comparisons, for they correctly occasion the expectation of bringing some day into one view the unity of the entire pure rational faculty (both theoretic and practical) and of being able to derive everything from one principle. The latter is an unavoidable need of human reason, as it finds complete satisfaction only in a perfectly systematic unity of its cognitions.⁸⁰

The chapter in the methodology of the first *Critique* which is concerned with the architecture of pure reason is of some aid in explaining Kant's position on this point, for there he says that our many modes of knowledge must form a system in accord with reason's legislative prescriptions. Only so can these all play their roles in furthering the essential ends of reason.⁸¹

In St. Thomas, no such unity as this can be found in any purely human science. Sacred doctrine, it is true, is both speculative and practical, but it unites both in a single principle only because it goes beyond all merely human knowledge, so that considering diverse things under the divine light of revelation, it unites those considerations which in philosophy must be distinct.⁸² We have already seen how there are first practical principles just as there are first theoretic principles. Both are acquired in a similar way but there is a basic difference in what is taken into account in the two cases, for the practical have a basis in the natural inclinations of man in a way in which the theoretic do not. And a reading of St. Thomas' commentary

⁷⁹ *Practical*, p. 129.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 195-197.

⁸¹ *Pure*, p. 653; pp. 653-665.

⁸² *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 4.

on Aristotle's *Ethics* will indicate how appropriate to the peculiarities of practical subject-matter he thought the structure of the argument in general and in detail must be. Not only the truths of the science but the form must be appropriate; in analyzing the book Aquinas derives the form from the peculiarities of the subject-matter.

On the other hand, Kant divides the theoretic and the practical as nature and freedom. In nature all is determined but man as a moral agent is free. For nature is not thing-in-itself but appearance, whil' man as a moral agent is in a world not of things as they seem but of things as they are.

According to St. Thomas, man as a moral agent fits into the world of nature. In fact, it is the will as a certain nature that is determined, and to this determination must be reduced the indetermination of will as will. Nature is a principle of morality in Aquinas, so that man as a moral agent abstracted from nature is impossible. For Kant, moral agency must be abstracted from nature, morality in nature is impossible.

"Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily they are reflected on: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me."⁸³

"There is one first of all beings, possessing the full perfection of all to-be, whom we call God."⁸⁴

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⁸³ *Practical*, p. 258.

⁸⁴ *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 1.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Christ of Faith. The Christology of the Church. By KARL ADAM.
Translated by Joyce Crick. New York: Pantheon Books, 1957. Pp.
364. \$6.00.

Msgr. Adam has in the evening of his life published a summary of the lectures that he has given for some years at the University of Tübingen. He discusses the sources of Christology and deals interestingly with the history of Christological controversies. The second part of the work is a study of the Church's doctrine of Redemption.

Christ is well and worthily treated from an apologetical and dogmatic point of view. The work is for the initiate in theology, since it uses technical terms freely and is deeply speculative. Yet it will be read by those without a theological background. Consequently, if not for the challenge of theological speculation, priests and seminarians would do well to be familiar with this book; Karl Adam already enjoys an earned reputation among English readers, and this monumental work might well become popular.

It would please this reviewer to recommend *The Christ of Faith* without reservation. There are passages, however, which are susceptible of misrepresentation. For example, on page 7 Moses is called the founder of the religion of Israel, and the author seems to put Judaism on a level with Buddhism and Islam. Christianity, he writes, is entirely different, and later: "Judaism is nothing but a mere episode." Certainly Karl Adam is not antisemitic, or unaware of our spiritual ties with Judaism, but one could get the wrong idea from such a statement.

When he notes on page 2 Athanasius' argument for Christ's divinity (only God can redeem mankind), he does not point out the fallacy or mention that theologians can have the right answers but give wrong reasons to substantiate it. (Adam doesn't hesitate to write on page 38, "There is no doubt that Cyril was not entirely motivated by unselfish reasons.") The Author himself does not seem clear on the necessity of the Incarnation for redemption because on page 298 he writes: "Only a God-man could redeem us." St. Thomas, in the *Summa Theologiae*, III, q. 1, a. 2, expresses the common doctrine that God could save the human race in a different way from the Incarnation, yet Msgr. Adam himself on page 330 and especially 331 states forcefully: "any theory of redemption that speaks of a necessity in Christ's redemption is to be rejected from the start."

The author seems to stress that God is "*das ganz andere*" (altogether different) in chapter 6 and returns to this theme in chapters 13 and 24.

Obviously he agrees to a degree with Otto and we even find shades of Tillich; however, it would be unfair to label this as a Barthian denial of the validity of analogy.

Then there are inexact formulations in Adam's doctrine. These are in the original German and are not the translator's fault. We will get to him later. On page 39 we read: "Even after the Incarnation Christ remains fully and wholly man." It is also technically inaccurate to speak of a *personal* freedom when speaking of Christ's human freedom. (p. 336)

The reader might be surprised to find that Karl Adam speaks about John the Baptist's "dawning doubt" of Christ as the Messiah on page 106. But that surprise will be mild compared to what is in store for him on page 254 when Msgr. Adam states that Mary knew that she had given birth to Sanctity, but: "more she did not know . . . for her there was still a long way to go for this knowledge to faith in the metaphysical Son of God. And the road was longer still to the belief that this Son would die on the cross."

The surprise might turn to shock by such statements as: "He (Christ) must surely have had some anticipatory knowledge of the suffering that was waiting." (p. 222) The translation tones down or up the German: "Wohl wusste er bereits Einzelheiten des bevorstehenden Leidens." (p. 241) One might think that the author does not mean that Christ would be ignorant of some of the details of the future. Apparently, however, he does think so. On page 253 we read: "Obviously Jesus' human consciousness had not yet been informed as to the moment when he might work his first miracle and take up his messianic ministry." The German text (p. 287) states that ordinarily Christ adopted no other than purely human means for his empirical knowledge. (The translator on page 287 renders this poorly: "he *could* . . . only by . . .") It is precisely in this matter of Christ's knowledge that Adam departs from the scholastics and modern manualists. His explanation permits him to say that Christ literally did not know the day of Judgment because He refused to reflect on the day and the hour. (pp. 275-276) Thus we find such statements as on page 267: "we can only conclude that when the triune God endowed him with the Incarnation he also gave him the knowledge of the Incarnation *as soon as his human consciousness was sufficiently mature to understand the union.*" (Reviewer's italics)

Concerning Jesus' expectation of the world's imminent end, we read (p. 276): "Since Jesus was fully man, it would be quite conceivable (es wäre an sich denkbar) that as a child of his time he might cherish ideas of the age even if they were wrong." He does go on to say: "but Christ could have never made such a notion the basis and turning point of his entire message." With such views regarding Christ's knowledge

the reader is not surprised to hear of St. Paul (p. 321): "and so his hope is rooted in the imminent end of the world."

Msgr. Adam emphasizes the experimental knowledge of Christ and on page 265 seems to infer that St. Thomas abandoned the opinion he had enunciated early in his career that Christ had infused knowledge. The *Summa*, III, q. 9, a. 4, is cited but article 3 of the same question in which St. Thomas teaches that Christ had infused as well as beatific and experimental knowledge is ignored. Also denied is the substantial sanctity of Christ's humanity. (p. 255) This may explain why on page 235 Msgr. Adam says that all the supernatural powers and properties such as actual grace and sanctifying grace in Christ, are there just as (genau so) a Christian receives all his supernal blessings. (Here the translator renders the German of page 254: "Z. b. die aktuellen gnaden, die heilegmachende Gnade" as "such as actual sanctifying grace.")

Another weakness that must be pointed out is a splendidly written but poor comparison of Scotist and Thomistic doctrine. (pp. 198 sqq.) Scotists are accustomed to be misrepresented, but Thomists will be astounded to see that, according to the author, it is Scotistic to say: "Only our faith knows that this love (the movement of Grace—the translation always capitalizes Grace) is wrought by God." It is also set down as Scotistic to assert of the sacraments (the translation has erroneously used "Eucharist" here); "It is our faith that assures that it is the symbol of Christ and therefore will work our salvation." Would any Thomist maintain that reason arrives at the supernatural power of the sacramental sign? Or would any Catholic deny what is labeled Scotistic: "All that is seen and experienced of Christ the man is purely human. Only our faith knows that in his metaphysical depths this man, Jesus, belongs not to himself, but to the Logos?"

On page 195 Adam says that Bañez founded the Thomistic school which teaches, "that its union with the self of the Logos caused the human nature to give up its own mode of subsistence. . . ." Then on page 196 we read: "The sharpest refutation of the Thomistic explanation came from Duns Scotus." Adam surely knows that Scotus died three hundred years before Bañez.

On the other hand, the Scotists will not be very pleased to see on page 208 that their key doctrine of the final cause of the Incarnation has been relegated in a work on Christology to three short, if sympathetic, sentences in a paragraph that deals more extensively with the German idealist philosophy.

Even theologians are human. Most of the "flaws" are really legitimate differences of theological opinions. Perhaps the basic weakness of the book is that it is a summary of lectures that were given over many years and

were not edited or sufficiently brought up to date. The word "*Vorlesungen*" (lecture) gets into the text (German p. 111, English p. 96). In a work, moreover, published in 1954 we would expect some reference to the Qumran findings.

Some of the defects in translation have already been noted. Others that should be brought to the attention of English readers are as follows. The translator says that if Christ were peccable it would: "thus bring our redemption to naught." (p. 41) The German (p. 53) has: "it *could* bring our. . . ." This has doctrinal implications.

In several places (e. g., p. 4) "*Die Sacramente*" is translated as "the sacrament" instead of "Sacraments." (cf. p. 151) Another recurring poor translation is of "*Kirchliche Lehramt*" which would be well rendered "*magisterium*" instead of "Holy Office," and all the other variations used. (e. g., pp. 43, 325, 325) On page 47 "*Einen Jesus*" should be "a" rather than "one." In the English (pp. 50 and 51) there is a sentence of fourteen lines which in German is given in four more intelligible sentences.

There may be nothing wrong in calling John a "passionate young man" (p. 170) but the German says: "John followed Christ when still in his fiery youth." We find the German "*Petrus*" (p. 211) translated as Cephas. "*Ephesianum*" is rendered "Ephesian symbol of Union." (pp. 184 and 185) "*Verbundenheit*" is translated "commitment" instead of "union" in faith and love. (p. 151) For "*Verklärung*" the translator has "Transfiguration" rather than "glorification" that the context demands. (p. 228)

Concerning devotion to the Sacred Heart we read (p. 242) in the English: "it was first initiated by St. Margaret Mary Alacoque," which hardly does justice to the fact or to the original German. To translate "*Medezin*" as "physic" may be permissible, but wouldn't it be better to say that Christ is our medicine? (p. 301)

"*Jungfräuliche*," i. e., virginal, is translated "supernatural." (p. 225) Page 266 speaks of Mary "who conceived him without original sin," when the German (p. 287) "*die ohne Erbsünde empfangen wurde*" clearly states: "who was conceived without original sin" as modifying "*seiner Mutter*." We will give one more example and let the case rest. "Merely a logical distinction" (p. 194) should be "a merely logical distinction."

Given these blunders we can still say that the translation is a fair one. It does have good qualities. The translation has a more detailed table of contents than the original, and it also has an index of persons which is incomplete, but nevertheless an addition to the German.

Occasional English translations are given for works referred to by Msgr. Adam, but neither Adam nor his translator is consistent in giving references. The printing is excellent with a few typographical errors, as page 205 has 1120 for 1121, and page 337 has Nicano for Nicaeno.

We can conclude than an excellent theologian has written a good work that is fairly well translated. It is a work, however, for professional theologians.

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He That Cometh. By SIGMUND MOWINCKEL. New York: Abingdon Press, 1956. Translated by G. W. Anderson. Pp. 544 with indexes. \$6.50.

The author of this important work is one of the world's best-known Old Testament scholars. A native of Norway, Sigmund Mowinckel studied at the University of Oslo, then at Marburg and Giessen in Germany. From 1922 until his retirement in 1954, Dr. Mowinckel was a full professor on the Faculty of Theology in the University of Oslo. The Norwegian edition of this work was published in 1951 under the title *Han som kommer*. The translator, G. W. Anderson, is lecturer in Old Testament literature and theology, St. Mary's College, University of St. Andrews. His graduate studies at Lund University in Sweden gave him the opportunity to study Scandinavian languages and pursue his studies in contemporary Scandinavian biblical scholarship. We are grateful to Dr. Anderson for an excellent translation of this significant product of Norwegian biblical studies.

This book is an examination of some of the central themes of biblical religion. Besides being the work of an expert, it has the further advantage of being an examination of certain theories advanced by the younger generation of Scandinavian scholars by one who is himself a Scandinavian. Mowinckel divides his work into two main parts: Part I treats of the future king in early Jewish eschatology, Part II studies the Messiah in later Judaism. In the first part, he first defines the term *Messiah*, determines and evaluates the traditional material in any study of Messianism, and discusses the ancient Israelite ideal of kingship. There must undoubtedly be, writes Mowinckel, a logical and historical connexion between the concept of the Messiah and the ancient Israelite idea of the king as 'Yahweh's Anointed.' (p. 21) But from the very beginning the royal ideology in ancient Israel had a tendential note: the ideal was never fully realized, there was always something to be desired. Therefore, the author considers next the future hope, the early Jewish future hope, the place of the king in the future hope: the Messiah. Part I concludes with a consideration of the Servant of Yahweh. Part II begins with a brief summary of the eschatology of later Judaism, continues with a study of the national Messiah, and concludes with a long (pp. 346-450) study of

the expression "the Son of Man." Additional notes, a list of abbreviations, a bibliography and indexes complete the work.

Dr. Mowinckel leaves no doubt as to his concept of the term *Messiah*: the word *Messiah* by itself, as a title and a name, originated in later Judaism as the designation of an eschatological figure. It is to such a figure only that it ought to be applied. (p. 3) The Messiah, or the Anointed One, was originally a political figure: in the O. T. the primary and proper sense of the expression *Yahweh's Anointed* is the king, the earthly king who at any given time is reigning over the people of Yahweh. This is true in practically every passage in the Old Testament where the expressions *Yahweh's Anointed*, or, the *Anointed One* occur. (p. 5) He repeats this many times during the course of his book. The reader meets more reason for the author's position as he peruses the work. Just before he begins to survey the traditional messianic material, the author gives what amounts to his thesis on the concept of Messianism: "the content of the Messianic idea will be unfolded in such a way as to make it still more evident that in its strict sense it is bound up with the future hope and eschatology of Israel and Judaism. An eschatology without a Messiah is conceivable, but not a Messiah apart from a future hope. All genuine Messianic prophecies in the Old Testament point forward." (p. 8)

In his survey of material attention is first drawn to a number of passages "which have nothing to do with the subject of this book." He rejects *Gen. 3: 15* on the grounds that it is simply a general statement concerning mankind and serpents, and the struggle between them which continues as long as the present state of things exists. He denies that the *royal psalms* speak of a future, much less an eschatological, Messiah; rather they are concerned with a contemporary earthly king of David's line, who has just been enthroned. The same applies to other psalms traditionally considered to be messianic prophecies: in their literal sense they have an immediate and contemporary reference; if they apply to Christ at all, it is in the typical sense. Actually, Mowinckel thinks these are not prophecies at all, but prayers. (p. 12) The prophetic books are the true sources for Old Testament conceptions of the Messiah. For the moment, the author is not concerned with the origin and antiquity of the hope of restoration, of the belief in a Messiah, and of eschatology. What he wishes to do is simply establish, if possible, the date of the actual Messianic prophecies in the prophetic books. The passages to be considered are the following: *Is. 4: 2; 7: 10-17; 8: 8b, 10b; 9: 1-6; 10: 21; 11: 1-9; 11: 10; 16: 5; 32: 1-8; 55: 3; Jer. 17: 25; 23: 5 f.; 30: 9. 21; Ez. 17: 22-24; 34: 23 f.; 37: 22-25; Os. 3: 4 f.; Am. 9: 11; Mi. 4: 8; 5: 1-3; Za. 9: 9 f.* Which of these passages belong to the pre-exilic age? The answer is important, not only for a survey of the probable historical development of the Messianic faith, but also for the

solution of a major problem which has been discussed during the past generations or more: Is the Messianic faith pre-exilic or post-exilic in origin? The author observes that ultimately the question has only a relative interest because even if the Messianic faith belongs, in the main, to the age of Judaism, its actual content goes back to much older conceptions. (p. 16)

From his study of the above passages he concludes that only two or three can be attributed on good grounds to the pre-exilic period. *Is.* 7: 1-14 undoubtedly goes back to the time of *Isaia*s that of *Is.* 9: 1-6 belongs to the period of the monarchy. Yet even these passages are not strictly messianic. Dr. Mowinckel thinks *Is.* 11: 1-9 presupposes the fall of the monarchy; *Is.* 32: 1-8 is not primarily a prophecy, still less a Messianic prophecy. It is really a wisdom poem describing in general terms the blessings subjects enjoy during the reign of any upright king. He maintains that all other passages are post-exilic. The result of this survey of material, then, is this: all genuinely Messianic passages in the Old Testament date from the time after the fall of the monarchy and the destruction of the Israelite states. Those few passages which are held to be Messianic and pre-exilic (i. e., *Is.* 7 and 9: 1 ff.) should not be considered Messianic in the strict sense. For this position he argues: (1) the conception of the king in the old royal ideology and the doctrine of the Messiah are, in all the main features, identical; (2) the vast majority of the Messianic passages belong to the post-exilic age when the monarchy no longer existed. It is therefore at least possible, and in fact very probable, that the few remaining pre-exilic sayings about the ideal king are really concerned with the actual historical kingship, and not with the Messiah. (p. 20)

The author follows with an extensive, detailed, and up-to-date study of the royal ideology of the ancient East and the relation of Israel's kingship to that of Mesopotamia and Egypt. Though he is especially concerned with the place of the king in cult, he is cautious with respect to the conclusions of the 'ritual pattern' school: its views have the character of a provisional thesis to be demonstrated by further research, rather than an assured position based on detailed investigation. (p. 24) The author rejects both the idea that this royal ideology concept must be traced back to a specific myth about a celestial, divine 'saviour king' of the future, of whom individual kings were regarded as realizations or incarnations and the theory that the royal ideology was originally associated with or derived from an *Urmensch*. Nor does Dr. Mowinckel think that the myth of the *Urmensch* is a concept common to the ancient East. (p. 55) When Israel adopted kingship after the Canaanite model, she also adopted and imitated Canaanite *ideas* of kingship, its forms and etiquette. The *Hofstil* in Israel

would naturally be a more or less faithful imitation of that of Canaan, which itself was but a special form of that found throughout the Near East. It must be remembered, he notes, that in Yahwism, the royal ideology underwent profound changes. Another modification would be the traditions which the Israel monarchy inherited from the old chieftainship of the semi-nomadic period and the time of the settlement. (p. 57) Israel's monarchy is the result of the fusion of the traditions of the old chieftainship with the laws, customs, and ideas of Canaanite kingship. Not to be forgotten also is the fact that, in the course of time, the common oriental royal ideology would undergo in Israel quite fundamental changes under the influence of Yahwism and the wilderness tradition, and that many of the forms which were borrowed would acquire a modified or new content. At this point, this reviewer would like to underscore an observation of Mowinckel regarding the relation of sources to Israel's concept of the ideal of kingship: "it is one thing to determine the ideas and terminology which Israel borrowed from alien sources, but quite another to determine what she did with them. (p. 75) This is an extremely important principle for all those who are preoccupied with source material. The identification of sources does not always solve the difficulty in the text under investigation. A further step is necessary: the discovery of the intention of the writer who used the sources.

Dr. Mowinckel notes that the Israelite concept of kingship contains no naturalistic elements in the relation of God and the king. The religion of Israel could never tolerate the thought that the king was identical with Yahweh or that he acted as if he were. There is no evidence to indicate the existence of a metaphysical conception of the king's divinity and his relation to Yahweh. On the contrary, the king is Yahweh's son by adoption only. (p. 78) Royal ideology in Israel differs essentially from that found elsewhere in the East because the Israelite concept of God differs essentially from that of other oriental religions. For example, when the Canaanite spoke of the *living god*, he meant *the god who has come to life again*. For the Israelite, the same expression meant *the God who always lives, and creates life out of His own life*. Yahweh is the holy God who does not die. Whatever cultic pattern and myths of Canaan the Israelites may have adopted, they certainly rejected or radically transformed all those conceptions and rites which presupposed the death and resurrection of the deity. There is no evidence in Israel for the Egyptian notion that the king is one with the dead god. Nor is there evidence that in Israel the king was regarded as Yahweh, much less the dying Yahweh. In every way the king was subordinate to Yahweh. In relation to the only truly living One, the king was a mortal man. (p. 88) The Israelite conception of and belief in kingship, writes Mowinckel, are the expression of

the desire for some visible human evidence and guarantee of Yahweh's covenant and of His active presence with His people. This conception really points forward to Him who was its true fulfillment. (p. 95)

The ideal of kingship in ancient Israel had a certain relation to the future. This ideal was never fully realized. There always remained something to be desired. The hope persisted that one day the true king must surely come. Then things would be as bright as they had been under David, the founder of the dynasty. (p. 97) At certain culminating and turning points in Israel's life the prevailing ideal of kingship crystallized into a present expectation and a specific promise of a definite person who had already come or would come. This figure would be the full realization of the ideal. The author contends that it is misleading to term this 'the Messianic hope,' or, 'Messianic faith,' because the word *Messiah* then loses its most important element, the eschatological. It is clearly evident that these decisive turning points in Israel had a cultic character. (p. 99) The realization of the kingly ideal was associated with the house of David, to which belonged the covenant and the promises. This future hope cannot be older than the monarchy itself because it comes from a time when Israel was conscious of the gap between the ideal and the real in her kings. The hope of change arose in virtue of Israel's affliction and need for help. What is the relation between royal ideology and the Messianic content? Which came first? Mowinckel does not leave any room for doubt: the royal ideology is older, the conception of the Messiah more recent. The Messiah is the ideal king entirely transferred to the future. He is no longer identified with the specific historical king, but with one who will one day come. (p. 123) The substance of the Messianic hope was taken from royal ideology, not *vice versa*. But how and why did this originate in Israel in the first place? What caused such expectations? In taking the step from royal ideology to Messianism in Mowinckel's sense, we must keep in mind his fundamental concept of Messianism: *it is eschatological*. Royal ideology is not Messianic when it refers to an historical king precisely on the score that it is not eschatological.

The Messianic faith was from the first associated with the Jewish hope of a future restoration. There is an important nuance for the author in the term 'future hope': a future hope which is national need not be eschatological. (p. 125) He rejects the views of Sellin, Gressman, and traditional Christians regarding the origin of the Jewish future hope. He does not deny the thesis that the concept of the Messiah came into existence because God revealed such thoughts and dreams to His saints. But, he asks, how old is this conception? Has it a history or did it come into existence in one fell swoop? What secondary causes did God use? Before the Jews acquired a genuine eschatology, it had a hope for the future

which was fundamentally religious. Out of the future hope eschatology developed. The earlier hope is always a hope of restoration. (p. 133) He distinguishes in the earlier Jewish future hope (1) the hope of restoration itself from (2) the specific conceptions of its content. This specific content of the idea was older than the faith in restoration which it embodied. In other words, restoration hope, which had as its background the destruction of the nation, acquired a specific content through the transference to a new *setting in life* of a group of concepts which already existed in another context. (p. 134) The chief features in the hope remain fairly constant. Yahweh had for all time chosen Israel for Himself and guided her history towards a definite goal, the glorifying of Israel in the world for the honor of Yahweh's own name, so that all nations might acknowledge Him as the only true God. (p. 137) A future hope such as this had two poles: politics and religion. For the ancients these were but two aspects of the same thing. Ultimately, it was the religion of Israel, not its national and political aspirations, which created the future hope. (p. 138) With respect to content, the fundamental idea in the future hope is always the kingly rule of Yahweh. The honoring of Yahweh as king is the final goal of history. (p. 144) In the description of the future, the specific features are those which emerge when these ideas drawn from cultic experience are applied to actual historical situations in which the Jews were placed. Yet this hope of restoration is not yet eschatological. How is it that Israel alone among the Oriental nations developed an eschatology? The answer of Mowinckel is: Israel's religion, its conception of God, and the distinctive historical character of that conception. (p. 151) Eschatology, then, was the product of a spiritual transformation of the national and political hope of restoration. He writes: "The essential content and theme of the future hope and of eschatology is the faith which grew out of history and was corroborated by history, faith in a living God who has a purpose and a goal in all that happens." (p. 153) Dr. Mowinckel thinks Deutero-Isaiah began this transformation. In spite of his universal outlook, however, Deutero-Isaiah is still a Jew, still affected by Jewish nationalism. He did not present a true eschatology. We miss the conception of a definite end to the present order, and of a new world of an essentially different character from this one. What does begin to take place in Deutero-Isaiah is the severance of the future hope from historical reality, from the contingent, from any causal connexion with circumstances, so that it assumes an absolute character. (p. 154)

It is against the background of the hope of national restoration that we must consider the Messianic expectation of early Judaism. The author considers the Messiah as simply the king of this national and religious future kingdom which will one day be established by a miraculous inter-

vention of Yahweh. Messianic faith is of its very nature linked with Israel's hope of restoration. But as we mentioned above, the hope of restoration required that there be a restoration to be accomplished. The hope, then, developed after the fall of the state. (p. 155) The Messianic hope in the strict sense arose at the same time as the hope of restoration, and as an integral part of it. A fundamental principle in understanding the content of the Messianic conceptions may be stated as follows: whatever applies to the Israelite idea of kingship also applies to the Messiah but in a greater measure. The Messiah is the future, eschatological realization of the ideal of Kingship. (p. 156) The king of the restored Davidic kingdom of the future is not a divine king but "a mortal man of David's line." He rejects any suggestion that this king might be David in person, returning in a wonderful manner, on the score that it is contrary to O. T. ideas of death. The fundamental thought in the Jewish hope of restoration concerns the kingly rule of Yahweh. The gloriously endowed king of the future, who will inherit the covenant promises made to David, will exercise that rule of Yahweh daily in the future restored kingdom. That kingdom will be restored on the basis of the old covenant. It will be the work of God, not of man. The kingly rule of the future king, like that of David, will extend over other distant and alien nations. He notes a close connexion between the priestly function of the king and the establishment of the new covenant. He also points out: all the mythical features, which in earlier times belonged to the conception of the king were transferred to the Messiah, the future king, in a greater measure than when applied earlier. Mowinckel turns from his study of this future king to a consideration of the Servant of Yahweh.

The author agrees with most scholars that the four servant passages form a separate group within the collection of Deutero-Isaiah's sayings. He recognizes that the Servant has received a quite special task from Yahweh: to make atonement for others, to bring them back to peace and communion with Yahweh by means of his own sufferings and death. He does not suffer for his own sins, but for the sins of others. (p. 209) The Servant is clearly no collective entity: he is not the nation, or the congregation, or a group within the nation. Nor is he the ideal as distinguished from the empirical Israel, for such a distinction is Platonic, not Hebraic. (p. 213) Dr. Mowinckel rejects the suggestion of a combination interpretation: he is the prophet and he is also Israel. This would combine the individual and collective interpretations. The Servant is a prophet, not a king. He is not, therefore, the Messiah of the O. T. But the author thinks he is a real historical person, who lived, worked, suffered and died, who is dead and buried. He will one day rise again and be highly exalted. (p. 249) He was a prophet from the same circle as the author of the

Songs, i.e., the Isaianic and Deutero-Isaianic circle. After his death, his disciples recognized the divine purpose. He who had been misunderstood and rejected was in a special sense the Servant of Yahweh, the mediator of salvation and restoration to the people of Yahweh and to all mankind. The poet, of course, has idealized the portrait. (p. 250) The entire spiritual experience of the Servant's circle, the prophetic movement, and of Israel throughout revelation history, left its imprint on the portrait. Still, it remains the supreme spiritual legacy of the prophetic movement, its ideal goal. (p. 251) The message about the Servant surpasses anything the Old Testament reveals about the person and mission of the Messiah, the future king. It is the task of the Servant to bring back Israel to Yahweh. He is to do this by his suffering and death. But for the Jews a suffering Messiah is a contradiction. This is the reason Judaism never interpreted the Servant of the Lord as the Messiah without drastic modifications of the text and portrait. Actually, the Messiah and Servant are perfectly compatible. What the Messiah cannot do, the Servant of the Lord will do. What no Messiah, as conceived by the Jewish national religion could accomplish, the Servant accomplishes: the conquest of the souls of men. (p. 256) He concludes that it is with justice that the Church has, from the very beginning, seen in Jesus Christ the true fulfilment of these prophecies. In this, she is simply following Jesus Himself. He was much more than the Jewish Messiah was conceived to be, and something essentially different. He found in the prophecies about the Servant of the Lord a prediction of His own mission and work. (p. 257)

Although all the pre-suppositions are there, the message about the future in Deutero-Isaiah should not, strictly speaking, be called eschatological. We can, however, justifiably speak of a real eschatology in later Judaism. The Jewish future hope became eschatological when it was linked to a dualistic view of the world, introduced from Persia. (p. 263) This addition of Persian dualism transformed the Old Testament hope of future restoration into as eschatology, a faith and doctrine about the 'last things.' There was a minimum of emphasis on the doctrinal aspect. The development of eschatology was deeply affected by theological, exegetical, and speculative learning based upon the old prophetic sayings and books. (p. 266) The influence of dualism also meant a considerable strengthening of the transcendental element in eschatology. But it was never forgotten that the starting point of the future hope was faith in the restoration of Israel as a free people among the nations of the earth. Thus there persisted in eschatology an unresolved tension, a gulf between those elements which were national, political, and this-world, and those transcendental, universal elements which belong to the world beyond. (p. 267) Here, Mowinckel notes, we have two profoundly different conceptions of the future, one of

which is older and more truly Jewish than the other. In the earlier period, the other-worldly dualism is least effective. The reason: the general assumption then is that the salvation of Israel will take place as an historical event. (p. 268) In the later period the newer elements gradually asserted themselves. In the development towards individualism and universalism, Judaism was becoming as much a religious community as a nation. (p. 270) In this development new needs arose. Salvation for the individual required more than the faith in the restoration of the people at some future time. A new eschatology came into existence; it was dualistic, cosmic, universalistic, transcendental, and individualistic.

The Messiah, he says, is not an indispensable part of the future hope or of eschatology. He appears not at all in some writings which speak of the future hope and in other writings only occasionally. It was not easy to disregard the fact that the Messiah was in origin a political figure belonging to this world. Had it not been a fact that in certain circles in the later period the conception of the Messiah was powerfully and decisively influenced by other religious and eschatological ideas, it might well have passed out of eschatology altogether. (p. 281) In the concept of the Messiah in later Judaism two tendencies appear: (1) The concept of the Messiah as national, political, this worldly, a concept characterized by particularistic tendencies; (2) the other concept is super-terrestrial, other-worldly, rich in religious content and mythological concepts, universalistic, numinous, at home in the sphere of the 'Holy' and wholly 'Other.' (p. 281) These two types seldom appear in a pure form. The first is found chiefly among the masses of the people and it is among them that this concept of the Messiah lived on. The second is found in apocalyptic literature, for the most part.

The Messiah was generally regarded as an earthly man like other men. Time after time, writes Mowinckel, some historical person was regarded as the Messiah and aroused great Messianic excitement among the people. (p. 284) He would be of David's line, a 'son of David.' It was not until the later period of Judaism that the king of the end time came to be called the *Messiah*. (p. 291) The Messiah's coming depended upon Israel's conversion. It was necessary, therefore, to have forerunners to accomplish this. Elijah, Moses, Henoah, possibly "the prophet" of the fourth gospel and possible, too, the Samaritan, Taheb. (p. 300) When the royal day of Yahweh is mentioned, the idea is that He becomes king and is acknowledged as such, because He has again accomplished His work as king. The day of the Messiah is evidently to be taken in the same sense. He is not only king, he is also, in a sense, priest and prophet. His mission is the salvation of Israel: to restore Israel as a people to her former glory by freeing her from her enemies, crushing the heathen world

power which holds her in bondage. (p. 311) Contrary to Christian thought the Messiah of Judaism is not a figure who suffers, dies, and rises again. There was no question of an atoning death. He did not have the place in later Judaism which is found in the Gospels. These latter would have us believe that this place was a dominant one, but we must remember that the Gospels reflect a particular *milieu* within Jewish religion and life. (p. 337) The Messiah, the author thinks, did not occupy an important place in normal, everyday, religious thought and feeling. When the purely religious aspect of the future hope is prominent, the Messiah is, to a certain extent, neglected. He plays no part in the Jewish cult except as a subject of prayer. (p. 341) If the idea of Messianic faith became central to the structure of belief in later Judaism, it was because a profound change had taken place in the Messianic idea, which is reflected in the concept of the Son of Man.

In his study of the expression "the Son of Man," Dr. Mowinckel treats of the meaning of the phrase, the sources of the conception of the Son of Man, the origin, characteristics, mission and kingdom of the Son of Man, the identification of the Son of Man, and the phrase as used by Jesus. The Aramaic *bar nāš* should really be translated 'a man,' 'a child of a man,' or, in the definite form, 'the Man'; it can be applied to any single individual of the species *man*. On this translation there is now complete agreement. (p. 346) He thinks that there is no valid linguistic grounds for denying (1) that the expression was a definite Messianic designation in certain circles, or (2) that Jesus could have used it of Himself. This view is opposed to that held by Campbell: Jesus could not have applied the term to Himself as a Messianic designation, because he could not have taken the phrase or the conception from so 'stupid' a book as the Enoch Apocalypse, and because Jesus was not interested in apocalyptic. (cf. note 3, p. 347) The author maintains that when Jesus calls Himself *the Man simpliciter*, He gives to the expression (or rather there is already implicit in it) a specific meaning. It is the intention of Christ to express something essential to His mission as God's representative and the mediator of the kingdom of God. In other words, He uses the expression to interpret His Messianic mission. (p. 347)

No one will deny the necessity of trying to understand what Jesus meant by the phrase, "the more so since the expression was not a customary Messianic designation in general use." Jesus Himself, says Mowinckel, was not the originator of this expression. In certain circles in Jewish religious phraseology it had already been used to denote a person who in many way corresponds to the Messiah. Perhaps in some circles it actually designated the Messiah Himself. At the time of Jesus the expression *Son of Man* embraced a certain specific content; when He used it, therefore, it

suggested to His hearers a number of definite conceptions of the mission and message of the *Man* who applied it to Himself. (p. 348) Mowinckel rejects the view of Badham which holds that before Jesus the expression *Son of Man* had no special meaning whatever and that it was Jesus Himself who gave it one. (cf. note 3, p. 348) This is not to say that Jesus simply took the expression in the same sense which it had before Him, "since Jesus and His message represent an advance on all who had previously proclaimed the kingdom of God." Yet, admits Mowinckel, even before the time of Jesus the phrase must have already included essential elements of what Jesus wanted to say about Himself; otherwise, why should He have adopted this one in preference to that of *Messiah* and other titles which he might have applied to Himself? To understand what Jesus meant by calling Himself *the Son of Man* we must try to discover what the expression stood for in the religious terminology of later Judaism.

From an examination of the vision of the beasts in *Dn. 7* (which he thinks comes from the period just before 165 B.C., in its present form) Mowinckel concludes: (1) in the present form of Daniel's vision of the beasts, the Son of Man is a pictorial symbol of the people of Israel, not an individual figure and not a personal Messiah of any kind; (2) the seer of *Dn. 7* is not himself inventing his material but actually using tradition. He, or the tradition he represents, was already familiar with a *Man* who would one day come with the clouds of heaven. It was most natural to see in this *Man* a symbol for Israel; (3) we can conclude from *Dn. 7* that about 200 B.C. or earlier there was in Judaism a conception of a heavenly being in human form (i.e., one like a man), who at the turn of the age, the dawn of the eschatological era, would appear and would receive from God delegated power and authority over all kingdoms and peoples. (p. 352) This, then, is the position of the author: the seer of *Dn. 7* has reinterpreted the figure of the Son of Man as a symbol of Israel in conflict with the beasts. It is precisely because of this reinterpretation and the juxtaposition with the beasts that Daniel does not use the expression *Son of Man* but speaks of "one like a man." Thus the conception of the Son of Man existed in Judaism independently of *Dn. 7*, according to Mowinckel. He suggests that the various forms of the conception (and this would include *Dn. 7*) must be dependent on earlier conceptions in circulation in some circles in later Judaism. These would be presented directly in Enoch, symbolically in *Dn. 7*. After *Dn. 7*, the chief source for the Son of Man conception is the *Similitudes* in the Ethiopic Book of Enoch (1 *En. xxxvii-lxxi*). The basic thought of the *Similitudes* is the fate of the righteous and the ungodly, and the eschatological role of the Son of Man as judge of the world and the ruler of the righteous. Once it is clear, says Mowinckel, that the conception of the Son of Man

in *Dn.* 7 had an earlier history on Jewish soil, there remain no valid reasons for suspecting the conceptions of the heavenly Son of Man in Enoch. To interpret this figure in Enoch as a symbol for the community of the chosen then becomes impossible. (p. 355)

From a study of these and lesser sources the author presents the following portrait of the Son of Man: he is above all else an eschatological figure who has not yet appeared, but who will be revealed in the last days; precisely because he is an eschatological figure, the Son of Man comes to be regarded in Jewish thought as one with the Messiah, though originally they were quite distinct from each other; in contrast to the earlier, earthly Messiah of David's line, the Son of Man (as he first appears in the Apocalypse of Enoch) is a pre-existent, heavenly being, with a real pre-existence, not merely an ideal one in the mind of God; he is the first of God's creatures, before the sun and the stars; God has endowed him with his *kābôd*, a kind of divine glory; the Son of Man is exalted high above the angels and is clearly regarded as the king of the eschatological community which already exists in heaven; he is regarded also as the ideal or typical man, but the most important thing about the Son of Man is that he will come forth and appear in the sight of men to effect the ultimate, eschatological judgment of the world, a judgment of cosmic dimensions; he thereby assumes his role as world king. Did later Judaism also believe that it was part of the character and work of the Son of Man in pre-Christian Judaism to suffer and die for the salvation of men? Mowinckel says Dalman and Klausner were correct when they maintained that there is not a single passage in the entire apocalyptic literature which suggests that it is part of the vocation of the Son of Man that he must suffer and die to atone for the sins of men. (p. 410) The author now turns to the problem of the origin of the conception of the Son of Man.

"It ought to be obvious that the heavenly, pre-existent being, 'the Man,' of divine, angelic character, preserved and hidden with God until the time of his epiphany, surrounded by a heavenly community of elect, righteous ones, the souls of the great departed, did not originally have any connexion with the Old Testament Messiah, and cannot be explained either by Old Testament presuppositions or by the royal ideology of the ancient east." (p. 420) It is clearly Mowinckel's opinion that the Messiah and the Son of Man have no common origin, not even in the royal ideology of the ancient east. More and more studies on this question of origins have focused upon the widespread oriental conceptions of the divine, Primordial Man, 'the god Anthropos.' The variant conceptions of this more or less divine Primordial Man appear to have had historical connections. All seem to be derived from Iranian or Indo-Iranian myths. The notion of the Primordial Man is really a cosmological idea which arose from an

attempt to explain the origin of the world or the cosmos. (p. 423) The Primordial Man is also an eschatological figure, for in most of the variants of this conception we find this as an essential feature. Dr. Mowinckel concludes: recent research has made it increasingly clear that the Jewish conception of *the Man* or the *Son of Man* is a Jewish variant of this oriental, cosmological, eschatological myth of the Anthropos. (p. 425) In Judaism, however, the emphasis is laid on the eschatological role of the Son of Man. Judaism was unaware that the Son of Man was really the Primordial man. (p. 436)

In what sense did Jesus Himself use the phrase? Here is the opinion of the author: "Both what has been said above, and also the use of the phrase in the Gospels, make it plain that what Jesus seeks to express by it is not, primarily, the idea, which most readily occurs to the modern mind, of His connexion with us men, of the earthly and human side of His nature. His use of the phrase proclaims boldly the original paradox, that He, who will one day come with the authority of God, is called 'the Man.' But with Him the order is reversed: He, who now goes about as an ordinary man, is also the one in whom the miraculous powers of the kingdom of God are at work; it is He who has the power over the mighty, and is Lord of the Sabbath; and it is He who will one day be revealed as 'the Son of Man,' with divine glory and authority." (p. 446) He stresses the fact that it is an original and essential element in Jesus' thought that the Son of Man will be rejected, and will suffer and die before He comes in glory. The thought was unheard of, both among the adherents of the national Messianic ideal and still more among those who gave allegiance to the idea of the Son of Man. But Jesus rejected the notion of Messiah as held by His contemporaries and replaced it with the concept of 'the Man' who comes from God to suffer and die as God's Servant, in order to save men from the power of sin, Satan, and death." (p. 450)

No one can reasonably deny that this is a valuable contribution to Old Testament study. It is a sober, scholarly presentation of important and central themes in the thought of Judaism during pre-Christian times. An examination of Mowinckel's references will reveal to the reader how complete and up-to-date are his sources. This reviewer has permitted the author to speak for himself in many places and has attempted to indicate the line of thinking. This is not a book for popular consumption. Conservative exegetes, especially those who have not kept abreast with modern studies on the Old Testament religious ideas, and those theologians who have neglected the study of Old Testament theology, will understand this work only with difficulty. A word ought to be said about the literary style of the author. I am not at my best in Norwegian, and cannot, therefore speak with authority on the original language of this book. How-

ever, it is clear that the translator has remained close to the structure of the original. Long sentences with many qualifying and modifying clauses abound, and may take re-reading. Yet Dr. Mowinckel is extremely logical in his presentation. He repeats again and again certain fundamental principles in his thought; this, no doubt, was very useful to his students and confirms the author's observation in his preface that the book originated in lectures to students of theology at the University of Oslo. In a book of this type it can be useful to us, the readers of his lectures, also.

Has he written the final word on the matter treated in this book? He would be the first to deny it. He could have said much more, or qualified what he did say, had he been more familiar with Catholic opinions. Mowinckel's definition of Messianism as eschatological can certainly be challenged. As a matter of fact, the author himself seems less strict when studying the place of the king in the future hope (Chap. VI). The term *Messiah*, it is true, does not appear until the period of later Judaism. It is equally true, however, that there existed in the earlier stages of the development of Israelite religious thought a conviction that God had set a determined goal for the unfolding of history and would intervene to guide it to this goal whenever necessary. Is it legitimate to deny to this concept of the future the term "Messianic"? The answer to this question will determine, as it has already in Mowinckel's case, the results of the survey of source material. If the soteriological aspect of Yahweh's relation with His people be considered in no way Messianic, the texts reflecting this soteriology will be rejected as non-Messianic. The moral and priestly aspects of Israelite kingship are properly emphasized. Israel's kingship was transformed as a result of its union with Israel's covenant with Yahweh. McKenzie has wisely suggested adding the kingship of Yahweh as the transforming agent. In his treatment of the Servant of Yahweh, Dr. Mowinckel has correctly emphasized the special task of the Servant: to make atonement for others, to bring them back to peace and communion with Yahweh by means of his own suffering and death. The position on the relation of the Servant to the Messiah is sound; they are perfectly compatible. Mowinckel is especially clear in his distinction between the two concepts of the Messiah in later Judaism. It is rather surprising to find no reference to possible light from the Qumran material, since most scholars feel it is valuable in determining the development of thought during the inter-testamental period.

He concludes his work with a long treatment on the title *Son of Man*, as we have seen. I am not as certain as Mowinckel seems to be that "for Jesus, the fact that *He* is the Son of Man is a paradox, a mystery of the kingdom of heaven, a cross of faith." (p. 446) Granted that Christ adopted the spiritual aspects and rejected the nationalistic and worldly

aspects of the Messianic hope, must we conclude to the position of the author as to the intention of Jesus in choosing the term? I think not. With respect to Mowinckel's suggested source for the idea of the Son of Man, I think he has wisely stressed the fact that a refashioning of the mythical figure had to be done in accordance with the spiritual structure of Judaism itself. Future study of the sources of the Son of Man concept will undoubtedly qualify some of the author's suggestions.

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The Character of Man. By EMANUEL MOUNIER. Translated by CYNTHIA ROWLAND. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. Pp. 351. \$6.00.

Mounier who died in 1950 has written several books of which the *Traité du caractère*, published in 1946, is one of the most important because it summarizes the author's ideas on man, his nature, and his destiny. The original work of some 800 pages has been abridged considerably in this translation, in fact, reduced to about one third. On this and on the translation in general some words will be said below.

Mounier is known as the initiator and leader of a movement which he termed "Personalism." His *Personalist Manifesto* has been made available to the English-speaking world several years ago, and so also his volume on *Existentialism*. His standpoint is, indeed, somehow akin to that of the "existentialists" inasmuch he, too, is concerned with individual man. He distinguishes, however, his position sharply from that of individualism. "Personalism," he wrote in a note supplied to Lalande's *Vocabulaire*, "is sharply distinct from individualism and underscores the collective and cosmic insertion of the person." The term "insertion" is reminiscent of expressions which recur in the writings of the existentialist thinkers: engagement, being-with, being-in-a-world. Mounier's personalism has been labelled, not unjustly, as "political"; in his conception the interaction of individual man and society plays a much greater role than it does with the existentialists. The present volume, however, deals chiefly with man as a person or, as the author says in his Foreword, with "all that it means to be a man, and a man of his time."

The book, Mounier remarks, is "intended to be scientific" ("scholarly" would have rendered his idea better). And it may deserve this name inasmuch as it assembles a multitude of facts, presents them in an organized form, and endeavors to take account of all sides of human nature. Never-

theless, the book is essentially that of a *dilettante*, if this term is taken in a non-pejorative sense, or, if one prefers, of an eclectic, who starting from definite notions makes use of whatever seems suitable to support his thesis. A consequence of this procedure is that of a certain lack of critique; one comes across occasionally references to sources which can hardly be viewed as reliable. Also some statements are given interpretations in a sense which is not that of the original author, because these quotations are taken in isolation and without consideration of the context in which they occur. Mounier's own views, in fact, do not need to be supported by those of others so that one feels that the book would have profited had its author tried less to make it into a *traité*.

Three chapters have been omitted; they deal with the "background," that is, the societal and biological factors determining or influencing man's character. This omission is justified, since in these fields so much work has been done in the last ten years, that some of the references are rather obsolete. Less fortunate is the exclusion of many remarks on contemporary and older art and literature; this has been done because these things are but little known to the American public. But this circumstance does not render the references less pertinent or less interesting. Also omitted are the numerous passages in which the author makes use of the typology proposed by Heymans, the reason being that the reader should not be confused by alien ideas to which he is not accustomed. But when an author believes that a particular typology is the most suitable one to render intelligible the varieties of character, and thus plays a basic role in his presentation, it seems more correct that these notions be incorporated even in an abridged translation. The one and a half pages summarizing this typology, in an appendix, are not really helpful.

The leading idea of Mounier may be stated, perhaps, by saying that he views man's character not so much as something given as it appears to him as a task to be done. Indeed, within the limits set by all sorts of conditions, biological, social, psychological, man is not independent of his ancestral or personal past but he is not its slave either. Most of what is said on these limiting conditions has been left out, though numerous references to such matters find their place also in the present text.

The notion of "personalism" entails the recognition of very person's absolute uniqueness; as a person, therefore, man cannot be an object of scientific inquiry. "The very object of the study of character is incapable of being known objectively, but not of being known. Characteriology is to the knowledge of man what theology is to the knowledge of God: an intermediary science between the experience of mystery and the rational elucidation to which the manifestations of this mystery may be subjected." (p. 24) If the "mystery of the person" is emphasized (one wonders at

finding no mention of G. Marcel in whose thought the "mystery of being," i. e., primarily of the human person, plays a prominent role), the empirical aspects are not overlooked and ample use is made of the real or alleged discoveries of modern psychology. The most numerous references are to Freud, Janet, and Nietzsche, for Mounier realizes that man's character and conduct must be envisaged in the confines of his present actual situation and that, therefore, consideration must be given to the ideas which have so much contributed to the shaping of this situation. And there can be no doubt that psychiatry has been one of the most influential factors. Sometimes it even seems that the author, like many of his contemporaries, tends to overrate the significance of psychopathology for our understanding of the normal person.

The idea that man is capable of, and in a way obliged to, shaping his own character is closely related to Mounier's fundamental Christian conception of man's nature and destiny. His discussions of human relationships, of the sense of guilt, and similar topics are penetrating and helpful. One wonders, though, that the phenomena of bad conscience, of repentance, atonement, and others are not taken into consideration. On the other hand, one will find interesting and searching remarks on the significance of moral and spiritual life for the full and healthy development of character.

These matters are dealt with in the final section "spiritual life within the limits of character." All the preceding chapters lead up to this last part. The approach is empirical and inductive. Man's relationship to reality, to his fellows, to himself, his use of reason are successively analyzed to furnish the basis for the concluding summary. The author realizes that moral considerations transcend the realm of psychological analysis, but also that without them an understanding of human nature remains sorely incomplete. He describes various types of distorted morality, which hinder the full growth of personality and, consequently, become an obstacle to a truly fruitful moral existence. One will find in this chapter valuable comments on the evils of an excessive puritanism, of pharisaism, of the preponderance of fear of vice over the love of virtue. Mounier formulates several rules of which one or the other deserves quotation. "Know yourself and accept yourself, because you will never be effective outside the paths and limitations that have been assigned to you." But this self-acceptance is anything but complacency. "You will never discover what you are (prospectively) except by denying what you are (statically)." And: "Understand and accept the character of the other, for it is the only way to lead you to his mystery, to break down your own egocentricity and establish the working foundation of a life in common."

Because every person is absolutely unique, his religious life likewise is his own, formed according to, and within the limitations of his personality.

The religiosity of the child is not that of the adolescent, and the latter's not that of the mature mind. Far from narrowing down, as many have maintained, religious life broadens and develops man's personality. Nor is true religiosity hostile to reason; quite to the contrary, it leads to a full appreciation of all sides of man's nature. "A healthy religious life . . . makes for free and liberal minds; only unhealthy expressions encouraged by a too inhibited or solitary religious life lead to uneasy religiosities."

The book contains many penetrating analyses of, and brilliant insights into, various sides of human being and conduct; in this sense its perusal will prove rewarding. It would do so much more, were not the English version marred by grave defects. There are several misprints; one is thoughtlessly taken over from the original (*pondus meus*); how *romantique* (p. 338 of the original) became "monastic" (p. 89) is incomprehensible. What is worse is that the translation is often inaccurate. *Acceuil vital* is not "vital response," but rather welcoming, absorbing, embracing; *prise de conscience* is not "act of consciousness" but becoming aware; nor is *arbre vital* to be rendered by "living tree," but by "tree of life"; the expression is, probably, a reminiscence of a passage in Goethe's *Faust*. A complex "*lâché*" (the quotation marks are Mounier's), is a complex released, freed from the repressing powers which hold it back in the unconscious, but not a "relaxed complex," which is a meaningless phrase. The worst, however, is that the bibliography is unusable and does not measure up to the demands of the American reader. About one third of the 320 odd references are incomplete; one does not know whether they are to a book or to an article. More than fifty titles are given in French or German of books which exist in English translations; twice titles of originally English works (by William James and Herman Melville) are given in French. Translating such a work requires more than an acquaintance with the language; one has to be acquainted also with the subject-matter, with the peculiarities of technical terms, and the form in which scholarly achievements have to be cast. The translator expresses the hope that the reader will be induced to turn to the original after having read the abridged version. Indeed, he should.

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The Coming World Civilization. By WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956. Pp. 210. \$3.75.

In this little book Professor Hocking of Harvard foresees a world civilization resulting from "certain interior necessities of the historical process." (p. 64) He gives a neo-Hegelian explanation to its causes. The principal necessity, which can be said to include all others, is for history to pass beyond modernity. Such an evolution is necessary because of certain conflicts within modernity. The modern spirit has been an advance; we cannot return to pre-modern ways of life and religion. For by secularism modernity has freed the arts and sciences from the domination of religion, and by subjectivism it has enriched individual, personal lives, making the subjective ego the center and source of ethical principles. Yet secularism and subjectivism carry their own contradictions within them. Subjectivism is contradicted by the loss of contact with other men, a tendency to solipsism, in the face of our natural desire for communication. Secularism is contradicted by its impotence to provide men with motivation.

Out of these tensions will come a new religious awareness and a new civilization. From the "I-am" of subjectivism a new awareness of the universal validity of religious experience will result. This awareness is an intersubjective "Thou-art," a recognition of a common experience which Hocking implies is God, an intuition of the goodness of all being. As a result barren secularism will give place to religious motivation. Secularism will abandon its "night view," a view of the world as devoid of final causes which secularism has adopted as a result of its preoccupation with the natural sciences and its ignoring of religion.

A new and revitalized Christianity must contribute to the new world civilization. This adult Christianity will meet other religions with only its bare essence, without exclusiveness, without claims of special revelations and miracles, without promises of heaven and threats of hell. The essence of Christianity is three-fold: (1) the faith that "the nature of things is divine love for the created world, a love that suffers"; (2) the moral code "that desire must be reborn as active love, a will to create through suffering"; (3) the practice of this code in the deed "which creates the conditions for the non-futility of all such wills." (p. 108)

To Professor Hocking Christianity in its essence is a completely natural religion. "The Prophet of Nazareth" made certain "inductions" based on his own experience and on Jewish tradition. These were principally the Golden Rule and the "intuitions" that "he who loses his life shall have it" and that "ye must be born again." (p. 90) In other words, Christianity teaches something that is universal in religion: the need to lose one's self in a higher and completer self.

Professor Hocking's frequent use of the word "induction," his appeal

to experience, his approval of John Dewey's statements, all suggest a religious pragmatism: that is true in religion which works for you, and what works is known only by doing. He implies that the moral law changes and evolves towards a greater awareness of the good. Yet he is opposed to Indifferentism, Relativism, and Syncretism because these paralyze the will and retard religion. He admits that every religion must have its particular elements, but if acceptance of these is demanded for its diffusion, its universality will be compromised. Religions must rather interact on the basis of their "unlosable," simple essences, which every man can interpret for himself through history. As a result, the true mystic in every religion—one who recognizes that "the nature of things is supreme good" (p. 138)—will recognize the true mystic in all other religions, as Gandhi recognized Christ, though he chose to remain a Hindu.

Professor Hocking's religion is, of course, a natural one. He rejects miracles as superstition; he abhors the intrusion of God into our affairs. His "God" is the "Thou-art" of which our individual "I-am" becomes gradually aware. God is the intersubjective reality of experience of the Other. His "speech is the voice of the world's hope." (p. 199) He can be equated with certain "ideal ends" of human life in the phrase of John Dewey. God is finite and in potency, for He suffers out of love for humanity. Some of Hocking's expressions suggest pantheism; he speaks of the "God-nature" in man, of men as the offshoots of God. (p. 105) He raises the question whether God may be "the ingredient of being in all beings, the 'I-am.'" Professor E. S. Brightman has classified Hocking as an absolute idealist, a monist. (*A History of Philosophical Systems*, ed. V. Ferm, N. Y., 1950, p. 346) His statements that the nature of things is love or good seem incomprehensible on any other basis.

Since God is not really distinct from us, there is no place in Hocking's religion for worship, ceremony, sacraments, or sacrifice, for God as the transcendent object of all our religious actions, or for God as the supernatural end of our lives. Religion becomes ethics. It is simply "the affirmation of the anchorage in reality of ideal ends." (p. 30) Its function is "the integrating of human motives." (p. 46)

Faith to Professor Hocking is "as natural as breathing." (p. 102) Consequently there can be no revelation in the traditional sense, nor is any needed. Our own minds are the standard of the truth of revelation. Otherwise truth and human nature would lose their unity. Our judgment would be set aside by "*force majeure*." (p. 115) For him creation represents the "particular universe" as "a passage from idea to fact." The doctrine of Incarnation (not *the* Incarnation) means "the escape from generality" to the particular. There can be prophets, messiahs, or *logoi*, "but God-in human-form . . . must remain in the realm of fable." (p. 181)

Professor Hocking's naturalization of everything Christian and his refer-

ences to supernatural revelation as *force majeure* indicate that he has no notion of grace as perfecting and elevating nature rather than destroying it. His denial of anything super-human suggests that he is not aware of the possibility of our minds' dealing with a transcendent God in theology and philosophy by means of analogy. He appears to be in error on two fundamental philosophical points. First, he seems to confuse love with feeling when he says (p. 88) that we cannot regulate our loving or not loving at will. But we can, for love is an act of the will, not merely of the sense appetite, and the will is free. Second, he seems to misunderstand the Thomistic doctrine of act as perfection and to confuse substantial act with predicamental action. He thinks that the Thomistic doctrine of "being-as-act" means that "to exist, for human beings, is to act as efficient causes." (p. 77 n.)

The Catholic reader may wonder how anyone can write of the spread of Christianity as if the Catholic Church did not exist. For Christianity has not been spread in the past and is not being spread today by missionaries who preach its pure "essence," but by missionaries who preach all of the truths which God has revealed. The Holy Eucharist is not an accident of Christian worship; it is the heart of the Catholic religion.

In one way Professor Hocking is far ahead of the incipient world civilization which he expects to emerge from our times. It has not yet passed beyond modernity. But in his use of the Bible, he has passed beyond Protestantism, which is part of modernity. His only Christian source is the Bible, and in this the gospels, and in the gospels those few sentences which express what he thinks is the "essence of Christianity." He refers to the other books of the New Testament only to reject them as additions to the message of "the Prophet of Nazareth" by his followers. It is strange indeed, passing strange, that he should know more about the true message of Christ than those who lived with Christ and heard it directly from Him. And He who taught the Golden Rule and the sacrifice of one's life to save it also taught the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, claimed to be God and died for claiming it, warned of judgment and hell, promised heaven, commanded us to sacrifice and eat His Body, demanded Baptism for salvation, gave Peter the keys and the apostles the power to forgive sins, spoke of our guardian angels, and required the acceptance of His exclusive doctrine.

He who seeks to exalt man ends by degrading God and man. The "religion" which Professor Hocking has labored to build is not that which the Lord has built. Therefore he has labored in vain to build it. In the dedication of his book he refers to "the arriving *civitas mundi*." The phrase is appropriate. If his city comes, it will not be the *Civitas Dei*.

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LINUS WALKER, O. P.

The Catholic Church, U.S.A. Edited by LOUIS J. PUTZ, C.S.C. Chicago: Fides Publishers Association, 1957. Pp. 415. \$5.95.

The title of this book is somewhat misleading; it suggests a more comprehensive treatment of the American Church than the text provides. True, the editor says in his preface that the subject might easily call for encyclopedic treatment and this had to be avoided. But the title does suggest areas of Church activity on which the writers have been strangely silent.

That a book on the Church in the United States covering the topics listed in *The Catholic Church, U.S.A.* is timely no one will question. And the reliability of the subject matter is guaranteed by the contributing authors; their names are well known in Catholic circles. So *The Catholic Church, U.S.A.*, is an important work—a must for those who would be correctly informed about the activities of the Church in America.

It is obvious from the table of contents that the contributors have given us monographs on subjects with which they are especially competent to deal for they have written on subjects closely related to their special fields of activity. However, it is a matter of regret that some vital issues of interest to Catholics as well as to those outside the Church in the United States should have been omitted. And an index, admittedly difficult in this instance, would have been most helpful.

How the late Father Augustine Maydiou, the French Dominican who had originally planned this work, would have covered his subject, we do not know. The book, according to the editor, is an attempt to realize the plan which Father Maydiou's untimely death prevented him from carrying out.

The editor was most fortunate in having His Excellency, the Bishop of Worcester, write the Introduction to the book. Bishop Wright has given us in brief not only an amazingly comprehensive sketch of the Church in the United States, but he has given it to us in his characteristically excellent style. The Introduction is a synopsis of what *The Catholic Church, U.S.A.*, implies.

A short history of the American Church, her relations with the Holy See, her organization, her school system, financial structure, labor relations, regional adaptations, intellectual and spiritual activities are all treated by one or another of the twenty-two contributors.

In this review the present writer must of necessity confine himself to those chapters which he thinks will command the widest interest, and this with apologies to the writers of the very fine essays that make up the rest of the book. Of especial interest to Catholics as well as non-Catholic readers because the topics are currently discussed in the press, on the radio and television, are the chapters on the Holy See and the United States, the Catholic school system, the Church and labor, the Church and racial

segregation and the Church's activities and the Christian life, which the author discusses under the title: *Activism and the Interior Life*.

On the Holy See and the Church in the United States Father Edward Ryan, S. J., has this to say: "The Catholic Church in the United States is the daughter of the Roman Church in a way that few Churches are . . . owing to the circumstances of the times Rome's surveillance of the American Church has, perhaps, been closer and more effective than was the case of other national Churches. In the nineteenth century America, because of the absence of ties between States and Church, Rome was in general successful in guiding the development of the Church. Counterbalancing this favorable circumstance," he continues, "was the deep suspicion and even hatred of the Catholic Church entertained by many Protestants." (pp. 37-38) Quoting Dr. Peter Guilday Father Ryan says: "'in 1785 the leader of the American Church (Bishop John Carroll) spoke of the jealousy of our government towards all jurisdiction of a foreign kind.' These sentiments," he adds, "have never ceased to torment large segments of the nation." (p. 38) With the exception of the Federal Government which is no longer suspicious of the Church, the unfavorable circumstances mentioned above are true today in some sections of the United States.

From the landing of the first priests in America up to 1908 the popes directed the Church here through the Sacred Congregation *de Propaganda Fide*, Propaganda as it is called. Since 1908 ecclesiastical affairs in the United States have been supervised by Rome as in other countries. The Apostolic Delegation set up in 1893 by Leo XIII is the intermediary between the American Church and the Holy See. The establishing of cathedral chapters (opposed by the American hierarchy), trusteeism with its advantages and disadvantages, the nomination of candidates for vacant American sees, the Americanization of immigrants who with Rome's approval set up national Churches, the beginnings of the parochial school system involving the problem of dual taxation and the rise of anti-Catholic societies complete Father Ryan's excellent essay on the Holy See and the Church in the United States.

In his chapter on the school system Msgr. Hochwalt describes the development of the Catholic school system. The First Provincial Council of Baltimore (1829) saw the necessity of teaching religion as well as the three R's in American schools. Some parochial schools already existed, but when Pius IX in 1851 urged the establishment of parochial schools, the First Plenary Council issued decrees on the subject. But the parochial school, as Msgr. Hochwalt points out, is only a segment of our educational program, "that involves literally millions of individuals and ranges from pre-school programs for infants to a complex schedule of education for adults in all walks of life. (p. 109) The Church is engaged in education

for one purpose only—to make men saints, that is to make them holy. . . . The Church seeks by every educational device to bring men to the knowledge, love and service of God. . . . Whatever else is done in educational endeavor must remain subordinate to the chief good of bringing salvation to men.” (p. 110)

There is an intimate relationship between education and citizenship, between education and personal integrity. The man and the citizen, apart from grace, is the product of education. The purpose of education under Catholic auspices was clearly expressed by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical on education: “to cooperate with divine grace in forming Christ in those regenerated by Baptism.” (p. 110) The premise upon which Msgr. Hochwalt bases his thesis is that a mutual relationship exists between one’s theory of education and one’s theory of life. “Because the Church has a definite concept of the nature of human beings and their destiny it is consistent for her to develop definite fundamental principles concerning education.” (p. 112) The principles may be reduced to three which in their simplest form may be expressed thus: God is the beginning and end of education; God has revealed Himself in the Person of Christ; only through the Church can man come to Christ and hence to God.

The author of the chapter on the Catholic school system, after describing the origin and development of the parochial schools in the United States, goes on to discuss the establishment of schools of higher learning, secondary schools, normal schools, colleges and universities. He has something to say about textbooks too, and the Department of Education, the Catholic Welfare Conference, the Catholic Commission of Intellectual and Cultural Affairs and the Confraternity of Christian Doctrine. It is not, as the author admits, a complete story of the Catholic educational apparatus, but it will apprise many readers of the tremendous task which the Church in the United States has undertaken in her educational program.

The story of “The Church in the Deep South” is epitomized in the account of Bishop Waters’ apostolate happily recorded in chapter XII. Special problems arising in other parts of the South are treated in other chapters of the book. But what has been accomplished in North Carolina under the leadership of the Bishop of Raleigh should be known to every priest and layman in America. It covers the problem and the answer.

The Catholic Church in the deep South and the Church and racial integration are so closely interrelated that they might well have been discussed in a single chapter. The material set down in the chapters devoted to regional problems is interesting and informative but will not, in the opinion of this writer, commend itself to the general public. However these regional studies could be read with great profit by the people living in those areas.

Edward Marciniak in his chapter on “The Church and Labor” quoting

from *Fortune*, a magazine for businessmen, writes: "The Church is today a potent ally of labor. . . . By reason of its support the Church has won respect and important influence in the labor movement." Marciniak himself declares "that in the United States working men seldom found any serious reason to share the conviction popularly held in other countries that the Church is in league with the wealthy against the poor." (p. 259).

The encyclicals of Leo XIII and his successors on social justice seem to have found their most zealous exponents in this country. Economists like the late Msgr. John A. Ryan, Msgr. Joseph F. Donnelly and labor leaders like the late Philip Murray, George Meany, President of A. F. L.-C. I. O., and men of cabinet rank like Maurice J. Tobin, Martin P. Durkin and James P. Mitchell, all Catholics, all have written or spoken in defense of social justice, the living wage, the rights of organized labor or of non-union workers. There is not always perfect agreement among the leaders on the means but all bend their efforts to the same end—social justice.

Working people in the United States have never developed a strong class consciousness. For May Day demonstrations American workers have substituted Labor Day which oddly enough is a holiday so timed that it extends the normal week-end rest. For the most part, laborers, many of whom own their own homes in this country, do not think of themselves as being on the lower economic level, but rather as "middle class." This group includes the so-called "white collar" employees in all types of service. There are, of course, migratory groups, says Marciniak, that live below the standards maintained by the "middle class." These as well as all other workers are the concern of the Church. Since 1887, when Cardinal Gibbons journeyed to Rome to defend the Knights of Labor, a relationship of trust has existed between organized labor and the Catholic clergy. For many year labor leaders have invited priests familiar with labor-management problems to address their conventions on the moral aspects of contractual engagements, the right to strike, the evil of violence in labor disputes and similar questions. The reader will pardon the reviewer for introducing a personal recollection because it supports the position taken by Mr. Marciniak. It was the privilege of the present writer to address the International Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America on ethical principles in labor relations at a convention called in 1921 by their president, George L. Berry, later Vice-Presidential candidate of the national Democratic Party headed by John W. Davis. Mr. Berry was not a Catholic nor were the other speakers, Samuel Gompers, and Secretary Davis of the Department of Labor.

"The Church in the U.S.," says Marciniak, "confronts a labor movement which functions without any religious commitments, like that of the Christian trade unions on the European and African continents, or without any political allegiance. . . . The neutral character of U.S. unions is not

an historical accident, but was designed deliberately to fit North American conditions." (p. 260)

That the Church has not played a larger part in the American labor movement is due in great measure to prominent Catholic lay leaders according to Mr. Marciniak. These men insist that the place for religion is the church. Because the larger trade unions are concentrated in important industrial cities, Catholics are more numerous than any other religious group in trade unions. Unfortunately, the vast majority of these workers are ignorant of the Church's social doctrine. To remedy this situation The Association of Catholic Trade Unionists and the Catholic Labor Alliances have been established to cooperate with the clergy in publicizing the immortal encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius XI.

Mr. Marciniak concludes his study of the Church and labor with this arresting statement: "Without an informed Christian social conscience, Catholics, even though their number in unions is proportionately quite high, will be followers rather than leaders in the competition among business, democratic and political unionism for the right to chart the future course of the American labor movement. The future, then, of the Church's closeness to the labor movement is by no means secure. It is quite possible that the Church's great tradition of sympathy for working people and their unions which Cardinal Gibbons began 70 years ago . . . could be lost to the United States and to the world. Chiefly responsible for this tragedy," says Marciniak, "would be the failure of the Church to develop laymen whose militancy and philosophy find their source in the Gospel of Christ." (p. 271)

Long recognized as an authority in the field of racial relations Father John LaFarge, S. J., presents the position of the Catholic Church on racial segregation. After pointing out the reprehensible aspects of segregation as a social policy, in part institutionalized in the United States and sanctioned by law in some states of the Union, Father LaFarge enumerates some of the evil consequences of segregation. He touches upon the Communist attempt to win the sympathy of the American Negro by playing up examples of racial discrimination in the United States and stressing the supposedly antisegregation policies of the Communists and fellow travelers. It is a well developed treatment of the question of segregation and deserves careful study by those who are confused about the Church's attitude on the subject.

As a picture of the Church in the U. S. A., the chapter on "Activism and the Interior Life" is one of the best in the book both from the point of view of content and presentation. The author, Father Jordan Aumann, O. P., touches upon many subjects discussed by other contributors, but he does so with that rare insight and decision which lends authority to his thesis. Some parts of his essay, brief but important parts, are encum-

bered with technical terms that will puzzle even the well-educated reader for whom the book was designed. But apart from these small defects his monograph is eminently worthy of the Thomistic tradition which he represents. Father Aumann quite correctly maintains that the Church in the United States is not tainted with the heresy of activism as has been alleged by some of her critics. Because America was for more than a century a missionary country, because Catholicism represents a minority group, because of the peculiar temperament of her people, the Church has been largely preoccupied with activities that are measurable in terms of churches, schools, asylums, hospitals and the building up of large urban congregations. In this respect the Church reflects the character of the American people who built a nation in the midst of the wilderness, and devoted tireless energy to the conversion of a vast continent into a nation of fertile farm lands, wooded areas and populous cities.

Americans have come from many lands—Spain, Italy, England, Germany, Ireland, Poland, Sweden, and from the far corners of the world, and most of these people brought with them their own priests and religious as they brought with them their own language and culture. From the beginning the Church has been confronted with a gigantic task. The aborigines, the Negro slaves, the thousands of Protestant and Catholic immigrants had to be taken care of. The situation was unlike that in any other part of the world. In such circumstances, as Father Aumann states, the Church is necessarily intensely active and evangelical. Yet “in spite of all the labors of religious and clergy and all the sacrifices of a generous Catholic laity the United States is by no means a Catholic country.” (p. 377) In the midst of an intensely dynamic apostolate shared by clergy and laity American Catholics have had little time for the calm pursuit of contemplation. Externally, at least, the Church has developed somewhat like the country. She appears to many of our fellow Catholics abroad a very successful machine or if this expression is too strong, a body with a spiritually starved soul; since . . . “to make external works, however laudable, an end in themselves is what Pope Pius XII calls the ‘heresy of action.’” This allegation has been made against us, but as Father Aumann says, it is only partially true, and can be attributed to over-emphasis on the external apostolate. Happily in our time this trend is finding its counterbalance in the establishment of numerous religious houses for the cultivation of the contemplative life both for men and women. A final word on the increasing popularity of doctrinal and spiritual books by Catholics and the tremendous increase of vocations to the priesthood and the religious life leads Father Aumann to conclude “that there is nothing in the life and work of American Catholicism to occasion undue alarm.” (p. 392)

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QUITMAN F. BECKLEY, O. P.

BRIEF NOTICES

The Angels and their Mission. By JEAN DANIELOU, S.J. Translated by DAVID HEIMANN. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1957. Pp. 114. \$2.75.

In order effectively to bring salvation to men the Church meets the problems of each age by insisting on particular and pertinent doctrines of revelation. In the last century, when her authority was challenged, she defined the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff; when workers were oppressed by employers, she forcefully restated the dignity of man and his right to a decent living. Sometimes she has emphasized aspects of particular doctrine. She did this with the doctrine of the angels. In the Middle Ages, which were much given to speculation, learned treatises on the nature and function of angels were needed. The Christians of the first centuries lived under different conditions and faced different problems. They had inherited the teaching of the Old Testament on the angels and they were aware that special aspects of this teaching would be understandable and attractive to neoplatonic philosophers and to believers in current Asian religions, be they Mithraic or Manichean.

In this situation the Fathers and the early ecclesiastical writers, in treating of the angels, concentrated on their mission, that is, the manner in which they were sent to men. They brought out the particular guardianship of the angels over the Chosen People in the giving of the Law and in the preparation for the coming of the Messias. They showed that the nations, too, though corrupt for the most part, were not without angelic assistance in their striving for a knowledge of God. They explained the familiar role of the angels at the Nativity and represented them as rejoicing at the Incarnation which would aid them in working for men. They portrayed the less familiar but not less interesting activity of the angels as they escorted Christ to heaven where the receiving angels, until informed, do not recognize the Word Incarnate. After Christ's Ascension, the Fathers see the angels watching over in a special way the Church and the Sacraments through which He continues to live among men. In the conflict between the powers of light and the powers of darkness they maintained that each man has a special evil angel enticing him to sin; they believed, too, that a good angel was appointed to help each man to act virtuously and attain union with God. And this assistance does not end with death but is present even at the resurrection and the Second Coming.

All this early Christian teaching on the angels is set forth in a scholarly

manner in Father Danielou's short work. He uses Apocrypha to some extent, but draws mainly upon the Fathers, especially Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and John Chrysostom. His selections are always readable and at times curiously interesting, for example: the sin of the angels consisted in their refusal to acknowledge the image of God in Adam; Christ after His Ascension called the friendly powers together in heaven to share familiarly with them His joy. As is to be expected from a professor of the history of primitive Christianity, the author writes from the historical rather than from the doctrinal point of view. He is more concerned with accurate reference than with theological argument.

The work is well documented. References are frequently made to the sources from which the material has been derived. Of special value is the Index of Citations at the end of the volume. It makes readily available quotations from Holy Scripture and the writings of the Fathers. This monograph should be found among any collection of works on angelology.

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Prayer in Practice. By ROMANO GUARDINI. Trans. by Prince LEOPOLD OF LOEWENSTEIN-WERTHEIM. New York: Pantheon Books Inc., 1957. Pp. 228. \$3.50.

Prayer in Practice says nothing new but the Author draws aside the curtain of the obvious, so often missed, and the reader, at whatever stage of spiritual advancement even only potential, sees himself in his daily life. The difficulties of life, and therefore of prayer which is part of life, find their fundamental and obvious solution in something the reader has *known* all along, yet perhaps but rarely practiced. The solution does not answer the difficulties except by the unanswerable discipline of recognizing reality in a day by day, hour by hour, devotion, the habit of willing service, in the acceptance of God's Providence ruling and guiding his *entire* life. This recognition is intellectual. Rarely is there intellectual difficulty in knowing the difficulties of life or of prayer. The problem lies in the will's failure to accept these difficulties by acting on one's knowledge. Thus one makes a virtue of necessity.

Hence, the necessity of prayer: for help in acting on the obvious, yes; but one owes service to God because He is God. Prayer of adoration then becomes the sure basis for petition; prayer of propitiation gives way to petition for forgiveness. The section describing various attributes of

God as a basis for particular types of prayer to God is well done. As all the divine attributes are interconnected, so are the different kinds of man's prayer to God. His prayer may be personal—God and I; or liturgical—God and we; or popular in which "we" is involved, yet not in the liturgical sense as representative of the entire Mystical Body. Man's prayer to God is a dialogue, and for personal prayer his own spontaneous words are most often best.

Through all prayer is its obvious substratum, the fourth petition of the Our Father: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." Acceptance of God's will implies love of God and therefore of neighbor. Submission to the divine will is but the evident implication and humble fulfillment of God's Providence in the obedience of faith, which sees all things as means leading to God. Through all prayer, too, is the well established part of courageously disciplined perseverance. "Collectedness" (recollection would have been a better word) from the very beginning of prayer is essential to this discipline, for prayer is not always a joy—save for the joy of good possessed because of duty faithfully done, an obvious point but better made had it been explicitly stated. Especially apt and of wide application are some analogies, for example, prayer is for the soul what air is to the body, and in prayer to the saints the mutual relationships of life on earth are extended to the communion of the saints.

Something more on contemplative prayer and its final end of love of God and union with Him; something on mystic prayer as the ultimate and normal perfection of contemplation; something on prayer as an act of the virtue of religion and its relation to the religious act of devotion; something on prayer's relation to prudence and the necessity of direction to avoid pitfalls; something on the indwelling of the Trinity in the chapter entitled "The Trinity and Prayer"—such fundamentals to prayer in practice should have been included.

It is not fair to take a statement out of its context, yet context cannot make up for inexactness. For example: "God's holiness as His inmost essential being" (p. 47); "lacking something which is an intrinsic part of human nature" (p. 56); "God is the supreme universal" (p. 63); God "the living substantial miracle" (p. 96); "admittedly there are times when prayer can do very little. . . ." (p. 211). Many would disagree with the advice for one "who is inwardly not at peace, or is troubled by religious problems" to leave the rosary alone. (p. 131)

Perhaps the value of this work is precisely that the author says enough to start the reader thinking and so applying for and to himself the obvious implications of prayer in practice. (Some of the remarks in this review are statements of such implications). To the sincere reader the book will present a challenge: a challenge of thought, for external goals are not man's

whole life; then a challenge of action, for the discipline of action is distinctly human; finally a challenge of courage in perseverance and the answer to that challenge is prayer in practice.

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The Philosophy of Science. Part One: Science in General. By P. HENRY VAN LAER in collaboration with Rev. HENRY J. KOREY, C. S. Sp. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University: Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series 6; 1956. Pp. 181. \$3.75 (cloth), \$3.00 (paper).

If anyone has any doubts that there is now, and always will be, a place for the solid textbook, he ought to read van Laer's *The Philosophy of Science*. This book is masterful for three reasons: 1) it is written directly from the sources, Aristotle and Aquinas, together with the major commentators on the latter; 2) it is, within the limits set by the title, comprehensive; 3) it is written with that clarity, objectivity and brevity which infuriates the intellectually flabby, but delights the intellectually disciplined—especially those conscious of the shortness of life, so that just “assists” as this book are needed to master efficiently one's intellectual heritage.

In ten chapters the author takes up successively the following topics: the various meanings of the term “science”; science as a system; abstraction in science; necessity in science; the object of science; the foundation of science; scientific methods; incomplete or scientific inductions; hypothesis and theory; demonstration in science. A second volume is promised which will take up the problem of the division of the sciences and the proper nature of the various groups of sciences (p. xiii)—a contemporary ordering, of Thomist inspiration, of human knowledge as a whole. Valuable as is this book, the second volume promises to be even more valuable.

Despite my deep appreciation of the brilliant way in which Prof. van Laer has summarized the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy of science, I have a few reservations about this book. 1) There is no serious reference here to the extensive work being done in the philosophy of science by that large group of philosophers known variously as “analytic,” or “logical empiricists,” or members of the “unity of science” movement. This is all the more surprising since Prof. van Laer has taken time to give thumb-nail sketches of all other philosophies of science, even of the pure nonsense named “occasionalism.” 2) A whole chapter—the second—is devoted to “Science as a System”; but there is no exploration of what a “system” is beyond saying that it must be a coherent whole of appropriately ordered

parts. (p. 8) This term has had peculiar significance since the famous Kierkegaard attack on Hegel, and I do not think it can be used in so cavalier, so unexamined, a manner as that in which van Laer uses it. I think van Laer is obligated to ask himself, "what, precisely, does a *system* mean?" 3) In the present volume, at least, the author gives no evidence of being conversant with intriguing suggestions made some years ago about a possible shift in the denotation of the terms "science" and "mathematics." It will be recalled that in his *The Degrees of Knowledge*, Jacques Maritain suggested that, with the exception of the biological sciences, the sciences of nature in our time are so mathematicized as to be formally mathematical, and only materially natural; that is, they pertain more to the second, than to the first degree of abstraction. Similarly in 1949, in the course of an article in *The New Scholasticism* ("The Nature of the Liberal Arts") Father Bernard Mullahy, C.S.C., suggested that the kind of thinking denominated "mathematics" in our time pertains to the Aristotelian category of "dialectic" rather than to the category "the second degree of abstraction." Now I am not sure that Prof. Maritain and Father Mullahy are correct, but their suggestions are too plausible to be ignored. 4) It is astonishing to read that: "On the third level of abstraction there is a gradational difference between pure metaphysics and the philosophy of nature." (p. 32) Throughout the book it is assumed that all speculative philosophy pertains to the third degree of abstraction, and that only the sciences, and not the philosophy, of nature pertain to the first degree of abstraction. 5) It is equally astonishing to read (p. 74) that the proofs for the existence of God are *deductive*, especially when one reads two pages later that these proofs are analytic rather than synthetic (p. 76); "analysis" having been earlier identified with *induction*. (p. 74) 6) There are a few quaint uses of the English language. For example, the author speaks of "the descent of Columbus" (p. 76) when he obviously means the voyage of Columbus.

The author confesses: "It goes without saying that this study is not original in all respects." (p. xvii) This is surely an understatement, for it would be difficult to name a single respect in which the book is original. Its very high merit lies, not in originality, but in the fidelity, lucidity and intelligence with which it communicates a notable philosophy of science.

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The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology. By STEPHAN STRASSER. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University, 1957. Pp. 249 with index and glossary. \$5.00 Bound (\$4.25 paper).

In this seventh study in the Duquesne Philosophical Series, the author, Dr. Strasser of the University "Carolus Magnus," Nymegen, Holland, sets out to determine the proper areas of investigation for philosophical and empirical psychology, propounding and defending in the course of his analysis the phenomenological method as the most effective and fruitful way of studying human nature rationally, and as the only way by which the domains of science and philosophy can be distinguished without being opposed.

The book opens with a discussion of the dichotomy presently existing between empirical and philosophical psychology, tracing the division back to the Cartesian notion of the soul, with its introduction of a dualism into the concept of human nature, and the subsequent development of this dualism into a triadism under the impact of the Kantian critique. To overcome the divisions thus inserted into the notion of human nature—which divisions seem so much at variance with our ordinary experience of personal unity—a new philosophical approach is needed: phenomenology supplies it. This ontological method uncovers the "primordial ego," the "I which I simply am," the source of all my thought and action, and posits this ego as the undeniable core of human nature in reference to which all else can be determined and accurately and profoundly related as to the basic unity in which the various aspects of human multiplicity can be integrated. This originating ego is held to be nothing other than the spiritual soul.

The second and major portion of the book develops the basic relations of this primordial ego to the rest of the parts, functions and objects of man. The epistemological conclusion is that philosophical psychology studies this primordial ego, this soul, this spiritual being, while empirical psychology devotes itself to that which is outside the ego, to the besouled, to the forms in which the spiritual embodies and objectifies itself. A philosophical analysis of behaviorism is appended in this American edition.

The heart of Dr. Strasser's position is, of course, the establishment of the primordial ego by the method of phenomenology. He proceeds by distinguished *being* against *having*, and by concluding that all those parts of the human complex which can be said to be *had* are excluded from the primordial ego; what is left is what we *are* and constitutes this ego. His definition of *having*, based on a description by Gabriel Marcel, asserts that *having* embraces all those things which are in some way independent, exterior, objectivizable, disposable and dominable. Then he asserts that

we *have* our body and all our psychic operations, while we *are* our soul. In this procedure, however, it seems to me that there has been a certain confounding of methods and ideas. It seems that the author has taken a psychological fact—that the soul can and does know itself through and by the intellectual act—and has reduced the validity of a principle of Critica, namely, that the act of the intellect is *per se* ordained to truth, to this one instance. At the same time he has equated the content of this act with the metaphysical person, and proposed this person as the *primum cognitum* of philosophical science. It is well, of course, to emphasize and examine that perfect reflective act by which the soul returns completely upon itself, but the whole content of valid self-knowledge cannot be limited to that only which derives from this kind of reflection. Far less can a whole metaphysics be founded on so narrow a principle.

The author is rightly profoundly impressed with the certitude generated in the knowledge man has of his soul, which St. Thomas also calls man's certain knowledge. St. Thomas, however, did not constrict his thought within the limits of this certain knowledge which the soul achieves in reflection back to itself, but regarded more often and more insistently that other pole which generates certitude in philosophy, the reflection to the origin of the object of thought in the apprehension of the senses. In this approach there seems to be clarity and depth of thought without the loss of due certitude.

There are also other points in the author's analysis with which one might take issue—such concepts, for instance, as relative self-subsistence in material substances, of the limiting of philosophical psychology to the study of the spiritual soul alone. St. Thomas held that the tracts on the soul itself were only the beginning of psychology, which did not reach its perfection until the operation of the soul in the body was investigated, and in each species of living thing. In other discussions here and there also less depth and clarity seems to have been achieved than has been managed otherwise in the perennial philosophy. Nevertheless there is often a freshness of approach which succeeds in throwing new light on old ideas, in bringing forth aspects of problems which have been appreciated perhaps only implicitly before. The study is, in this sense, valuable and instructive, even if one does not agree with all its conclusions.

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Dynamics of World History. By CHRISTOPHER DAWSON. Edited by JOHN J. MULLOY. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1957. Pp. 487. \$6.00.

The able editor of this compilation and correlation of some basic views of the eminent modern historian, Christopher Dawson, has marshalled his material under a judicious title: *Dynamics of World History*. It would seem the choice of his term "dynamics" is a studious one, for it serves the reader as a bas-relief with which to compare Dawson's historical views, especially with the "dialectics" of Hegel, as found in the Marxian materialistic interpretation of world history, and the materialistic "challenge and response" theory of Arnold Toynbee.

The general purpose of the editor, as expressed in his introduction, is to call the attention of anthropologists and sociologists upon two Dawsonian well-springs: 1) a tracing of the historical development of Western culture, 2) an analysis of the causes of the contemporary crisis. These two main streams of Dawson's ideas course throughout four areas: 1) The Movement of World History, 2) The Dynamics of Culture, 3) The Evaluation and Criticism of Various Conceptions of World History, 4) The Meaning of Mankind's Religious Experience.

Within these four areas of Dawson's historical work, the editor organizes his volume under the two main sub-titles: 1) Towards a Sociology of History, 2) Conceptions of World History. He selects nineteen essays of Dawson to comprise the first part, assaying them to be illustrative of Dawson's contention that world history is based primarily upon sociological factors, which constitute the main dynamics of historical events and movements. The second part, consisting of twelve essays, presents Dawson's preoccupation in historical writing with sociological facts, rather than philosophical ideas. To quote the editor concerning this second part: "Only when a conception of history is based upon a regard for sociological facts can it avoid the explaining away of history which is the pitfall of the philosopher." (Introd., p. x)

In the opinion of this reviewer it is important for the general reader to note that the editor is intent upon placing an antropological-sociological, rather than a theological-philosophical, accent as a facade of the historical writing of Dawson. Thus, the approach to this selection from the work of Dawson is homocentric in three section of the first part: 1) The Sociological Foundations of History, 2) The Movement of World History, 3) Urbanism and the Organic Nature of Culture.

However, it must be noted that the editor does accord some attention in part one to such historical factors as cultures originating in and emanating from religions. Witness, for example, Prevision in Religion, in Section I; Stages in Mankind's Religious Experience, in Section II; and Catholicism

and the Bourgeois Mind, in Section III. Yet, such Theo- and Christocentric aspects of world history (much more than an undercurrent of thought in Dawson's historical contributions) seem to be kept somewhat in the background, in order to fix the attention of anthropologists and sociologists upon Dawson.

As a counter-balance to this penchant of Dawson's editor, it might be well to draw the attention of readers of this work to some statements of Dawson himself which are not included in the present volume.

Commenting upon cultures within civilizations in general, Dawson, in one of his major works, *Progress and Religion*, says:

. . . every living culture must possess some spiritual dynamic which provides the energy necessary for the sustained social effort which is civilization. Normally this dynamic is supplied by religion, but in exceptional circumstances the religious impulse may disguise itself under philosophical or political forms. (*Progress and Religion*, Sheed and Ward, New York: 1937, p. viii).

And again, in *Religion and the Modern State*, concerning the influence of the Church upon world history, he writes:

. . . [It] enters into every human culture without identifying itself with them. It inherits all the riches of the Gentiles, Greek philosophy, and Roman Law, Oriental mysticism and Western humanism, and incorporates them in its own tradition while preserving its spiritual identity and the transcendent authority of its supernatural mission. (*Religion and the Modern State*, Sheed and Ward, 1935, p. 150).

Such basic religious philosophy of Dawson as quoted above is brought into focus by the editor in Part II of this volume, "Conceptions of World History." In this part Dawson is shown as an historian with a profound knowledge of world history and more than a bowing acquaintance with philosophy and theology, from which emerges his own philosophy of history. Anyone reading the four essays in this section of Part II, must arrive at his convincing conclusion, viz., prehistoric periods of world civilization are all either directly or indirectly related to the genesis and aegis of Christianity before, during, or after the appearance on earth of the historical personage known as Jesus Christ. The intelligent reader, therefore, may well surmise that Dawson himself consciously subscribes to the transcendence of theological and philosophical dynamics of world history over temporal dynamics, ever mindful as a Catholic that history is His story!

The second section of Part II, "The Vision of the Historian," opens with an introductory essay entitled "The Problem of Metahistory." The term metahistory is claimed to be a new word applied to the writing of world history, yet in reality is an old ideology of technique in the field of historiography.

Metahistory, then, is a modern verbal coin, minted in the treasury of

supra-mundane truth in universal history. Such truth is kindred to that found by the process of human reasoning, within the metaphysics of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. Although Aristotle wrote on physics, he also wrote of ideas beyond the realm of the physical that have their validity from the reality as it is conceived by the mind of man; for example, the Aristotelian doctrine of essence and existence and of potency and act. Metahistorians adopt this method, this suprasensible avenue of thought soaring far beyond the pedestrian facts of history, in their approach to a philosophy of history where dates are of little significance and the rise and fall of nations and cultures are unimportant compared to the Cause and End of the whole business.

In so probing the depths and scaling the heights of human values in World civilization Mr. Dawson would have his friends and foes alike become aware that the problem of metahistory finds solutions only in transcendental reality. He would especially have the adversaries of metahistory (like the modern philosophers who oppose metaphysics) realize that metahistorians do not in the least evince symptoms of deranged minds, surcharged with chimeras and disordered imaginations rampant with hallucinations.

To substantiate his thesis for metahistory as the vision of the world historian, Dawson claims to be not only on the side of the angels, but likewise in the company of many non-angelic men. Among philosopher-historians who wrote in the metaphysical vein he mentions in passing: Montesquieu (1689-1755); Hume (1711-1776); Voltaire (1699-1778); Gibbon (1737-1794); Touqueville (1805-1859); Michelet (1797-1874); Carlyle (1795-1881); Von Ranke (1795-1886); Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889).

From this array of metahistorians Dawson quotes in particular Toqueville, author of the classic *Democracy in America*. From the preface of his work he would have the non-metahistorian note the following assertion:

It is not necessary that God Himself should speak in order to disclose to us the unquestionable signs of His will, we can discern them in the habitual course of nature, and in the invariable tendency of events. (cf. p. 293)

For the reader to understand, therefore, how Dawson evaluates in concluding essays historians such as St. Augustine, Edward Gibbon, Karl Marx, H. G. Wells, Oswald Spengler and Arnold Toynbee, the following conclusion to his essay, "The Problem of Metahistory," may prove valuable:

The academic historian is perfectly right in insisting on the importance of the techniques of historical criticism and research. But the mastery of these techniques will not produce great history, any more than a mastery of metrical technique will produce great poetry. For this something more is necessary—intuitive understanding, creative imagination, and finally a universal vision transcending the relative limitations of the particular field of historical study. The experience of the great his-

torians, such as Toqueville and Ranke leads me to believe that a universal meta-historical vision of this kind, partaking more of the nature of religious contemplation than of scientific generalization, lies very close to the source of creative powers. (p. 273)

The entire presentation of the thirty-one choice essays of Dawson is crowned by an excellent concluding essay contributed by the editor, entitled "Continuity and Development of Dawson's Thought." Herein are resums of Dawson's thought on the various phases of history of which he wrote.

In the opinion of this reviewer the present volume, or anthropolgy, of the works of Christopher Dawson, is well worth the attention of modern scholars and students of world history. It should be a basic collateral reading text on the library shelves of non-sectarian as well as Catholic colleges and universities. And in Catholic institutions the study of this book should be imperative, especially in these days when the most noted historians are pro-pagan and anti-Christian.

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